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FOREWORD
/
Manned Launch System (AMLS) Study, have been published to satisfy the
DRDs. The principle objective of the Task Assignment was to conduct a detailed
analysis to determine whether a fully-reusable two-stage manned launch system concept
can really achieve simpler operations with lower cost per flight at a low life cycle cost
(LCC). This vehicle system was designed for crew safety, simple operations, and high
operational utilization. The results of the AMLS reference system concept development
are documented in the following Rockwell Space Systems Division reports:
SSD91D0269 Study Groundrules (DRD 2)
SSD91D0674 Final Report (DRD 12)
SSD91D0675
SSD91D0676
SSD91D0677
SSD91D0678
SSD91D0679
SSD91D0271-1
SSD91D0271-2
SSD91D0271-3
Hardware/Software Design Description (DRD 3)
Acquisition Phase Definition (DRD 4)
Operations and Support Analysis (DRD 5)
Life Cycle Cost Analysis (DRD 7)
Technology Development Plan (DRD 8)
Subsystem Design and Analysis (DRD 10)
Operations and Support Analysis (DRD 10)
Technology/Acquisition/LCC (DRD 10)
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Space Shuttle was originally envisioned as a means of routine manned access to
low earth orbit at a relatively low cost. As the Shuttle program progressed, budgetary
pressures forced design compromises. Besides designing the system for payload delivery
performance, these compromises precluded the full realization of the original cost goals.
However, to continue to be the world's leader in space exploration and operations, space
transportation must become a relatively small and stable part of the NASA budget. This
would free funding for major new programs such as lunar and Mars exploration and
utilization.
In recent years, NASA and the Air Force have emphasized that low delivery costs are
necessary to accommodate the required national launch objectives of the future. Several
NASA studies, the joint NASA/DOD Space Transportation Architecture Studies (STAS),
and the Advanced Launch System (ALS) studies, showed the need for a multi-vehicle space
transportation system with designs driven by operational criteria. In addition, technology
advances were identified that are expected to make new system designs more operationally
efficient than current launch systems.
Two classes of vehicles, with some possible common elements, are emerging as the
leading candidates for the space transportation system fleet. One class is the unmanned
booster designed to carry over 50,000 pounds of bulk cargo, propellants, and large satellites
to orbit at a lower cost per pound than present launch systems. The second class consists of
smaller manned vehicles that carry personnel and/or priority cargo to and from orbit, or
perform on-orbit servicing and repair missions. These payloads could range up to the weight
and size of the Space Station logistics module while the passenger carrying capabilities could
be on the order of 4 to 10, depending on the mission requirements.
The AMLS, for the purposes of this study, is visualized in Figure 1-1 as an eventual
replacement for the Space Shuttle system. It will provide the same services as the Space
Shuttle system but avoids the problems of the Shuttle by incorporating lessons learned by.
capitalizing on an extensive
empirical database. After a
phasing in period, it will
provide much of the up-
cargo and personnel
transportation during its
period of operation,
complemented by the PLS
and NLS. Other
alternatives exist or may
exist to provide future
transportation, but they are
not a consideration for this
study.
Figure 1-1. AMLS is a Key Option for Future Space
Transportation Systems.
Theprincipalobjective of the Advanced Manned Launch System program, therefore,
is to provide a detailed analysis of these sortie-class vehicles to determine whether NASA-
developed concepts can really achieve simpler operations with lower cost per flight at an
affordable life cycle cost. Subordinate objectives include determining the ability to design
the system (vehicles, acquisition, and operations) for low cost operations while integrating
the interactive effect on the design, development, test, validation, and production costs.
This study translates these objectives, characteristics, and new recommendations
advanced by the study team into specific system design attributes and an identification of the
cost savings that might be realized if they were to be implemented.
The current Task Assignment focuses on the in-depth development and assessment of
a two-stage fully reusable launch vehicle with its supporting facilities and operating system
(Figure 1-2). The AMLS
vehicle concept was provided
by the NASA Langley
Research Center (I.aRC). Like
the prior study of the HL-20
lifting body Personnel Launch
System (PLS) concept, the
system will utilize cost-
effective, state-of-the-art
technologies existing at the
initiation of the DDT&E phase
(Phase C): FY 2000 in the case
of the AMLS. It is expected to
reach operational status in
2010 and will have a nominal
operating life time of thirty
years. Figure 1-2. Two-Stage Fully-Reusable Launch System.
The objectives of the AMLS Task Assignment are to design and quantify launch
vehicle systems and subsystems; to establish requirements for their reliability and
maintainability; to define operational approaches, and manufacturing and operational
facilities; and to develop a database for life cycle costing. Technology availability has been
assessed and development program plans and schedules for the critical technologies will be
developed.
This report documents the major activities leading from the design requirements
established by the operations and manufacturing functional areas that have led up to the
definition of the reference system design concept.
In this report, this unique approach to cost efficient operations of a large payload-
carrying reusable manned launch system. The report has been structured to cover each major
functional area separately. There is no "best" sequence for discussion, since each of the
major functional areas contributed equally and concurrently to the definition of the reference
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system,but the requirements of the operations and manufacturing functions strongly
influenced the ultimate design of the system. The flight system design is presented fast in
order to provide an enhanced understanding of what is being manufactured, validated,
operated, and maintained. The groundrules and system requirements were, of necessity,
defined early on to guide the initial development.
The study team for this Task Assignment is composed of the same Rockwell
organizations and most of the same personnel as participated in the earlier PLS Task
Assignments. The Rockwell Space Systems Division (SSD) in Downey is the lead
organization for the study and provides the major engineering, manufacturing, and
operations support for the study. Rockwell's KSC function provides launch site operations
support while our Space Operations Center provides mission planning and flight support.
Johnson Controls (formerly Pan Am World Services) provides critical support in two major
areas: airline operations concepts and KSC ground operations. The results of the team's
combined efforts are presented here and in a series of companion documents, References 1-1
to 1-6.
The basis for this approach to the AMLS study has been the same as for the earlier
PLS system design activities: cross-functional team emphasis on those features enhancing the
operation of the system as well as the fabrication of the system leading to lower life cycle
costs. These features have been incorporated into the design of the flight vehicles as well as
into the design of the operating system.
The following material presents an overview of the current def'mition of the reference
system as we have developed it from the baseline concept given to us at the outset of this
Task Assignment. We have incorporated several changes that we feel will enhance the
capability of the system to meet low LCC goals.
1.1 GROUNDRULES
The definition of the AMLS groundrules was completed during the initial phase of
the effort. These groundrules reflect the requirements of AMLS DRM- 1 and have been
developed from NASA-provided groundrule documents and from a review of applicable
study report documents. The reference mission (DRM-1) has the following principal
characteristics:
• Space Station Freedom cargo transport and crew rotation
• Destination: 220 nmi at 28 deg inclination
• 10 personnel (2 flight crew + 8 passengers)
• 40,000 pounds cargo and logistics up & down
• 15-ft diameter x 30-ft long payload bay
• 72-hour mission duration
• KSC is the primary launch & landing site
• Design shall not preclude other possible missions
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Table 1-1. Principal Groundmles.
• PROVIDES TRANSPORT TO SPACE STATION (DRM 1)
• 2 CREW, 8 PASSENGERS, AND
• 40,000 POUNDS PAYLOAD
• DRM 1 DOES NOT PRECLUDE OTHER MISSIONS
• BERTH AT STATION SHU'I-rLE NODE
• MODULARIZED PAYLOAD CONTAINMENT SYSTEM (PCS)
• BOTH STAGES FULLY REUSABLE
• LAND HORIZONTALLY AT KSC
• IOC 2010 - 2020
• TECHNOLOGY LEVEL 6 IN 2000
• ENHANCED LAUNCH PROBABILITY
• DEMONSTRATE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY, MAINTAINABILITY,
AND REPAIRABILITY
The principal groundrules
used to conduct the study are
presented in Thble 1-1. They have
been periodically updated during
the course of the study. The full
set consists of:
• General groundrules - used to
perform both the overall study
tasks and documentation
requirements
• Mission design groundrules --
used for mission planning
• Subsystem design groundrules
-- used for the AMLS system
design
• Operations and support
groundrules -- used for ground operations
• Payload containment system groundrules -- used to establish the approach to processing
payloads
.._i
1.2 PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS DRIVE SYSTEM DESIGN
The basic program has the principal objectives of achieving high levels of operational
efficiency at affordable life cycle costs while maintaining high operational utilization and
crew safety. These goals, summarized in Table 1-2, have driven the design of the Rockwell
AMLS concept from the outset. The system design reflects the operational goals through
design features that have been incorporated into the flight vehicle design concept. It also
provides features that facilitate manufacturing, operations, maintenance, and inspection and
overhaul.
The system concept developed for the AMLS reflects an integrated approach to the
design of the system. No single area (subsystems, design layout, manufacturing, nor
operations) dominated the design but rather all program requirements were addressed
concurrently in initiating the design activity.
k.._j
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Table 1-2. ProgramRequirementsandFeatures.
PROGRAM REQUIREMENT
CREW SAFETY
81MPLE OPERATIONS
HIGH OPERATIONAL UTILIZATION
LOW COST PER FUGHT & LOW LIFE
CYCLE COSTS
OPERATIONS & SUPPORT EFFICIENCY
ECONOMICALLY PRODUCIBLE
AMLS FEATURES i
PD ESCAPE SYSTEM
CREW MODULE INTEGRITY (WATER LANDING)
MULTIPLE INGRESS/EGRESS HATCHES
ANY RUNWAY
STANDARD MISSIONS S PROCEDURES
CREW FUOHT PROFICIENCY MAINTENANCE
COMMON DATA BASES
HIGH LEVEL OF AUTONOMY
MINIMUM TURNAROUND TIME
USE OF AIRLINE MAINTENANCE
PROCEDURES
MAINTENANCE SCHEDULING
SUBSYSTEMS DESIGNED FOR MINIMUM
MAINTENANCE
INSPECTIBILITY & ACCESSIBILITY TO SUBSYSTEMS
HIGH-RELIABILITY SUBSYSTEMS
COST-OPTIMIZED BUILD RATE
OESIGNEO FOR ACCESSIBILITY & MAINTAINABILITY
TRANSPORTABIUTY
BUILT-IN-TEST
AUTONOMOUS OPERATIONS
MANUFACTURING ACCESS
EXTERNAL SYSTEMS INSTALLATION
TPS INSTALLATION/REMOVAL
1.2.1 AMLS Launch Svstem General Arran_,ement
The Langley-developed AMLS flight system is a two-stage system utilizing all
LO2/LH2 propellants to minimize the handling of multiple propellants (Figure 1-3). All
engines on both stages fire at lift-off with propellant being transferred into the orbiter from
the booster during first stage operation. At separation, therefore, the orbiter has a full load of
propellants. There are five derivative SSME engines on each stage; the system can,
however, meet the mission success requirements with one engine out at lift-off on each stage.
Both stages normally return to the KSC launch site although the orbiter is capable of
returning to any major airfield within its 1100 nmi crossrange flight capability.
A unique feature of the system is the external payload canister concept. This
innovative concept reduces the complexity of the orbiter structural design by eliminating the
need to provide structural breaks for large payload bay doors. It also allows for future
payload bay expansion, a feature not found in concepts with internal payload bays.
The crew of two and eight passengers of the orbiter (the booster is unmanned) are
carded in an escape module during ascent and entry. This capsule provides assures crew
safety from on-pad aborts to in-flight emergencies. During on-orbit operations, the crew
"lives" in a workstation in the forward end of the payload canister. Rendezvous and berthing
operations to SSF are carded out from this workstation.
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Figure 1-3. AMLS Launch System General Arrangement.
The AMLS system is roughly comparable in size to the Shuttle launch system.
Figure 1-4 is presented to help the reader in visualizing the AMLS system, flight vehicles,
manufacturing processes, and maintenance facilities and processing in the ensuing
discussion. The principal differences are realized in the AMLS orbiter providing its own
propellant after booster separation and the AMLS booster utilizing a far less dense propellant
plus glide back aerodynamic surfaces.
The development of the
AMLS concept has benefited from
the combined experience of
Rockwell and subcontractor
participants. Given the broad
objectives on operational efficiency,
low life cycle costs, and crew
safety, features have been provided
enhancing accessibility for
maintenance,enablingeasy access
forinstallationofsubsystemsduring
manufacturing,simplewelds on FY
2000 material,transportabilityon
747-type aircraft, and subsystems
enhancing the ability for efficient
maintenance operations and Figure 1-4.
ai_ Auts
AMLS Is Comparable In Size to the STS.
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turnaround. A major contribution to this approach continues to be the adoption of aircraft
and airline approach to aircraft ceRification and flightworthiness: one-time certification and
constant maintenance of flightworthiness as compared to the Shuttle's full recertification for
each flight. The AMLS system has been designed to reflect this essential difference in
philosophy -- recognizing that this is a major cultural change from the way we do business
now.
• Performance trending
• Certified Airframe and Powerplant personnel
• Lifetime certification
• Operational environment
The design assures full interchangability of major components between vehicles to
reduce spares requirements and ease processing schedules, incorporates "smart structures"
systems for cryo tank leak and crack detection with means for internal inspection of tanks
and intertank areas, and the repairability of structures and tanks.
1,2,2 Design Features Of Vehicle Concepts
The final configuration reflects the results of system design effort for maintainability
and operability. We have incorporated a number of design features which contribute
significantly to the operation and maintenance of the system as ilh_strated in Figure 1-5.
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Figure 1-5. The Reference Configuration Reflects Results of System Design Effort for
Maintainability and Operability.
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These include:
The PCS includes only the actual payload bay and the PCS base fairing: the fairing can
be utilized by the user community for payload support equipment at their discretion as
long as the payload weight and CG limits are observed.
• SSF berthing mechanisms are located in the PCS forward fairing. They will utilize the
Shuttle/SSF interfaces existing during the Shutfle/AMLS parallel operations.
The on-orbit work stations and living quarters are located in the forward PCS fairing
combined with the SSF berthing system and payload bay access hatch. The tunnel area
provides communication between the crew escape module and the work station area.
An aerodynamic fairing will be used for ferry operations.
• All avionics systems in each stage are colocated on a platform that can be lowered to
ground level for ease of access during servicing.
The development of the AMLS concept has benefited from the combined experience
of our Rockwell and subcontractor participants. As a result, design legacies from these
programs have been incorporated into flight vehicles. Given the broad objectives on
operational efficiency, low life cycle costs, mission completion assurance, and crew safety,
features have been provided enhancing accessibility for maintenance, enabling easy access
for installation of subsystems during manufacturing, simple welds on conventional material,
transportability on conventional aircraft, and subsystems enhancing the ability for efficient
maintenance operations and turnaround.
A major contributor to this approach continues to be the use of aircraft and airline
approach to aircraft certification and flightworthiness: one-time certification and constant
maintenance of flightworthiness as compared to the Shuttle's full recertification for each
flight. We have designed the system to reflect this difference in philosophy -- recognizing
that this is a major cultural change from the way we do business now.
A major contribution from aircraft design practices is the need for inspection and
repair of the cryo tanks and main engines. Large access hatches are planned for the tank
domes to support insertion of space frames for inspection cameras and maintenance
personnel. Body panels surrounding the engine compartment are non-structural and are easy
to remove for access to the engines.
A full complement of subsystems has been defined for both the booster and the
orbiter. These have been selected from a range of candidate options on the basis that they
will provide the most cost-effective system when integrated. Some of the systems have been
selected, such as the MPS-SSME-derivative, since they will have a thirty-year operating
history plus periodic upgrading in the "normal" process of operation. Thus, we will be able
to take advantage of this operational history to plan and schedule routine maintenance and
minimize unscheduled and expensive servicing. Others, such as the avionics system
components, have been selected on a similar basis but more with respect to their millions of
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operating hours in commercial or military aircraft. Such systems have, and will continue to
have, a verified history of trouble-free operation. These will be "off-the-shelf" components
having an already-demonstrated lifetime of operational robustness and reliability, an
approach that, again, will go a long way to minimizing maintenance and operating costs.
1.3 OPERATIONAL SCENARIO
Operational benefits derive directly from design drivers that include accessibility,
maintainability, maintenance evaluation, health monitoring, and the use of built-in test
equipment. Ground, flight, and mission operations use standardized operations templates to
reduce support resources needed to prepare the vehicles for the next flight. On board health
monitoring during missions will provide a historical record that will be used to determine the
required maintenance activities, both planned and unplanned. Following aircraft-type
operational scenarios, only those systems requiring repair will be recertified -- other systems
will be maintained in a flightworthy state. The use of licensed A & P personnel will reduce
the number of skill mixes required, thus minimizing processing time and technician
requirements.
The data developed during this study period included:
• Ground operations scenarios, facility requirements, software analysis, search and rescue
analysis, processing timelines, manpower and associated staffing requirements, and GSE
definition
• Flight and mission operations, mission analyses, staffing requirements, mission
timelines, software analysis, and facility requirements
• Spare analysis, logistics sensitivity analysis, and logistics cost breakdown
v
Under the
operating scenario
developed (Figure 1-6),
the orbiter and booster
elements will arrive at the
launch site landing strip
from a returned mission
or from the manufacturer
on a carrier aircraft.
Elements returning from
a mission will be towed
on their landing gear to
the Horizontal Processing
Facility (HPF) processing
bays. Elements arriving
from the manufacturer
will be towed to the HPF
mating bays for removal Figure 1-6. Operations Scenario.
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from the carrier aircraft before they too are transferred to the processing bays.
Elements will undergo processing operations indicated by on-board health monitoring
flight data. After preparation for integration with the other AMLS elements, the elements
will be towed to either a mating bay or to a storage bay.
Integration of the AMLS vehicle will begin with the positioning of the transporter in
a mating bay. A booster element will be lifted and mated onto the transporter. Next, an
orbiter element will be positioned next to the boosterltransporter, lifted, and mated to both
the booster and the transporter. A PCS, which has undergone checkout and verification in
the PCS Processing Facility (PCSPF) will be lifted and mated to the orbiter. The PCS
mating operation is the final operation performed before the AMLS vehicle is transported to
the launch pad. This minimizes the time the payload can not be accessed.
The vehicle will be transported to the pad, where the supporting structure of the
transporter will be mated to the in-place erection mechanism. The mechanism will rotate the
vehicle to vertical and umbilical and interface connections will be made. The transporter
will be returned to its horizontal position and removed from the pad area. Operations at me
pad are minimal and include propellant loading, pyro arming, and crew ingress.
The new American Airlines Maintenance base under construction at Alliance Field,
Fort Worth (Figure 1-7) is representative of the type of conventional construction that we are
projecting for the AMLS maintenance base at KSC. The design is standardized and requires
little new development other than that required for the particular application. The main
building features a
totally unobstructed
working area with,
again, commercially
available workstand
designs that are easily
moveable to wherever
needed. The back
shops are close-in and
accessible during all
maintenance operations.
Figure 1-7. American Airlines Maintenance Facility Represents
the State-of-the-Art in Facility Design.
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1.4 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
In order to minimize development costs and risks, our principal technology
groundrule specifies that all technologies reflect a NASA Technology Level of 6 or better.
This implies that the individual components or brass-board models must have been tested in
a relevant environment. The groundrule further specifies that this technology level must
have been reached by the year 2000.
An extensive database of technology development requirements was reviewed. These
developments range from the NASA Space Technology Plan and the Air Force's Military
Space System Technology Plan to the National Launch System and the National
AeroSpaceplane (NASP). These resources, coupled with airline-oriented technologies
identified by Johnson Controls, have provided a comprehensive list of available and
emerging technologies that will either be available now, fully matured by 2000 in their
current development cycles, or whose development can be economically accelerated to reach
the required maturity levels with minimum risk.
It is recognized that not all of the technologies presented in Figure 1-8 have to be
fully matured at an early stage of the system development. Some are needed early on
because the system design in dependent on them, e.g., TPS and the primary structural
materials. Others can be brought into maturity later although at an increased technology
risk.
Applicable technologies where identified early in the study in order to identify to the
system developers just what technologies could be expected to be available in the reference
time frame. This time frame is centered on the FY 2000 technology readiness date
established for this study. Some technologies are currently state-of-the-art while others
require considerable acceleration in order to be available and fully matured by the time they
are required.
As in the case for the PLS, there axe no enabling technologies -- that is, there are no
"breakthroughs" required and the system could be developed with existing technologies with
enhancements. However, performance will be enhanced and operational costs will be
minimized by capitalizing on the advancing state of new and emerging technologies to make
it worthwhile from a LCC standpoint. 1
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Figure 1-8. Technology Options.
1.5 MASTER PROGRAM SCHEDULE
The Master Program Schedule (Figure 1-9) outlines the sequence of major events in
the development of the AMLS concept through to IOC. Major milestones beginning with
ATP for Phase B are shown. The manufacturing schedules include lead times for
procurement of material and vendor parts as well as in-house manufacturing and assembly,
test, and validation.
Structural and component tests will verify the design of those elements. The need for
a long term dynamic test program (test to failure) as conducted for aircraft is still being
evaluated; the low flight rates for these vehicles may preclude the need for such tests.
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Figure 1-9. Summary Master Program Schedule.
The approach and landing (ALT) flight test program includes full scale low speed
tests launched from a 747. These tests include unpowered approach and landing tests. These
tests are designed to verify the post-entry handling qualities, landing performance, and the
guidance and control and autoland systems. The orbital flight tests complete the flight test
series by verifying the overall operational capability of the full system over a wide range of
potential operating conditions.
1.6 SUMMARY
The AMLS, for the purposes of this study, is seen ag ,_ replacement for the Space
Shuttle system. After a phasing in period, it could provide much of the up and down-cargo
and personnel transportation during its period of operation, complemented by the PLS and
NLS. Other alternatives exist or may exist to provide future transportation, but they are not
a consideration for this study. The principal focus of this study has been on the development
of the operationally efficient AMLS system concept and the identification of technologies
that may be required for the system concept to realize its full potential in terms of LCC
effectiveness.
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This document reviews the achievements of our work under Task Assignment 3, the
Advanced Manned Launch Systeni. We present a detailed "snapshot" of the f'mal system
concept and the decisions we have made and their rationale.. The same (:ost-efficient
operational and design philosophy we used in the development of the PLS concept has been
employed here augmented by considerations harvested from the design and operation of very
large aircraft. We have incorporated an extension of aircraft methodologies to large reusable
aerospace systems into the system concept and, in the process, we have defined most
subsystems, manufacturing, and operational scenarios. The data we have developed has been
assembled into an electronic database in order to provide ready access to a multitude of data.
These files include mass property data, manufacturing methods and facilities, development
tests and facilities, test articles and facilities, and the technology status on each WBS
element.
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2.0 SYSTEM DESIGN PHILOSOPHY AND STUDY GROUNDRULES
This section documents the groundrules used throughout the study. They consist of
general groundrules used to perform both the overall study tasks and documentation
requirements specified by NASA, mission design groundrules for mission planning and
design, subsystem design groundrules for the AMLS system, and operations and support
groundrules for ground operations. These latter groundrules are program-level and project-
level requirements, from which lower level requirements are specified in a subsequent
requirements/allocation process. The payload containment system groundrules are included
to establish the AMLS Program approach to processing payloads.
2.1 STUDY GROUNDRULES DEFINITION
The following sections provide the study groundrules that form the basis for
performing the analytical and documentation activities for this study.
2.1.1 General Groundrules
The general study groundrules presented in Table 2-1 were derived from NASA
AMLS documentation, study Task Assignments 1 and 2, and groundrules presented at the
time of the Task 3 kick-off meeting on November 29, 1991. They hre distinguished from the
other groundrules in that these general groundrules are derived from the overall study
objectives and government direction on assumptions or methods used to conduct the study.
They establish the overall framework from which the Task Assignments are performed. On
the other hand, the design groundrules presented in Section 2.2 establish the top-level
requirements used in defining the AMLS operational system.
Six of the eight study groundrules were extracted from the AMLS
Groundrules Documentation, Reference 2-1, provided by NASA LaRC. Of these, the
In'st groundrule in Table 2-1 (specifying that the AMLS should be a low-cost,
operationally efficient system, with 30 year operational life) is derived from the
overall objective of the study. Design evaluations to be performed during the course
of the study are traceable to this groundrule. In addition to nominal life-cycle-cost
estimates over an agreed upon milestone and operational schedule, a cost risk
estimate is required along with cost/benefit analyses for each major technological and
process innovation to be incorporated later into the final preferred design. The latter
data provide the cost arguments for the innovations by providing the negative cost
impacts that could be felt by a nominal AMLS program if a particular innovation was
not incorporated.
Specification of the IOC goal enables the determination of the schedule for
important program milestones. It also has an indirect influence on the test program type
and duration which must be performed to demonstrate with a high confidence level
achievement of the maintainability and reliability goals. The ATP for Phase C/D which
corresponds to an 2010 or beyond IOC goal will be derived from the study based on a
development schedule which provides a low risk, low cost development program.
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Table2-1. AMLS StudyGeneral Groundrules
1. The AMLS is the manned replacemeiat for the Space Shuttle with an IOC date between 2010 to 2020. It
shall: t
o Demonstrate low life-cycle cost and low cost-per-flight.
o Be capable of safe and reliable vehicle operations.
o Incorporate the use of operationally efficaent systems.
o Be robust system with tunely response.
o Have an operational life of 30 years.
2. Only minimal moldline changes to the AMLS booster and orbiter moldline to improve the design or
increase the internal volume shall be incorporated.
3. All elements of AMLS shall be manrated according to the guidelines set forth in JSC-23211 "Guidelines
for Man-Rating Space Systems" with spacecraft systems designed for fail operational/fail safe operations.
4. The system design will accommodate DRM I. but it will not preclude other possible missions such as
satellite servicing and repair, delivery, rescue, etc.
5. The AMLS shall use proven state-of-art cost-effective technologies at NASA technology level 6 or better
and be available on a date consistent with the expected IOC date. Some system elements may have an
earlier IOC than the complete system.
6. AMLS system includes all flight hardware, ground and flight systems, facilities, and personnel.
7. The AMLS shall not produce any long lifetime orbital debris.
8. All unique AMLS facilities at the launch site are new.
9. All AMLS program data shall be presented in Standard English Units.
_=
The development of credible cost and schedule estimates ate necessary to provide
design and program decision information. Groundrule 4 def'mes that the prime mission will
be transportation of passengers and cargo to and from the Space Station. Alternate missions
capability for servicing, repair, on-orbit delivery and rescue will not be excluded by the
design.
Groundrule 2 provides that the overall AMLS booster and orbiter moldlines defined
by NASA will be retained as much as possible throughout this Task Assignment. Exceptions
to this are the potential to locally scale-up the geometry of the vehicle to increase the internal
volume capability or include TPS beyond the IML. Such geometry modifications, however,
shall have minimal affect on the existing aerodynamic/aerothermodynamic characteristics for
the AMLS vehicles.
Groundrule 3 addresses the fact that the AMLS vehicle is to be manned. This
requires that all elements be man-rated, affecting the design of all hardware of the system. It
requires that the hardware design has appropriate safety factors for adequate design margins,
high reliability, and minimal hazardous or highly toxic materials. It also requires quality
assurance methods, redundancy in critical systems, and a level of fault tolerance, specified as
fail-operational/fall-safe for the AMLS. This is required for crew safety, as specified in
applicable documents such as JSCM 8080 (Manned Spacecraft Design Criteria and
Standards), and JSC 17481A, Safety Requirement Document for JSC Space Shuttle Flight
Equipment.
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Therequiredtechnologylevel, Groundrule 5, helps determine the number of options
available to the subsystem designe_ when attempting to satisfy functional requirements
within cost and schedule risks constraints. The requirement for AMLS i_ NASA Technology
Level 6 or better to support the AMLS IOC date. This requires that the component or a
brass-board model has been tested in the relevant environment. As a point of comparison,
the following provides the definition for the various technology levels:
• Level 1
• Level 2
• Level 3
• Level 4
• Level 5
• Level 6
• Level 7
• Level 8
Basic principles observed and reported
Conceptual design formulated
Conceptual design test performed analytically or experimentally
Critical-function breadboard demonstration
Component or brass-board model tested in relevant environment
Prototype or brassboard model tested in relevant environment
Engineering model tested in space
Baselined into production design
Typically, the first three technology levels are considered technology development
while the fourth to seventh level are advanced development. Technology Level 8 is off-the-
shelf technology, which could be modified to satisfy unique design requirements.
Groundrule 7 was added to establish that the system shall not produce any orbital
debris. A growing concern for designers of spacecraft in low earth'orbit is the increasing
population of man-made debris in earth orbit. This debris ranges in size from small particles
to large upper stages and nonfunctioning satellites and is distributed nearly uniformly in
orbital inclination in low orbits (less than 250 NM). Concern stems from the significant
damage fact that even small particles can do to spacecraft. The probability of such impact
increases with the size and duration of a satellite in low earth orbit -- characteristics that
apply to Space Station. An effective way to prevent the increase of this population is to
design upper stages, spacecraft, and separation devices to preclude the generation of debris.
This is a policy that NASA has agreed to pursue.
All facilities at the launch site will new, Groundrule 8. No overlap with the Shuttle
facilities will be addressed in the current Task.
2.1.2 MIL-STD Tailorine
v
DRD's 3, 4, 5, and 6, presented in the study task statements, referenced specifications
to be applied when responding to the data request. A tailoring exercise was performed for
each referenced military specification. The results of these tailoring activities are presented
in Reference 2-5. When reviewing the application of the specifications to the requested data
within the DRD, it was understood that the specification tailoring establishes the
organizational content with which the DRD submittal will comply only for this pre-Phase A
study.
As a means to initiate the tailoring activity, DOD-HDBK-248A ("Guide for
Application and Tailoring of Requirements for Defense Material Acquisitions") was
reviewed. This document provided general guidelines and a suggested format to perform the
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tailoring exercise. In addition, Appendix B of R0ckweU's ALS Phase 1 System Design Data
Package, which provided specification review sheets from the ALS specification tailoring
exercise, was reviewed. Using these documents as guides, a-specificatioh tailoring template
was developed. Each task leader reviewed the appropriate specifications and recommended
modifications or deletions to specification paragraphs with an appropriate rationale.
Appendices within several specifications provided a guide to assist in the tailoring by
identifying the paragraphs that are appropriate for various program phases. Where these
inputs were available, they were used to justify appropriate paragraph deletions.
In compliance with DRD 3, specifications DoD-STD-100C and MIL-STD-490A
were reviewed and tailored. The results of this activity are summarized and presented in
Attachment 1 of Reference 2-5. The drawing practices defined in DoD-STD-100C are
adopted as specified, with the exception of the use of English units for the new AMLS
design. The CAD-produced drawings will use the Rockwell version of the various ANSI
Y14 drawing format conventions since it is part of the installed software package. These
variations are few and minor. The AMLS vehicle/subsystem description will follow MIL-
STD-490A, Type A (System/Segment Specification) except for sections pertaining to the
requirements of production and delivery of hardware. The paragraphs of the specification
MIL-STD-490A other than those relating to the characterization of the AMLS vehicle and
system will be top level in nature.
DRD 4 requests an Acquisition Plan which extends from cohcept development
through the operational phase of the AMLS program. Tailoring of the referenced
specifications will be an on-going process as part of refining the acquisition plan prior to the
initiation of the next AMLS program phase. Several of the referenced specifications such as
MIL-STD's-1547A, 1546A, 1540B, DoD-STD-167A, and MIL-Q-9858A are applicable to
hardware, and such, will be deferred until hardware procurement in program Phases B,
and/or C/D. Specifications which are applicable to a pre-Phase A type study with the
appropriate tailoring are those pertaining to program management, or system engineering,
such as MIL-STD-483A. The suggested tailoring of these specifications is presented in
Attachment 2 of Reference 2-5. In addition, a review of manufacturing oriented
specifications typically used at Rockwell resulted in the suggestion that MIL-STD-1528A
"Manufacturing Management Program" be included in the set of specifications used as a
guide for this study phase. A tailoring exercise was performed on this specification with the
results also presented in Attachment 2 of Reference 2-5.
Attachment 3 of Reference 2-5 provides the recommended tailoring of MIL-STD-
1388-1A (Logistics Support Analysis) to support DRD 5. The major change in the
documentation level reporting is Task 401. This task is normally not required during this
phase of a program; however, in-house military aircraft data and STS orbiter data will be
used as a point-of-departure to determine task requirements for the cost and operations
estimating activities. The remainder of the task definitions were chosen at the level that
would normally support a conceptual-development type of analysis. The MIL-HBK-
266(AS) requirements are addressed by the Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) activity
per MIL-STD-2173(AS), as modified in Attachment 4 of Reference 2-5. This activity is to
be closely coordinated between the logistics and reliability/maintainability organizations
during the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) process. RCM factors that drive operations
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support (MTBF, MTTR, and Availability) are tobe evaluated for each subsystem to
determine their impact on support and logistics and to identify trades that are required for
determination of optimum repair levels/procedures.
The reliability and maintainability standards were reviewed for this effort and are
also included in Attachment 4 of Reference 2-5. MIL-STD-1629A will be tailored to
include RCM as adopted by the airlines' Maintenance Steering Group (MSG). All references
to weapon system applications are deleted from this analysis. A Failure Modes and Effects
analysis (FMEA) will be performed on selected high maintenance system/subsystems
scheduled for investigation to a Phase B level. These specific systems/subsystem studies will
provide additional insight into the reliability, maintainability, and maintenance philosophies
being applied to the AMLS design process. Abbreviated Reliability Centered Maintenance
(RCM) shall also be the integration of design and maintainability engineering and the
development of design driven maintenance programs.
• MIL-STD-470A data will cover only those task numbers that apply to this preconcept
phase.
• MIL-STD-1543A will include most of the tasks that are evaluated at a Phase B level of
documentation.
• MIL-STD-785B will be selectively applied in most of the task_ (except where detailed
design data or plans are needed).
MIL-STD-2173 (AS) will support the RCM activity and also supports MIL-STD-
1629A. Only minor modification is required until Paragraph 4.2.2 where detailed
hardware and operations data would be needed. This standard will support MIL-HBK-
266(AS)-type activities.
2,1.3 Adoption of Airline Soecifications
During the pre-Phase A period, an Airline Transport Association (ATA) coding
system, ATA-100, was studied for possible tailoring to the AMLS systems and operations in
support of system design breakdown and WBS. This system will provide tracking capability
for schematics, maintenance manuals, maintenance specifications, part number system,
FMEA, MSG, procurement specifications, design specifications and technical
correspondence during the active life of the system.
Additional areas of review not applicable to pre-Phase A which would be included in
future program phases include Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) specifications. ARINC
provides standards for all major aircraft vendors line replaceable unit (LRU) venders and
airline engineering departments. These include design specifications for various types of
connectors,interface configurations, environmental requirements, and racking configurations.
Other areas of future study shall include application of ATA 300 to the AMLS. This
specification provides standards for the shipping, handling and storage of flight and GSE
hardware including standardization of containers.
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2.2 DESIGNGROUNDRULEDEFINITION
Designgroundrulesshown in subsections 2.2.1 through 2.2.4 establish the important
program- and project-level set of requirements for the requirement allocation process. Since
the AMLS Groundrules Document, LaRC Kickoff Meeting Briefings and Government
Furnished Data (References 2-1, 2-4, 2-6, and 2-7) provided by NASA established a
thorough listing of groundrules applicable to AMLS, the majority of recommended
groundrules in this section were extracted from these documents. The Payload Container
System (PCS) study final report, Reference 2-7, was reviewed to insure subsection 2.2.4 is
complete. Vol. X, Flight and Ground Systems Specification (Reference 2-2), and the
Shuttle-C Requirements Document (Reference 2-3), were also reviewed as a means to ensure
that a comprehensive set of groundrules is established.
Conclusions from prior applicable studies listed in Table 2-2 were also used, either to
recommend a new groundrule or to justify an existing one. Many of the reviewers selected
to perform this review task were either program managers or heavily involved with these
studies. Others are aware of study results as a means to stay abreast of developments in their
areas of expertise. The results of this study review activity indicate that the majority of
findings from prior studies support the AMLS groundrules presented in Reference 2-1. New
groundrules in this section that are traceable solely to results of prior studies are those
pertaining to adequate spares and airline-type operations.
As the WBS numbering system matures, these groundrules and the lower level
requirements will be correlated with the appropriate cell in the three- dimensional WBS
matrix proposed by NASA. This will permit tracing a change in a ground_rule (or lower level
requirement) to the set of WBS data templates (hence, cos0 that may be affected by this
change. PC-based system engineering tools, such as the commercial n4th Dimension"
program, are being evaluated as the method to store and manipulate requirements to support
the systems engineering activity. Once this tool is established, the groundrules shown in this
section will be entered as the top-level requirements.
When defining groundmles, a typical issue that must be addressed is whether a
groundrule is actually a lower level requirement. Since this is usually subjective, rationale is
provided to justify each proposed groundrule. The following paragraphs provide such
rationale for each proposed groundrule.
2.2.1 AMLS Mission Design Groundrules
The groundrules presented in Table 2-3 relate to the mission planning and design,
crew training, etc that is normally conducted at NASAJJSC.
Mission Definition. Specification of design reference missions _RMs) are
important to the design of the system, especially that of the flight vehicle, since they guide
the further definitions of many of the functional requirements. In particular, they guide the
sizing of the spacecraft power, propulsion, and life support systems and provide the basis for
the booster performance requirements. For this task, only DRM-1 is considered. This DRM
requires the AMLS to provide delivery of passengers and cargo to and from the Space
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Station. This alsoimpliesthattheorbiter designmust be compatible with Space Station
requirements. In addition, reference missions also serve as an operations baseline against
which the vehicle design can be measured. Implicit in the 7-2-hour miss/on duration of
DRM-1 is that 2 crew and 8 passengers will enter the SSF following docking and the orbiter
will operate autonomously requiring no support or services from the Space Station. Critical
systems functions which will allow the AMLS to remain functionally independent of SSF
will remain active during this docked phase. The 35 mandays capability incorporated in the
AMLS orbiter design shall not preclude alternate missions.
The booster will be unmanned, but recoverable, with the capability to return to a
horizontal landing at the launch site runway after separation from the orbiter.
Vertical Lift-Off. The booster and orbiter are design for vertical lift-off from the
launch pad.
Enhanced Launch Probability. The AMLS design will have sufficient margin to
allow launch during non-seasonal winds and marginal weather conditions that will still
support the return of the booster to the launch site runway. The system design will also
support night as well as day launch with capability to perform all abort modes, plus night
landing at the launch site runway.
Launch probability is dependent on AMLS design margins 5.rid launch site weather
statistics. By designing the flight vehicle to be able to launch under adverse weather
conditions (temperature, wind, and rain), its ability to meet target launch dates and launch
windows is significantly increased. An advantage of having the AMLS launch site at KSC is
that extensive weather statistics are available to establish accurate weather requirements.
This requirement will be an important design consideration for the design of the AMLS
flight control and guidance hardware and software. The ability to launch (and to recover,
following an abort) at night will also increase launch probability and will potentially reduce
the length of launch delays.
Autonomous Launch Azimuth. The on-board computers and navigation systems will
accommodate early or late launches and still optimize the ascent trajectory to obtain
maximum to-orbit weight performance.
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Table 2-2. Prior and On-going S_dies Reviewed to Assess AMLS Groundrules
NASA Shuttle II Study
i
NASA I_aRC AMLS Study
Advanced Manned launch System Study, PLS Tasks, September 11, 1990, Rockwell International.
Contract NAS 1-18975, NASAILaRC
Conceptual Design Study for a PLS, December 4, 1990, Boeing, Contract NAS9-18255, NASA/JSC
Shuttle Ground Operations Efficlencies/Technologies Study, March 21, 1989, Boeing, Contract NAS10-
11344, NASA/KSC
cOl_afionally-Efliclent Launch Site (OELS) Study Final Report (05-88-KSC.016), October, 1988, Vitro
orporation, Contract NAS 10-11436, NASA/KSC
Advanced launch Systems (ALS) Design Study, Phase 1 System Design Review (STS 88-0686), June
1988, Rockwell International, Contract FIM701-87-C-0139, AF/SD
Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) (STS 87-0532), November 16, 1987, Rockwell
International, Contract F04701-85-12-0158
NASA/JSC Design Goals and Technology Requirements for Future launch Systems Final Report (88-187),
April 19, 1988, Eagle Engineering/LEMSO, Contract NAS2-17900, NASA/JSC
Air Force Structural Definition Study, Contract F33615-87-C-3243, Rockwell International, 1987
National Aerospace Plane (NASP). Contract F33657-86-C-2127, AS/NASA Joint Project Office
Space Transportation Main and Booster Configuration Studies, Phase A, NASA/MSFC
Reducing launch Operations Costs (New Technologies and Practices) (OTA-TM-ISC-28), September
1988, Office of Technology Assessment
Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV), System Performance Requirement Document (SPRD), JSC 34000,
November 6, 1990
Advanced Manned Spaceflight Capability (AMSC) Technology Identification Study, AFWAL-TR-83-3055,
Rockwell International, Contract F33615-81-C-3033, June 1983, AFWAL
STS Evolution Study, July 1989, Rockwell International, Contract NAS9-14000, Schedule E, NASAJJSC
An Assessment of Alternate Thermal Protection System for the Space Shuttle Orbiter, STE 81-0549,
February 18, 1982, Rockwell International, Contract NAS 1-16302
NDV Space Transportation Comparison Study - Task 11, Rockwell International, Contract F33657-86-C-
2127, January 20,1989
Launch Operations Concerns and Operation Enhancing Technology (Propulsion), October 26, 1990, NASA
Project Office, MSFC, ALS 90-80
STEP Phase B Design Concept Review, July 9-13, 1990, Rockwell International, ALS90-53
Integrated Hydrogen/Oxygen Technology (IHOT) Applied to Auxiliary Propelsion Systems, September,
1990, Rockwell International, Contract NAS3-25641, NASA/LeRC
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Table 2-3. AMLS Mission Design Groundrules
1. The AMI_ shall be designed to accofiaplish DRM I as follows:
I
Orbimr
o Two crew and eight passengers to and from the Space Station at 220 NMI (262 NMI MAX) at 28.5 deg.
inclination.
o 72-hour mission duration with 12 hour for contingency (35 man-days)
o OMS Delta Vel. of 1350 FT/SEC for orbital maneuvers plus 40 fgsee reserve.
o RCS Delta Vel. of 150 FTISEC for attitude control plus 45 ft/sec reserve.
o Deliver and return a 15-ft diameter by 30-ft length payload, with max weight of 40,000 lbs.
B_ster
o Unmanned with glideback to hunch site runway. 1o RCS Delta Velocity of 40 Fr/SEC for attituae eontro plus 8 ft/s¢c reserve.
2. The orbiter and booster will be designed for vertical lift off.
3. The AMLS shall have an enhanced annual launch probability compared to STS due to weather constraints.
The AMI.,S vehicle shall also have night launch and landing capability.
4. The vehicle shall have autonomous variable launch azimuth capability to execute all acceptable launch-to-
insertion azimuths for KSC.
5. The AMLS orbiter shall be the active vehicle when docking with Space Station, but will also have the
provisions to allow berthing at a Space Station node using Space Station handling equipment. Both manual
and automated control capability will be provided for acuve docking. Minimal RCS plume impingement
and contamination effects on the Space Station or other orbiting element is required.
6. The vehicle shall have autonomous operations while docked to Space Station Freedom, requiring no
support or services.
_. In order to achieve Space Station crew rotation as specified in DRM-1, the
orbiter will be capable of docking to Space Station. This requires rendezvous maneuvering,
a docking mechanism compatible with Space Station and proximity operations. An
alternative to a hard-docking system is using a berthing technique with manipulator arms
providing the final closing maneuver. Since the AMLS will be manned as specified in
DRM-1, it is anticipated that the orbiter shall be capable of automatic or manual docking
with man in the loop. The orbiter will accomodate berthing with the Space Station handling
system. The orbiter proximity opeations control system will minimize the propelsion plume
impingement on the Space Station elements.
Autonomous O_rations. The AMLS will impose no additional subsystem loads on
the Space Station except for support of the transferred crew and cargo transfer and berthing
to the required node.
2.2.2 AMLS Subsystem Design Groundrules
The groundrules in this section, Table 2-4, address the configuration of the subsystem
design.
Autonomous Vehicle O_rgtions. The ability of the AMLS vehicle to perform
autonomously (i.e., independently) from ground mission control has significant implications
for the design and operations of several AMLS functional areas and vehicle subsystems such
as GN&C, data processing, and health monitoring. Synergy exists with the capability and
reduced ground check-out during vehicle processing due to having on-board fault detection
and isolation at the component level.
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Table 2-4. AMLS Subsystem Des!gn Groundrules
1. Thfle AMLS vehicle . desi_n.s .hgll have autonomous operations from.pre-launch through landing within the limits
o program constraints. MlSStOn sequences snail ne automatea wire _rew take-over,capability.
2. iAoirCraft-like subsystem.desig_a, at_proa.ches _d meth.odologies shall be applied where possible to insure efficient
ong term operauons. _ne vemcle oes_gns wm prowoe easy access lor maintenance and inspections.
3. Where on-the-pad emergencies dictate rapid, but orderly evacuation of the AMLS vehicle, the vehicle and
ground s_ facility desiljn shall allow emergency egress of all crew and passengers to a safe area in a
maximum of mree minutes from notification.
4. ThenLA_on.S _ have.continuous esca.pe/abort capability from .the .time of crew access arm retraction through
t:.on_lt o_. mUon, and following .entq, where a safe uttlm_at!._on of .the crew escape system is available.
,,uter retort, me _at,_ system man prowae tor intact recovery ot the vehicle and crew under the widest
possible range of failure scenarios.
5. AMLS elements with return-to-launch-site (RTLS) capabilities shall provide for depletion of onboard propellants
prior to an intact landing.
6. R .e_. very systems on the crew module shall engage automatically to provide a safe environment for the crew
_a_t_rescue. Th.ee_ress .hatch s_lll be orien .t_. above _e water line for w.ater.recovery and accessible for land
rang. in e _ orD1._..aeslgn sn.at! _'oyme for qmck crew egress followmg an abort autonomous of ground
crew support. Inls capat_mty snail exast for l_oth mght and day, and in all weather conditions.
7. The escape and water impact accelerations on the crew following ascent escape will not exceed the following
values:
X (g's) Y (g's) Z (g's)
Escape 8 .
Water Impact 15 10 5
8. The orbiter accelerations shall not exceed the following values:
Ascent
Entry
Landing
Landin_ fEmergency)
X (g's) Y tic's) Z (_'s)
4 4 .0.5
<2 1 0.5
1.8 1.5 4.2
4.5 1.5 4.5
The product of load factor and time shall not be detrimental to deconditioned SSF personnel.
The emergency landing conditions are the extreme contingence case.
9. The AMLS orbit___all have alan. ding crossrange capability of at least 1100 NMI. All elements will be able to
_n_i.Onn an 11,000 It longrunway m dayh'_h .t or at night using available landing system such as MLS (microwave
in wing sys__m e_;) _ omer_ extt_nal LiN&C assets...All etements .shall.have _e capability of erosswind landings
u,_at an augte ot up to yu eegrees n'om me tanomgs pare ax_s aria at 25 knots veloctty.
10. The system design will allow a single main engine failure, that shut-down safely, on each flight element and
still satisfy the mission requirements.
11. A common propellant will be used for all AMLS propulsion systems.
12. The AMLS orbiter shall have an airlock system for on-orbit crew transfer to and from an unpressurized payload
bay (EVA), to and from the Space Station and for space rescue. The airlock and tunnel hatch configuration will
msure the return of all crewmen to the crew module under all failure scenarios.
13. EVA provisions for two trained crewmen shall be provided and personnel rescue systems for on-orbit survival
and intercraft Iransfer for all other personnel.
14. The AMLS crew module internal volume shall accommodate all flight personnel (5 to 95 percentile) wearing
partial pressure suits.
15. The AMLS spacecraft manned area shall have a 10 to 15 PSI N2/O2 amaosphere. The crew module shall be
capable of _o_.o.p_._es and two re.__ssurizations per mission. .-__,
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Although the vehicle is capable of automatic operation throughout all mission flight
phases, the ability of the flight cre_v to command and monitor automatic mission sequences
and to take over active control wilt be provided. Automated. mission sequences which will
have crew monitoring and take-over capability are pre-launch, launch to the desired orbit,
abort, performing necessary on-orbit maneuvers including docking with the SSF, executing
the de-orbit bum, entry, and approach and landing at the selected landing site.
Vehicles Designed For Ease Of Maintenance. Designing for ease of maintenance
reduces turnaround time and launch delays due to equipment failures. This requirement
affects the design of all vehicle subsystems by ensuring that they are easily accessible and
repairable. This will result in the use of built-in test equipment, modular subsystem
components, low-maintenance TPS, and the elimination of hydraulics and APU's. This
requirement also has implications for the allocation of mean time before failure and mean
time to repair.
Ouick Crew Egress. A lesson learned from the Apollo program is the importance of
a manned spacecraft to provide quick egress of flight personnel on the launch pad and
following landing. This is especially true for aborts in which conditions may exist where
egress is critical for flight personnel survival. This is an important consideration in the
orbiter design (specifically hatch size and location) and has obvious safety implications.
Continuous Abort Capability. A significant flight crew saf6ty issue is the ability of a
manned flight vehicle to safely perform aborts. The requirement for continuous abort
capability maximizes the probability of safe crew return. This will necessitate the capability
for on-the-pad aborts. This groundrule has a direct impact on the design of the abort and
recovery subsystems hardware and software and the ground recovery operations.
Detflete Prot_ellent For RTLS Abort. The orbiter will be designed for landing with
maximum payload weight, 30,000 pounds plus passengers and crew, and empty propellent
tanks. During an Return-to-Launch-Site (RTLS) abort, the booster and orbiter design must
incorporate means to deplete the main engine fuel prior to approach and landing at the
launch site landing strip.
Recovery Systems. The safe recovery of the orbiter and flight personnel following
nominal and aborted missions is an important consideration for the design of the orbiter and
recovery operations. To ensure that this is accomplished, this capability must be provided
for land and water, day and night, and a wide range of weather conditions. The ability to
automatically engage appropriate recovery systems on the AMLS such as location beacons
and stabilization devices enhances crew safety, especially following an abort or landing at a
remote site. The stabilization floatation devices must be sufficient to expose an access hatch
following water impact.
Vehicle Accelerations. The maximum accelerations during operations are significant
factor in the vehicle structural design. The structural margins will support the launch during
non-nominal wind conditions without impacting the design or mission planning. The
maximum values for ascent are consistent with the Space Shuttle design and would be
controlled by throttling the main engines during the ascent period.
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Crew Accelerations. The faaximum accelerations and exposure times to accelerations
are important considerations for crew safety. Nominal mission entry and landing phases were
chosen to be acceptable for deconditioned crew personnel, Reference 8. The peak values for
launch escape and water impacts, both of which would be encountered only during aborts,
are of very short duration and will most likely never be subjected to de,conditioned crew
personnel. The crew compartment separated with the crew will be designed to withstand
these G levels.
Landing Capability. The requirements for landing capability are important to both
flight vehicle design and landing site characteristics. Specification of cross-range capability
provides the lift-to-drag ratio required by the orbiter and figures in the availability of a
particular landing site during any given period. This availability is an important factor when
satisfying an abort-from-orbit requirement.
The runway length required for safe landing at alternate landing sites is an important
consideration for emergency conditions. The use of existing landing aids which should
reduce DDT&E and operational costs, is important to the design of the on-board landing
system, and should increase the number of acceptable landing sites.
Ascent Main Engine Failures. The system design will allow continuation of the
nominal mission if an engine on both the booster and orbiter shut down safety during ascent.
The performance margin will greatly enhance the crew, vehicle, and mission safety margin.
Common Propellants. The propulsion systems, main engine, OMS and RCS will use
a common propellants. The AMLS propulsion system design and ground servicing
operations will benefit from this groundrule.
_I]_.Ai£1._k. The orbiter will have an airlock to allow shirt sleeve transfer of
passengers to the Space Station and allow EVA into the payload bay. The combination of
the airlock and hatches will always allow the transfer of all personnel to the crew module in
an emergency situation.
FNA Provisions. The orbiter will contain provisions for two crew to go EVA and
enough personnel rescue systems to allow transfer of the remaining crew and passengers
through space to another vehicle.
Crew Work Area. This requirement sizes the interior of the crew module. Since all
flight personnel will wear partial pressure suits during the ascent flight phase in case of cabin
depressurization, it is necessary to allow sufficient space to accommodate them. The
specification for 5 to 95 percentile personnel sizes has been derived from Space Station
requirements and has been used previously in other manned vehicle design studies.
Manned/Cabin Atmost_here. This requirement addresses the need for the life support
of the flight personnel. The capability to purge and repressurize will allow contingency
repressurization and multiple on-orbit EVA's, if they should become a design requirement.
26
This will also provide cabin repressurization for a time criltical about in the case of a cabin
leak.
t
2,2,3 AMLS Operations and Support Groundrules
The groundrules presented in Table 2-5 address the configuration of the ground
operations and logistic support system the should be in place to support the program.
Table 2-5. AMLS Operations and Support Groundrules.
1. After becoming operational, the AMLS shall use _t-like techniques and methodologies where
appropriate with a progressive program of scheduled hardware and software maintenance activities.
2. The AMLS spacecraft shall be designed for ease of access for maintenance and inspections.
3. System sensitivities to fluid consumables loading should be minimized. The number of different types of
and use of highly toxic or corrosive fluids in the vehicle shall be minimized or eliminated. The use of
pyrotechnics in all vehicle elements shall be minimized or eliminated.
4. There shall be adequate spares, with a probability of sufficiency of 0.95, to avoid cannibalizing. Initial
orbiter and booster procurement shall accommodate attrition of either vehicle.
5. The cleanliness levels within the AMLS crew module shall comply with Space Station Environmental
Requirements.
6. KSC is primary launch and landing site. Landing sites at other than the primary site shall exist for the
purposes of flight safety and other contingencies.
7. The AMLS spacecraft shall be capable of being ferried by Land, Sea, and Air using existing commercial
or l_overnment translmn systems with minimum specialized GSE.
Efficient _Operations. Advanced launch system operational approaches are required
to ensure efficient and thus low cost AMLS operation. One such operational approach which
offers promise is applying, where appropriate, methodologies and techniques from the airline
industry to AMLS ground processing. With this approach, routine verification will be
replaced by hardware and software performance trend analysis and monitoring.
_. The subsystem design must support ease of access by the ground
personnel that permit multiple maintenance technicians to work at one time. The design
should also allow LRU removal without disturbing any other system element or interface.
All inspection access requirements should be of a simple and reusable design and have a time
limit established and verification performed to assure it was satisfied by the final design.
Minimal Fluid Servicitlg. Fluids that are not toxic or corrosive are favored for use, as
well as single simple interface for servicing for each type of fluid. Also, the number of
different fluids should be minimized to allow a small number of support equipment needed
by the ground.
Adequate Spares. An important lesson learned from the Space Shuttle program is the
importance of logistics, especially with regard to the timely adequacy of spares for all
vehicle systems. By having adequate spares to avoid the necessity of cannibalizing another
flight vehicle for replacement parts, the AMLS program can significantly reduce the chances
of having "hanger queens" and can increase the chances of retaining a full fleet of
operational and flight-ready vehicles.
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Crew Area Cleanliness. As a consequence of the AMLS docking with the Space
Station as defined in DRM- 1, it is important that the orbiter comply witt{ Space Station
environmental requirements. This requirement affects prelaunch operations in terms of
accessibility to the crew module and design of the crew access arm.
STS payload processing is accomplished in a Class-100,000 clean room. These clean
room requirements will impact the PCS processing cost, both at the payload builder and
integrator. This is due to additional cleanliness provision and procedures required in the
processing buildings.
Launch and Landing Sites. The identification of launch sites determines the range of
orbital inclinations, which directly affects launch vehicle performance requirements and
orbiter injected weight, and is a significant factor in specifying logistic requirements.
Landing of the vehicle at a site other than the launch site will require special logistic support
to return the vehicle to the launch site.
Ferry_ Capability. Since the AMLS orbiter is the only reusable element of the AMLS
system that will land at other runway sites, its ability to be ferried easily is an important
factor to providing rapid turnaround capability. Ferry for both the booster and orbiter from
the prime contractor should also be provided by the program. By specifying that existing
transports are used with a minimum of specialized GSE, the AMLS vehicle turnaround time
should be minimized. It also reduces the amount of AMLS-unique ground support required
for turnaround operations, which again decreases operating costs.
2.2.4 AMLS Payload Containment System (PCS) Groundrules
The groundrules presented in Table 2-6 address the method in which payloads will be
handled by the AMLS program.
Table 2-6. AMLS Payload Containment System Groundrules.
1. Modularized payload containment system (PCS) shall be used to facilitate off line processing of payloads.
Customized PCS for alternate DRM's are desirable.
2. PCS shall allow for a high degree of payload manifesting capability. Numerous discrete attacl_nent points shall be
provided within the PCS for payload installations.
3. AMLS orbiter shall provide safety status monitoring of payload functions. This will include the ability to direct and
relay telemetry and command with attached and released payloads. The PCS shall independently monitor the safety
status of attached payloads and be able to shut down and make all payload systems safe.
4. Standardized power and environment levels shall be supplied payloads by the AMLS orbiter through a standardized
interface camcept to the PCS. Power and environment in excess of standard values shall be provided by and charged
to the payload.
5. AMLS and PCS design shall allow for late payload access for minimal service at the launch pad, such as fluids,
batteries, gases, and insertion of biological elements. Payload access at the pad will not be pan of the nominal flow,
but will be available as a payload option.
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Payload Containment System. The mission payload will be integrated into the PCS
off line. Thus the serial impact on "the Orbiter and Booster processing will not be hindered
by the payload requirements, except to mate and verify the PCS interfaces during preparation
for booster/orbiter stacking.
]_,$_]_,,IdbJJJ_. The design of the PCS should allow the ultimate of flexibility for
the payload builder and the program to configure unique PCS's for rescue, on-orbit servicing,
delivery, payload specific misssion, etc.
Monitoring and Statusing of Payloads. The PCS interface with the orbiter will allow
safety monitoring of the status of the payloads in the PCS, as well as providing bent pipe
communication of the payload with its ground system. The PCS shall incorporate the ability
to safe all payloads automatically, independently, or with crew action.
Standardized Interface_. The orbiter will provide a standard interface with the PCS,
power, cooling, date, etc. The PCS will integrate the payloads to share this interface or use a
dedicated portion. Any requirements for additional power or environmental control of the of
the payload will be provided in the PCS for the payload as an optional service.
Access of Payload on The Pad. The AMLS orbiter/PCS will be designed to allow
payload access in the horizontal and vertical. The late access by the Payload will not be
considered a nominal operation, but will be made available under the right set of
circumstances as a payload option and cost.
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3.0 HARDWARE/SOFTWARE DESIGN DESCRIPTION
This section documents the design and analysis work. performed to initially select
concepts for structures and TPS, mechanical systems, launch escape system, payload
containment system, electrical power system, environmental control and life support
system, MPS/OMS/RCS, and avionics areas. With the exception of the reliability and
maintainability area, design concepts are proposed to support possible trade studies
during the next phase of this contract. As such, these concepts represent a reasonable
beginning point for further analysis.
3.1 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES, AND MASS PROPERTIES
The general design features and the mass properties of major items in the orbiter
and booster are described below. No major changes were made to the shape of the
NASA LaRC-provided baseline configuration although each vehicle was
photographically scaled to allow for needed structural depth between the inner and outer
mold lines.
3.1.1 Orbiter
The major design features and overall dimensions of the AMLS orbiter are shown
in Figure 3-1. It accommodates a crew of two and eight passenger_ in the forward crew
compartment, which also serves as an escape module. The crew compartment is
connected to the workstation by a pressurized tunnel. The workstation contains crew
accommodations and an airlock for berthing to Space Station Freedom or access to the
Payload Containment System fPCS). The PCS is detachable for payload integration and
processing independent of the orbiter. The PCS usable internal dimensions are 30 ft.
long by 15 ft. in diameter. The maximum payload weight is 40,000 lbs.
Integral LH 2 and LO 2 tanks with internal insulation, aluminum lithium walls and
external metallic TPS comprise the majority of the body volume. Five modified SSMEs
provide vertical takeoff ascent thrust. OMS/RCS uses integrated hydrogen/oxygen
technology (IHOT) to provide on orbit/deorbit/descent maneuvering and control. The
orbiter performs an unpowered reentry to a horizontal landing. Wing elevons and a body
flap provide roill and pitch control while wing tip fins provide yaw control during the
atmospheric stage of reentry.
The initial design of the orbiter placed the crew accommodations in the transfer
tunnel. An evaluation of the concept revealed several problems with this approach which
would hamper the crew and increase the difficulty of maintenance. The transfer tunnel
has neither the size, shape, nor orientation to adequately meet the operational goals of the
AMLS program; its cross-section area is not well suited for accepting both a passageway
and required subsystems. Many existing NSTS components could be used on the AMLS
but would have to be redesigned or repackaged to fit the smaller volume of the transfer
tunnel. While all systems could be made to fit, the resulting passageway would be
difficult to traverse. The passageway would be even less acceptable on the ground
31
PI_C_DING PAGE BLAN}( I_,'f)T FILMED
_'_ 165 FT.
\
2 WHEEL NLG
53 FT.
2-4 WHEEL MLG
Figure 3-1. General Arrangement- Orbiter.
during servicing: workers would have to crawl through the tunnel which will be at an 11
degree angle. Also, no large tools or supplies could be brought inside.
A large workstation volume overcomes all of the problems encountered in the
transfer tunnel. The large volume provides easy passage and ample room for storage and
internal systems. The arrangement of floors and walls allows easier installation of
existing Shuttle hardware. Also, the floors in the workstation are level and workers can
stand erect during ground processing. All of these benefits simplify the ground
processing of the system.
The workstation is designed to use as much of the forward PCS fairing volume as
possible. The large workstation volume allows additional space to carry special cargo,
store extra food, or simply provide more space to accommodate higher levels of activity.
The workstation also accommodates an airlock which exits into the payload bay.
The shape of the workstation pressure shell will greatly impact its weighL If the
workstation consists of a single irregularly-shaped module, maximum use of available
volume is achieved. The drawback to this option is the module must be stronger (and
therefore heavier) to react internal pressure forces. Reducing the cabin pressure by 4 psi
to 6 psi while on-orbit would reduce this penalty. If the workstation is divided into
multiple modules, cylindrical and conic modules could be used to efficiently (low
weight) support the internal pressure. However, this approach does not effectively use
the available volume, see Figure 3-2. A compromise solution has been selected which
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placessleepstationsin the
transfer tunnel and uses a
structurally efficient single conic
module for the workstation itself.
By locating crew
accommodations equipment in
the aft flight deck area, the
forward crew cabin size can be
minimized to reduce the LES
requirements. Some subsystems,
consumables tankage, and sleep
stations are located along the
tunnel between the two areas, see
Figure 3-3. The crew stowage,
MULTIPLE
MODULES
SINGLE
MODULE
Figure 3-2. Various Workstation Designs are Viable.
additional sleep stations, galley, waste management system, etc., are located in the larger
aft volume.
Two options for SSF docking were considered. The f'trst is the current STS in-
bay berthing approach which requires a longer payload bay to allow room for the tunnel
and alrlock of the SSF-mating hardware. The alternate (and preferred) concept uses
ASTP-type docking interface at the top of the aft flight deck under'clamsheU doors. This
concept is believed to be less expensive, simpler and lighter. It is also compatible with
Soyuz hardware. Since the current in-bay mechanism is the only one approved for
current use at SSF, it was selected as the baseline approach.
CREW CABIN
CLAMSHELL _ DOCKING/WORK STATION
\
AIRLOCK _
PCS
Figure 3-3. Crew Accommodations, Docking and PCS Control are provided in Aft
Flight Deck.
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3.1.2 Launch Escaoe System (LES)
A groundrule is to provide a crew escape capability over as widela flight regime
as possible. To achieve this, a Launch Escape System (LES) is designed into the forward
crew module as shown in Figure 3-4. The system is available for use from the launch
pad through Mach 6 on ascent, fit is assumed that the vehicle will abort intact during the
descent flight phase.)
AFT HATCH
/ ""'FSL°,
Figure 3-4. LES Concept Enhances Crew Safety During AscenL
The LES vehicle is the forward crew cabin in which all ten personnel are seated
during all non-coast flight phases. The crew cabin is a cylindrical pressure vessel with an
aerodynamic nose cone. Separation from the tunnel occurs immediately aft of the aft
hatch in the crew cabin. The aft fairing structure which houses the parachutes and
flotation system also provides some aft aerodynamic surface area. To achieve passive
aerodynamic stability, a pair of trapezoidal fins are automatically deployed at LES
initiation.
Acceleration is provided by a pair of 1400-pound solid rocket motors installed in
a thrust structure in the nose of the LES vehicle. Using this tractor arrangement
simplifies the rocket control system by eliminating a complex TVC system and by
reducing the installation alignment requirements for the motors. The initial separation
from the orbiter is controlled by means of short guide rails.
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Figure 3-5. Booster General Arrangement.
The booster is an unmanned, fully reusable vehicle. Major design features and
overall dimensions of the AMLS booster are shown in Figure 3-5. Integral LO 2 and
LH 2 tanks with external insulation and aluminum-lithium walls comprise the majority of
the body volume. Five modified SSMEs provide vertical takeoff ascent thrust up to
staging at Mach 3. A reaction control system (RCS), employing integrated
hydrogen/oxygen technology, provides control authority during the booster's unpowered
return to the launch site, and lands horizontally. Wing elevons and a bodyflap provide
roll and pitch control, while wing tip fins provide yaw control during the return to the
launch site.
3.1.4 Mated Configuration
The orbiter is mated to the top of the booster while the vehicles are in a horizontal
position. The orbiter's weight is transferred via external structs to the ground transporter
which also supports the booster. The ground transporter also acts as a strongback for
erecting the vehicles to a vertical position at the launch pad. At the pad, the number of
umbilicals are minimized to reduce on-pad operations. Since the booster crossfeeds
propellant to the orbiter this same connection is used to load the orbiter propellant tanks,
thereby reducing the number of pad-to-vehicle fluid interfaces. Rise-off disconnects will
also be used to reduce pad operations. A minimal tower will be provided for crew
ingress/egress and minor payload access. All venting will be through pad interfaces.
Figure 3-6 shows the mated configuration on the launch pad.
35
3.1.5 Mass Prot_erties
AMLS parametric weight estimating relationships h_ve been developed, critiqued
and revised such that the weight data represents the construction, materials, systems, and
configuration of the orbiter and booster vehicle illustrated in this report. The template
used to complete and present the resulting weight and longitudinal centers of gravity is
the LaRC program CONSIZ. The data are presented in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 for the orbiter
and booster vehicles.
Orbiter. The exposed wing and tip fins have almost the same wing loading as the
STS orbiter (117psf vs. 119 psf) but is constructed of a high temperature capable metal
matrix composite (titanium aluminide) which obviates the need for upper surface thermal
protection. The structural unit weight is almost the same as the STS orbiter but the
average unit weight including the lower surface carbide TPS panels is 20% less than the
STS orbiter using aluminum- silicon tile TPS system.
The sides of the aluminum lithium (A1-Li) LH2 tank support the flight loads
between the organic composite (Gr/PEEK,Gr/Polyimid) nose and aft body.
Aerodynamic panels are also provided to cover the upper and lower tank open lobe areas.
The AI-Li tank weight is 15% less than the comparable STS El" aluminum tank but 15%
was added for stiffening and internal lobe tension ties, for an essentially unchanged unit
weight.
The use of organic composites for the remaining body sections reduced the unit
weight by 25% from the STS type aluminum structure. The lobed conical thrust
UMBILICALS MINIMIZED-
ORBITER FUELED TItROUGH BOOSTER
NO GROUND POWER CONNECTION
NO MAJOR TOWER/PAYLOAD
FACILITY ON PAD
RISE OFF DISCONNECTS
BOOSTER FlXl
HOLD DOWN STR
ORBITER MLP HOLD
DOWN STR
HYDRAULICALLY ADJ.
Figure 3-6. Mated Vehicle Configuration.
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structure was assumed to have a unit weight (weight-to-thrust) ratio similar to the STS
orbiter thrust structure.
1
The crew cabin was sized to hold two pilots and eight passengers for three days
and the equipment necessary to support the crew during an emergency escape rocket
sequence. See the crew escape capsule paragraph. The weight of the payload shroud,
access tunnel, and tunnel fairing were taken from LaRC data.
The thermal protection system utilizes advanced carbon-carbon (ACC) for the
nose and wing leading edges and carbon/silicon carbide panels on the lower body and
wing surfaces, three dimensional silicon fabric with Q-f'ller filled blankets (AFRSI or
TABI) on the sides and on top of the organic composite body structure. No protection is
required on the MMC wing upper surface.
Sealed multi-layer insulation (MLI) is installed inside the LO 2 and LH 2 tanks at
an average unit weight of 0.65 psf. The weight of the helium purge tank is based on the
STS He tanks and is 6 times the He contents weight for a titanium lined-Kevlar wrapped
high pressure tank. The internal thermal control system employs equipment cold plates,
a coolant loop, body mounted radiators and bulk insulation blankets to protect the
avionics and control equipment. The weight is estimated as a percentage of the avionics
equipment weight and a factor of the unpressurized body volume.
The nose and main landing gear were taken from the B-767 aircraft which has
about the same landing weight. The total weight is 3.6% of the landed weight. The
escape and recovery items belong to the crew escape capsule system which is discussed
below.
The main propulsion engine weight is based on the SSME. The system
components are based on the STS orbiter and ET systems. However, the STS hydraulic
TVC actuators are replaced with an equivalent electro-mechanical actuator and the heat
shield is made of protected GR/EP rather than the steel system of the STS orbiter. The
RCS and OMS systems use the Integrated Hydrogen/Oxygen Technology study
(Reference 3-1), system which employs a gaseous H2/02 RCS and pressure fed H2/02
OMS.
The electrical power generation system employs high-density fuel cells and a
LO2/LH 2 cryo tank system to supply the equipment power and a small battery to initiate
the escape capsule seperation and provide power during descent.
The aerodynamic surface actuators are electro-mechanical (as also are the main
engine TVC actuators). The unit weight was assumed to be the same as the STS orbiter
hydraulic actuators.
The avionics weight data was taken from the personnel launch system (PLS) data
(Ref.erence 3-2) and is about 25% of the STS orbiter system weight.
37
TheLaRCparametricdata for the environmental control system and the
personnel provisions were used unchanged.
i
The inert weight is the sum of all the above elements plus a 15% growth
contingency factor applied to all elements except the payload shroud and the fixed
landing gear weight.
The LaRC parametric data for the personnel residuals, reserves, OMS and RCS
propellants and payload was also used directly. The only "useful load" elements
modified were the subsystem residudal fluids which now include fuel cell reactants and
retained purge helium. The in-flight losses now include only consumed fuel cell
reactants and cooling water.
Crew Escape Capsule. This system is designed to contain 10 crew and land them
safely after an emergency escape from a faulty launch vehicle. The capsule is composed
of structure, TPS and the system elements that are installed inside the capsule and cannot
be left behind. Figure 3-4 illustrates the component elements, the recovery parachute
system, and the escape rocket system. All of these elements are included in the orbiter
weight data and are deliniated here for reference only.
Booster. The small value of the staging velocity and the light wing loading leads
to the selection of a heat-sink type vehicle, in which the return heat'is absorbed by the
vehicle and little external insulation is required.
The exposed wing (including the tip fins) have almost the same area as the STS
obiter. The wing loading, however, is about 33% less (80 psf vs 119 psf). The titanium
leading edges and the graphite polyimid acreage construction and the reduced wing
loading resuts in a 40% lighter unit weight than the STS orbiter aluminum construction
system.
The body is primarily constructed of sections of the LO 2 and LH 2 AI-Li tanks.
The shape and construction are similar to the STS ET. The AI-Li reduces the unit weight
by 15% but an additonal 15% was added to provide additional stiffness and reuseability
for a net constant unit weight. The Al-li intertank structure and Gr/Pi aft engine
compartment structure result in an average unit weight about 17.5% less than the STS
orbiter. The lobed conical thrust structure was assumed to have a unit weight ratio
similar to the orbiter vehicle and the STS orbiter.
External TPS consists only of spray-on-foams (SOFI) insulation at a unit weight
of 0.25 psf on the external tank surfaces to provide no ice build-up during ground hold.
The internal thermal control system is a passive bulk insulation blanket system (ie, TG-
5000) to protect the avionics and control equipment.
For cost containment purposes, the booster will use the same landing gear as the
orbiter, even though the booster is 1/2 the orbiter weight at landing. This results in a
gear weight/landed weight percentage of 7.1%.
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Themainpropulsionsysteha of the booster is almost the same as that of the
orbiter. The main difference is the use of a low expansion ratio nozzle. _This reduces the
weight and increases the sea level performance.
The RCS system is virtually the same as the orbiter system. No OMS system is
required on the booster.
The booster also utilizes a high density fuel cell system and cryotank system to
provide electrical power. The fuel cell weight is presented in the line rifled "batteries, SC
and gimbles", and the reactant dewars in the line rifled "batteries avionics".
Since the booster vehicle is about half the orbiter size, the electrical power
distribution and control and the aerosurface actuation system is also about half the orbiter
system weight.
The avionics system is an unmanned autonomous system that is very similar to
that of the orbiter with the display and control system for the crew removed.
The environmental control system needs only to control the heat load of electrical
and avionics equipment for a short time and the weight is about 12.5% of the orbiter
system weight.
The LaRC 15% growth margin was retained as reasonable, for a vehicle at this
level of description. As in the orbiter, the LaRC parametric data for the residuals,
reserves, and RCS propellant were used directly. The residuals now include only fuel
cell reactants and retained cooling water. The infight losses include only the consumed
reactants and cooling water.
In comparison to the orbiter, the booster entry weight is 51%, the ascent
propellant 83%, and the gross weight 76%. The mass fraction (propeUant/(inert and
propellant)) is 0.874 for the booster and 0.814 for the orbiter. The booster is then 37%
more efficient than the orbiter, or put the other way around, the penality of crew,
payload, and a high entry velocity is 58% more than a vehicle without those
requirements.
3.2 STRUCTURES AND TPS
The AMLS structural design was developed to identify basic requirements and
concepts. Structural concepts and materials were selected based on experience in aircraft
and spacecraft system design and operation, as well as on results of recent studies and
programs such as NASP, SSTO and PLS. The basic objective of this study was to
identify and recommend baseline concepts that promise high vehicle and system
performance at low development and operational risk.
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The approach was to select design concepts and materials that are known to
provide efficient, reliable structures. In general, conventional materials are used, but
some advanced materials that are expected to be developed and certified_in the next few
years are also indicated.
The LaRC baseline design was reviewed and a few material changes suggested to
enhance operability or producibility. A major point of internal discussion revolved about
the use of materials and construction processes not in common commercial use today
versus the stated program objective of stressing the importance of operability and
maintainability. The materials and processes chosen represent those which Rockwell
believes will result in the best possible compromise between increased operability,
structural efficiency, temperature capability, and required payload to orbit performance
given a technology maturation date of 2000. Structural materials have been selected
from the list in Table 3-1 to correspond with the maximum reuse temperatures shown
Some of the materials and concepts were selected because of their expected development
in other programs, such as NASP, in time to support the AMLS schedule. Should some
of the recommended materials and processes not mature adequately, and this program
alone can't be responsible for their maturation, then alternates have been identified with
some impact on payload performance. Material and process choices may also change
during the next phase, particularly for the orbiter, as the temperature profiles are ref'med
to reflect more than only the vehicle centerline and wing leading edges. Detailed
structural analysis being performed by NASA LaRC is also expected to result in
revisions to the proposed structural concepts.
The basic requirements for the AMLS structure are integrity, durability,
maintainability, fabricability, light weight, long life, and the design factor of safety.
Each of these items is discussed in the following paragraphs:
Structural integrity and durability are of primary concern. The structure must be
capable of supporting all design loads and thermal conditions for the design
lifetime while maintaining the required factors of safety.
Maintainability must be built in to the structural design. This includes accessibility
for inspection and repair, and structural concepts and materials that can be
efficiently and effectively repaired with minimal impact to operations.
Fabricability affects initial costs. Materials and structural concepts must consider
the ease and cost of fabrication. Accessibility for assembly and inspection must be
provided.
Minimizing dry weight is important, but is of lower priority compared with the
previously mentioned subjects. Long life must be butt into the structure by
selecting of operating stress levels to minimize fatigue effects, and in providing
durable structures that are not easily damaged by operational conditions or
inadvertent impacts or minor accidents.
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Table 3-1. Structural Materials.
ITRUCTURAL MATERIALS
• 2090 ALUMINUM-LITHIUM
= TITANIUM ALUMINIDE
1100 TITANIUM
GRAPHITE EPOXY
GRAPHITE PEEK
GRAPHITE BISMALEIMIDE
* GRAPHITE POLYIMIDE
* SELECTED MATERIALS
350 ° F
1300
1100
350
400
45O
55O
INSULATION MATERIALS
• SOFI 300 ° F
ROHACELL FOAM 400
KAPTON/AL FILM 350
HEAT SHIELD MATERIALS
• AFRSI 1500 ° F
TABI 1800
ACC 2700
* C/SiC 2800
A design factor of safety of 1.5 is used to provide for occasional overloads, for
degradation in structural properties over the lifetime of the system, for minor
design analysis inaccuracies, for minor accidental damage, and for other unforeseen
occurrences which may degrade the structure. A factor of 1.5 is commonly used
for military and commercial aircraft.
Z2,a_.B_.0..0._
As shown in Figure 3-7, the booster structure consists of two propellant tanks, an
intertank structure, a nose cap, aft structure that incorporates wing carry-through, thrust
structure interface, orbiter attachments, a wing and wing tip fins, landing gear supports,
insulation, and internal equipment supports.
Both propellant tanks are constructed of welded aluminum-lithium alloy. The
intertank structure is also made of aluminum-lithium alloy, for thermal compatibility
with the tanks. The wing is primarily graphite polyimide composite construction, while
the wing and tip fin leading edges and body nose cap are titanium, to withstand heating
and impact at these locations. The thrust structure is made of an aluminum-based
composite material to provide extra strength and stiffness. Removable non-structural
graphite composite panels cover the aft section to provide easy access to internal
subsystems.
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Figure 3-7. Booster Structure.
Booster design load factors were derived from study ground rules and are listed in
Table 3-2. Ascent load factors are the same for the booster and orbiter. Descent and
landing conditions were assumed to be the same as for the orbiter. Thrust values used
are for the SSME-derived engines as described in the NASA Baseline Vehicle
Description. Approximate temperature values were obtained from NASA thermal
analysis runs. These temperatures were used only to establish the suitability of proposed
material applications.
The booster propellant tanks, shown in Figure 3-8, are welded aluminum-lithium
alloy construction. Weldalite, 2090 and 8090 alloys are all weldable and are candidate
alloys. Basic construction is similar to the Shuttle external tank, with internal frames and
longitudinal stiffeners. The LO 2
tank contains slosh baffles, which
are mechanically attached to internal
structural frames. The welded tank
structure includes aluminum-lithium
attachment skirts, which provide
thermal strain isolation from
adjacent warmer structures.
A spray-on foam external
insulation, similar to that used on the
Shuttle external tank, is proposed for
the AMLS booster. This type of
Table 3-2. Booster Loads and Criteria.
Ifl 11MAI F I)FRI(,IN I O/I.I) FAC'I'OI1S
ASUI'N r DESCENT LANDING
N. - 4.5 Nx _ 0.75 N_ = 1.5
N v - 0.7 N r = 1.5 N r = 0.75
N, = 1.05 Nr = 3.75 Nt = 3.75
"rLIRUST
SEA LEVEL THRUST = 2,270,000 LB
ALTITUDE THRUST ffi 2,485,000 LB
TEMPERATURES
ASCENT - NOSE TEMPERATURE = 500°F
DESCENT - WING LEADING EDGE TEMP = 500 ° F
0.2 AFT ON BODY TEMP _ 400 ° F
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Figure 3-8. Booster LO2 and LH2 Tanks.
insulation is easily applied, inspected and repaired. Its durability in repeated use must be
established. Repeated filling of external tanks in Shuttle operations has not caused
extensive cracking of the insulation, although this also remains an item of concern which
will require further study. The external foam insulation may also provide thermal
protection for the tank structures, where it is required.
An alternate concept for cryogenic insulation has been under way at NASA LaRC
for several years. This concept employs internal closed-cell foam blocks which are
bonded to the interior of the tanks. The foam blocks are wrapped in an impervious film
wrapper such as aluminized kapton which facilitates sealing of the cracks between blocks
and minimizes seepage of hydrogen gas into the foam. This concept has the advantages
of leaving the external metal surface of the tank accessible for inspection, except in areas
where thermal protection is used, and of minimizing the thermal stresses in the metal
tank structure that are associated with large temperature excursions.
The intertank structure is attached directly to the aluminum-lithium tank
structure, and is fabricated from aluminum-lithium in order to minimize thermal strain
differences. The intertank structure includes internal frames and longitudinal stiffeners,
which are mechanically attached to the shell. The intertank includes two large access
doors which are used for access to the interior and for inspection of the tanks. Hard
points will be provided for attaching the inspection GSE and work platforms in order to
facilitate maintenance operations. The intertank structure also houses the nose landing
gear of the booster and supports the forward orbiter interface link.
The thrust structure supports the five booster engines on a D-shaped conical shell.
The conical shell transmits thrust loads efficiently to the outer tank shell. Aluminum-
silicon carbide, an advanced metal matrix composite material is proposed to provide
extra stiffness and strength to the thrust structure. Longitudinal stiffeners are
mechanically attached to the conical shell. An aluminum ring at the aft end provides a
standard interface for engines, feed line supports and actuators. The aft ring also
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supports the aft heat shield. An aluminum ring at the forward end interfaces with the
booster aft structure.
i
The aft structure provides the connection between the thrust structure and the
LH 2 tank. It also includes the wing carry-through structure, which must be designed to
allow the thrust structure to pass through it, and ties the wing to the body. The upper
part of the aft structure includes the orbiter interface fittings. This is a very heavily-
loaded structure, with loads and stresses in all directions. It is constructed of aluminum-
lithium alloy, with some aluminum-based metal matrix materials used in heavily-loaded
members. The wing carry-through structure is graphite polyimide, which is
mechanically attached to the aluminum-lithium frames and shell structure. The body flap
is also supported from this structure.
The aft portion of the vehicle, surrounding the thrust structure and propulsion
system, is made up primarily of removable non-structural panels. These panels are
supported from the aft primary structural frame and the aft heat shield, which is mounted
off the thrust structure. The non-structural panels are constructed of lightweight graphite
polyimide honeycomb sandwich, designed to resist aerodynamic and acoustic loads and
to transmit them to the supporting structural members. Edge seals, similar to the design
used on the Shuttle payload bay doors, will be used. No external TPS is required.
The booster wing is a graphite polyimide box beam with th/'ee spars, as shown in
Figure 3-9. The skins are honeycomb sandwich panels, mechanically attached to the
internal structure. The spars are solid laminates, with stiffeners co-cured with the spar
web to provide a reliable monolithic structural panel. The ribs are open trnss-plates
made of graphite polyimide laminates to provide an efficient load path while allowing
accessibility for inspection and maintenance. Accessibility is provided through access
doors in the upper surface structural panels.
The forward spar is attached to the LH 2 tank wall by vertical links. These links
take lift loads but permit the LH 2 tank to expand and contract without transmitting
longitudinal loads into the wing or
load back to the rigid attachment at
the aft stl'getu_. ROOTRIB--_
\
The wing tip fin
construction and materials are _N,/
similar to those used in the wing
tank. A root rib carries the drag _2 MAINSPARS
\\//|
structure. Control surface actuators
axe located aft of the rear spar for
accessibility. Movable control
surfaces may be constructed of
graphite bismaleimide if the 450 F
temperature limit of this material
can be assured. Graphite
FRONT SPAR
Figure 3-9. Booster Wing Structure.
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bismaleimideis easierto fabricatethangraphitepolyimideandwill beproposedfor use
throughout the structure where design temperatures permit. Full depth honeycomb is
used in thin composite trailing edge locations.
Predicted temperatures on the booster are 500 F or below, so that little thermal
protection will be required. The nose cap, at the forward end of the LO 2 tank, is a
titanium conical shell, which is resistant to bird and ice impact and will protect the tank
material from temperatures over 350 F during descent.
Temperatures on the external foam insulation may exceed its capability in limited
areas, and may be protected with an emissivity coating or ablator, as is done on the
Shuttle external tank. If an ablator is required, a material will be selected that can be
reused for several flights before refurbishment. This may require some material
development work to identify and evaluate candidate materials. If internal cryogenic
insulation is used, an external emissivity coating may be required to maintain aluminum
tank structural temperatures below 350 F during descent flight.
The graphite polyimide wing and tip fin structures will withstand extended
service at 500 F and require no external thermal protection.
3.,2,2__.Ozbil_
The orbiter structure consists of two propellant tanks, an intertank structure,
forward structure, a nose cap, aft structure that incorporates wing carry-through, thrust
structure interface, and orbiter attachments, a wing and wing tip fins, landing gear
supports, insulation, and internal equipment supports, as shown in Figure 3-10.
Both propellant tanks are of 2-lobe design with a central web, and are constructed
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External S,,ffene,._ _J
\ / _![
\ LI \ / oboco.T.s °o°0
"_!'_: 'i_"": "" a //
MLI Internal In,*ulallon _ _ _t _qL_ '_;)_ :' _" ..... ,J
ACe Nolle Cap "-/ _ --_'j_'_.__ "_,_"' ]_ Z.
/ / \,'.v ':'' \ I " ,,,,i,,viin,i _;,l,jth,,i I,,l_VJili,J,,
/ / \ ":.,.ii:.,'_l_.'.,,:_]_ _,,, ,.i,,i.,,
_ i ,Ther
L mlhll/ t-d
Figure 3-10 Orbiter Structure.
45
of welded aluminum-lithium alloy. The intenank structure is made of graphite-
reinforced thermoplastic. The wing is stiffened titanium aluminide construction, while
the wing and tip fin leading edges and body nose cap are ACC to withst_tnd heating and
impact at these locations. The thrust structure is made of an aluminum-based composite
material to provide extra strength and stiffness. Removable non-structural graphite
composite panels cover the aft section to provide easy access to internal subsystems.
Durable, hard surface thermal protection tiles are mechanically attached to the
lower portion of the tanks and wing. Upper surfaces, where temperatures are below 1800
F, are protected by flexible ceramic insulation blankets which are bonded to the structure.
Orbiter load factors, presented in Table 3-3, were derived from AMLS study
ground rules. Ascent load factors are the same for the booster and orbiter. Descent and
landing conditions apply to
the orbiter with propellant
tanks empty. Thrust values
used are for the SSME-
derived engines as described
in the NASA Baseline
Vehicle Description.
Approximate temperature
values were obtained from
NASA thermal analysis runs.
These temperatures were
used only to establish the
suitability of proposed
material applications.
Table 3-3 Orbiter Loads and Criteria.
ACCELERATIONS
ASCENT DESCENT LANDING
N x = 4.5 N x = 0.75 N x = 1.5
N v = 0.7 Ny = 1.5 Ny = 0.75
Nz = 1.05 N= = 3.75 Nz = 3.75
THRUST
SEA LEVEL THRUST = 2,092=500 LB
ALTITUDE THRUST = 2,567,500 LB
TEMPERATURES
ASCENT - NOSE TEMPEBATURE = 1000 ° F
DESCENT - WING LEADING EDGE TEMP = 2800 ° F
0.2 AFT ON BODY TEMP = 1800 ° F
WING UPPER SURFACE TEMP = 1000 ° F
The orbiter propellant
tanks, shown in Figure 3-11,
are welded aluminum-lithium alloy construction. Weldalite, 2090 and 8090 alloys are all
weldable and are candidate alloys. Both tanks are a 2-lobe design with a central web.
Tank ends are modified ellipsoidal shells, that also attach to the central web. Welded
attachment skirts provide thermal strain isolation from adjacent structures.
The tanks have internal frames for structural stability. Major frames at the ends, at the
beginning of the tapered section of the LH 2 tank and at external loading points, distribute
loads into the tank shell primary structure. The central web is a plate-girder construction,
with openings for propellant passage and for maintenance access. The web is
mechanically attached to the welded shell. An extruded or machined y-section longeron
is used at the joint between the shell and the web, and helps to introduce thrust loads into
the tanks. External stiffeners are used on the lower part of the LH 2 tank, for attachment
of the thermal protection panels. On the upper part, which uses bonded-on blankets, the
stiffeners are on the inside of the tank. Since the tank is made in sections and has a large
radius stiffener location should pose no manufacturability concern.
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Figure 3-11. Orbiter Propellant Tanks.
Internal multilayer insulation (MLI) is proposed for use in the orbiter. Using
internal insulation separates the functions of cryogenic insulation and TPS and allows
each to be designed and maintained separately. MLI was developed by Linde Corp. for
the Rockwell NASP design. This evacuated insulation is thermally efficient and takes up
little tank volume. MLI panels are bonded to the structure between frames and stiffeners,
and the joints are sealed using a thermoplastic or similar tape, which can be applied with
a heat gun or laser. MLI is not appropriate for insulating internal frames and stiffeners.
Formed foam blocks have been used in the Shuttle aft fuselage for insulating cryogenic
feed lines and could be used for covering tank frames and stiffeners. The blocks would
be wrapped in an aluminized kapton impervious wrapper to prevent propellant migration
into the insulation. Additional development is required to validate this concept.
The forward structure contains the forward RCS system, the nose landing gear
and supports the ACC nose cap. The nose cap is similar to the Shuttle orbiter nose cap.
This concept provides thermal protection and impact resistance from birds, ice, and rain.
The orbiter intertank structure joins the LH 2 and LO 2 tanks and supports the weight of
the LH 2 tank on the launch pad. This structure also includes the wing forward spar
beam, the upper payload carrier interface, and two large access doors for tank
maintenance. Both structures are made of graphite-reinforced PEEK thermoplastic, with
graphite PEEK internal frames, which are mechanically attached to the shell. Graphite
PEEK longitudinal stiffeners are bonded to the shell using secondary bonding. In the
lower portion of the structure, the stiffeners are external for attachment of thermal
protection panels. Because of the elevated temperature capability of the PEEK resin
(about 400F), reduced TPS thickness is possible in this area. Graphite PEEK is used for
the intertank on the orbiter because of its light weight and because the internal insulation
on the orbiter provides a warm tank surface for attachment.
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Theaft structureprovidestheconnectionbetweenthethruststructureand the
LO 2 tank. It also includes the wing carry-through structure and ties the wing to the
body. The lower part of the aft structure includes the booster interface fittings. The
upper pan of the aft structure supports the payload carrier. This is a very heavily-loaded
structure, with loads and stresses in all directions. It is constructed of aluminum-lithium
alloy, with some aluminum-based metal matrix materials used in heavily-loaded
members. The wing carry-through structure is titanium aluminide, which is
mechanically attached to the aluminum-lithium frames and shell structure. The body flap
is also supported from this structure.
The lobed conical thrust structure supports the horizontal engine arrangement,
three above and two below, and matches the shape of the LO 2 tank, see Figure 3-12.
The conical shell transmits thrust loads efficiently to the outer tank shell, directly aft of
the heavy LO 2 tank. Aluminum silicon carbide, advanced metal matrix composite, is
proposed in this application to provide extra stiffness and strength to the thrust structure.
Longitudinal stiffeners are mechanically attached to the conical shell. Tapered longerons
at the upper and lower center lines provide concentrated support for the center of the
LO 2 tank. An aluminum ring at the aft end provides a standard interface for engines,
feed line supports and actuators. The aft ring also supports the aft heat shield. An
aluminum ring at the forward end interfaces with the orbiter aft structure.
The aft portion of the vehicle, surrounding the thrust structtire and propulsion
system, is made up primarily of removable non-structural panels. These panels are
supported from the aft primary structural frame and the aft heat shield, which, in turn, is
mounted off the thrust structure. The non-structural panels are constructed of lightweight
graphite polyimide honeycomb sandwich, designed to resist aerodynamic and acoustic
loads and to transmit them to the supporting structural members. The panels and
surrounding structure are covered with AFRSI thermal protection blankets. Edge seals,
similar to the design used on the Shuttle payload bay doors, will be used.
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Figure 3-12. Orbiter Thrust Structure.
The orbiter wing is a
titanium aluminide box
beam with three spars. The
two rear spars carry the
wing bending through the
aft fuselage. The forward
spar is attached to the
intertank structure by
vertical links which take lift
loads and permit the LO 2
tank to contract without
transmitting longitudinal
loads into the wing. A root
rib carries the drag load
back to the rigid attachment
at the aft structure.
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Titanium aluminide is in development for propulsion applications and for the NASP
program. If it is not available to stipport the AMLS schedule, 1100 Titanium alloy can
be used, with a slight weight penalty.
The orbiter wing skins are titanium aluminide sheet material, stiffened by
super-plastically formed mechanically attached titanium aluminide stiffeners. The spars
are conventional sine-wave shear-resistant beams of titanium aluminide, welded to upper
and lower caps. Ribs are tubular trusses of titanium welded to titanium end fittings, and
mechanically attached to the spars and skin panel.
The upper surface of the wing is capable of withstanding temperatures of over
1000 F and is not covered by TPS. This offsets the weight penalty of using titanium
aluminide instead of a composite. The use of titanium aluminide and the resulting bare
upper surface also enhances accessibility to the wing interior. Access is provided
through doors in the upper surface structural panels. The lower surface is covered with
hard-surface thermal protection panels to be described later. These TPS panels are
mechanically attached to the wing structure. The TPS thickness will be sized to allow
the lower structure to operate as closely as possible to upper surface temperatures to
minimize thermal stresses. The wing leading edge is ACC, similar in concept to the
Shuttle leading edge structural subsystem.
The wing tip fin construction and materials are similar to thbse used in the wing
structure. Hard-surface and blanket TPS will be used on both surfaces of the tip fin as
required. Control surface actuators are located in an insulated area aft of the rear spar for
accessibility. Movable control surfaces may be constructed of ACC.
The hard-surface TPS panel concept proposed is based on the C-SiC material
developed by the French company SEP for use on the HERMES reentry vehicle. These
12" by 12" panels, shown in Figure 3-13, provide a strong outer surface of the vehicle,
and have excellent resistance to thermal and acoustic loads. Low-density layered
insulation is used inside the panels, and flow barriers are used next to the orbiter skin.
The mechanical attachments are buried in the gaps between tiles, and are covered with
gap f'fllers to keep the fastener temperatures low. This low temperature is a key to
removability and reusability of the TPS panels. SEP makes the following claims for the
C-SiC panel TPS concept:
• lower weight owing to the optimized weight of the internal insulation materials
• improved impact strength owing to the high specific properties of C-SiC
composites
• higher temperature limits capabilities
• maintainability due to mechanical attachment to the airframe.
The orbiter side and upper surfaces will be protected by flexible ceramic blanket
insulation similar to that used on the Shuttle orbiter. The most common material now in
use is Advanced Flexible Reusable Surface Insulation (AFRSI). These blankets are used
at temperatures up to 1500 F. A more recent development, Tailorable Blanket Insulation
49
/ {'/SIC IPS PANEL
/ / GAP FILLEI, • '
FIfJItOUS / _.... _ MECIIANICAL ATrACIIMENIS
INSULA I ION _-_IIIMHn_WIII|II_ JllJJll_JJ]llilll[lUlllll*_r
INSULATING _ _--;_1 | \ I/' __- TANK STRUCTURE
AD.ESaVEBOND-- ___ _'I /
FOAM BLOCK FILLEI1----_ , _.
REFLECTOR LAYERS .-_--_- .
RIGID CERAMIC LOAD j
BEARING POSTS
Figure 3-13. Orbiter Lower Surface Thermal Protection System.
(TABI) shows promise for service at higher temperatures. Waterproofing of these areas
is a concern and needs to be investigated.
The standard approach to attaching the orbiter to the booster employs the three-
point attachment system used between the Shuttle orbiter and the external tank. This
arrangement is structurally efficient because the large thrust load is divided into two
components and loads are applied to the shell structure generally in a tangential direction.
However, this arrangement requires a large transverse beam to support lateral loads.
This beam causes severe air flow problems which include high drag and unsteady
aerodynamic flows.
An alternate approach is suggested, in which all thrust and normal loads are taken
in centerline fittings, and longitudinal moments are resisted by two outrigger struts, as
illustrated in Figure 3-14. Feed fines and umbilicals would likewise be located on the
vehicle centerline. A study of the alternate (tandem fitting) interface concept concluded
that the high thrust load (2,000,000 lb limit) would produce a moment which would have
to be resisted by a thrust beam in both the booster and the orbiter. This beam is similar
to the beam in the Shuttle external tank that takes SRB loads into the ET structure. The
study concluded that, if the moment could be kept relatively small through close spacing
between the orbiter and booster (18 inches was assumed in the study) the weights of the
tandem and the three-point concepts would be similar.
The payload carrier is securely attached to the upper surface of the orbiter. A
three-point attachment scheme isolates the payload carder from tank contractions and
simplifies installation and removal of the loaded carder. Thrust loads are transmitted
through two aft ball-joint fittings. The forward link takes vertical and side loads, but
permits fore-and-aft motion. After installation of the structural attachments, the tunnel
and seal must be attached at the forward end, the electrical/data interface plate must be
attached, and aerodynamic fairings must be attached and sealed. Aerodynamic faifings
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will require an interface with the upper TPS blankets. The fairing connection must be
easy to attach, and must seal against pressure differentials across the fairing.
i
Repair methods should be developed concurrently with the structural design.
Application of the methods to specific structures in actual locations and orientations in
the vehicle must be demonstrated. This is necessary to assure that the final design is
repairable, which is a design requirement. Basic repair methods that could be used
include:
• Welding cracks in the tanks
• Bonded boron-aluminum patches for dents/holes
• Hand layup of contoured patch and cure with vacuum bag and local heat
Some of the structural design concepts have not been completely developed, but
they are believed to be efficient and practical approaches to specific AMLS design goals,
considering materials and fabrication technologies that are expected to exist in a few
years.
3.2.3 Propellant Tank Leak Detection
An instrumentation method is needed to detect cracks and l_aks in AMLS
cryogenic tanks and other structure. Early sensing of cracks and defects, before they
assume critical proportions, permits repairs to be scheduled with minimal disruption of
operations.
Various methods are available for detecting cracks in metal structures, including
Orbiter _ # _, f
I _J
:I _:_ _-" Outrigger Support Struts
) I_,,,/
J
Top View
CenterlineAttach Fitting/ --[/
,\Booster
Side View _----Electricaland FluidUmbilicals
/ Centerlinc Thrust Beam
_---Wing Box
Figure 3-14. Orbiter to Booster Attachment.
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radiography, ultrasonic, and acoustic emission. Recent work has been done to develop
the capabilities of fiber optic sensors for detecting ultrasonic and acoustic waves. A
network of such fiber optic sensors could be used to sense the structurallstate and to
detect anomalies. Such a network would be part of an on-board sensing system that
would periodically pulse and scan the structure, automatically analyze the return signals,
identify changes from previous scans, and record the location of the discrepancy. The
data could be downlinked to service personnel, so that immediate repairs could be
initiated. Fiber optic networks are used on specific components and in other fields
outside of aircraft/aerospace. Fiber optic networks for large aerospace structures should
be fully developed by the time the AMLS design is finalized.
Several areas of development that would have to be undertaken to develop this
technology are listed below. Successful development of this system would be very
beneficial to the AMLS and other reusable spacecraft.
• Fiber optic sensors
• Acoustic pulse transducers
• Network design
• Scanning method
• Data analysis
• Installation and repair techniques
Other structural inspection techniques proposed for AMLS include:
• Closed circuit TV for visual inspection of interior of tank,
• X-ray for specific structural details,
• Eddy current inspections,
• Isotope radiographic for specific structural for massive sections,
• IR-scanning for possible insulation "leaks"
None of the proposed inspection techniques will require a technology
breakthrough. "IV, X-ray, Isotope, eddy current and IR-scarming have been used in
airline maintenance for five to twenty-five years, with proven results.
3.3 MECHANICAL SYSTEMS
The major mechanical systems of the AMLS booster and orbiter include the
landing gear, control surface and engine thrust vector control actuators, payload bay
doors, interstage connections, and vehicle hatches and their associated pieces of attaching
hardware. Two concepts employed in this section to enhance operability were the use of
existing off the shelf equipment where feasible and the elimination of a centralized
hydraulic system. The In-st concept played a major role in the landing gear selection
while the second concept played a major role in the selection of actuators.
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3.3.1 Landine Gear
The landing gear requirements listed below are intended to bring the AMLS
vehicles into compliance with the commercial airline operating philosophy.
• Provide primary directional and deceleration control during landing roll
OUt
• Withstand loss of 50% of wheel and tire assembles per strut without major
structural damage to vehicle structure, gear, and attachments
• Support all normal ground handling operations at maximum landing gross
weight
• Require no special structural inspections between flights
• Withstand barrier contact or contract with runway shoulder/overrun
without major gear/structural damage
These requirements will result in the gear being designed with sufficient margin
to accommodate landing anomalies and vehicle weight growth without placing operating
restrictions on the vehicles. Figure 3-15 shows the general arrangement of the orbiter
and booster landing gear.
The main landing gear was located longitudinally on the AMLS vehicles to carry
90% of the vehicle's weight. The gear height was then set to accohamodate a tail scrape
angle of 15 degrees with the vehicle center of gravity forward of the gear. The lateral
location was assumed to be the fuselage wing intersection, and the overturn angle was
verified to be within limits. A four-wheel bogey is baselined to achieve lighter tire
loading and the capability to withstand a blowout without adverse effects. This
arrangement also provides more braking surface thereby increasing the mean time
between maintenance for the braking system. The brakes and all other landing gear
actuators are electromechanical.
The nose landing gear on the AMLS vehicles was located on the vehicle
centerline longitudinal location which places 10% of the vehicle's weight on the gear.
The gear location takes advantage of major propellant tank structure for attachment. The
gear uses two wheels to reduce tire loading and size. The gear would have the capability
of swiveling up to 90 degrees with the torque links disconnected to facilitate ground
operations in congested areas.
3.3.2 Miscellaneous Mechanical Systems
The miscellaneous mechanical systems are comprised of the various movable
aerodynamic surfaces, the main engine thrust vector control (TVC) actuators, the payload
bay doors and their associated hinges and motors, the interstage disconnect hardware and
their protective doors and associated actuators, and finally the escape module and
workstation hatches.
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Orbit_
Figure 3-15. Orbiter and Booster Landing Gear
Installation.
Electromechanical
actuators or other electrical
motor will_oe used as
appropriate throughout
these systems. There will
typically be a mechanical
connection consisting of
bellcranks, pushrods, or
torque tubes between the
motor and the associated
component being moved.
The PCS doors will
be capable of being opened
in a lg gravity field without
the use of any supporting
strongback GSE. However,
to reduce weight, the PCS
motors will be 0 g only.
Power to open the doors on
the earth's surface will be
supplied by GSE.
3.4 PROPULSION SYSTEMS
Various options are presented for the MPS/OMS/RCS. The final selection was
based on the potential for that system to enhance operability while meeting basic
performance requirements. In the case of the OMS/RCS options and final selection,
Rockwelrs Integrated Hydrogen Oxygen Technology (IHOT) study was used as a
primary reference and guide.
The requirements and groundrules for selection of MPS/OMS/RCS were based on
the AMLS program goals. The AMLS is to be a reusable, low maintenance system and
this priority is reflected in the first two requirements listed below:
• Reusable system
• Reduce operations- Minimize number of different fluids used
• Performance- 40k payload
• Booster crossfeeds MPS propellant to orbiter
• NASA technology level 6 by year 2000
• No centralized hydraulic system
3,4,1. Propulsion System Options.
Options which met the above requirements axe listed in Table 3-4. The
characteristics of each of these options will be discussed briefly.
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_daiil.,F,llgia_. Theprimarydesigndriversof the STME are low cost and high
operability. As a result, it will have lower specific impulse and higher Weight than the
other candidates. The lowest cost approach has required that the engine be expendable,
but reusability may be imposed on the STME. The engine provides no feed system
flexibility and has no bleeds.
For the AMLS the SSME would have to be modified to increase operability.
These modifications would focus on the turbomachinery components, increasing their
life and general robustness. The SSME would also incorporate changes, such as
reduction in the number of welds, to reduce production costs. Improved health
monitoring will also be incorporated to improve operability.
The plug nozzle engine is a revival of an old concept and could offer some
advantages for the AMLS with its high performance and low weight. Because it is
shorter and wider than the conventional bell nozzle engine, it integrates well into the
vehicle layouL Complete prototype engines have been test fired in the past, and
individual segments are now being tested. Because it is impractical to gimbal the entire
engine, thrust vector control is a concern. Differential throttling and fluid injection are
being evaluated to provide the TVC function.
Pro_llants. Storing the hydrogen and oxygen propellants for the main engines in
the conventional subcritical or normal boiling point form requires large tankage but
provides the most simple flight and ground systems. The hardware and procedures for
loading, preconditioning, and supplying the engines have been developed for other
vehicles and are well understood.
The use of triple point fluid reduces tank sizes, but it is difficult to handle and
store because of the more critical temperature/pressure requirements. During loading and
up to engine start, a continuous bleed from the vehicle to the ground is needed, requiring
added ground interfaces. Critical procedures must be developed and validated.
Slush propellants result in the smallest tankage and therefore the lightest vehicle.
Vehicle and ground systems and procedures are even more complex than those for triple
point fluids. Mixers are required in the tank to prevent settling of the solid particles.
Pronellant Cross Feed. Propellants can be transferred from the booster to the
orbiter stage during first stage parallel booster/orbiter bum by providing booster tank
pressure sufficiently high to overcome liquid head differences and pressure losses
through the interconnecting plumbing system. A significant disadvantage of this method
of transfer is that the required booster tank higher pressures, especially for the LO 2, can
increase tank weight and adds residual weight in the form of booster ullage weight at
MECO. An issue, common to the other options as well, is the large size required of the
cross feed system. This system must be sized to provide propellants to the orbiter
engines and must contain shut-off valves and disconnects.
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Table 3-4. Candidate Propulsion System Options.
• MAIN ENGINE
• STME
• MODIFIED'SSME (LaRC BASELINE)
• PLUG NOZZLE/AEROSPIKE
• MAIN PROPELLANT
• SUBCRITICAL (LaRC BASELINE)
• TRIPLE POIN_
• SLUSH
• PROPELLANT CROSS FEED
• PRESSURE TRANSFER
• PUMP TRANSFER
• GRAVITY TRANSFER
• PROPEELANT PRECONDITIONING
• FLIGHT RECIRC PUMPS
• GROUND RECIRC PUMPS
• OVERBOARD BLEEDS
• OMS
• SHU'IWLE DERIVATIVE - STORABLE, PRESSURE FED
• LH2/LO2 PUMP FED (LaRC BASELINE)
• LH2fLO2 PRESSURE FED
• RCS - ORBITER
• SHUTTLE DERIVATIVE - STORABLE, PRESSURE FED
• LH2/LO2 PUMP FED (LaRC BASELINE)
• GH_GO2 PRESSURE FED
• RCS - ESCAPE MODULE
• SHUTrLE DERIVATIVE - STORABLE, PRESSURE FED
• LH2/LO2 PUMP FED (LIRC BASELINE)
• GH2/GO2 PRESSURE FED
Pumps can be used to avoid
the impact of high ullage pressures.
These pumps mus( be large to
provide the flow for all the orbiter
engines and therefore require a
large power supply, either electrical
or from an auxiliary drive. The
large plumbing system is also a
concern.
If the booster LO 2 tank is
forward while the orbiter tank is
aft, the least complex system can
be used because gravity can
provide the transfer mechanism for
the LO 2. The hydrogen will
require pressurized transfer, but
this requires relatively low
pressure. The large plumbing
system is again a concern.
l_Igg.flhlli_i.QI_g. To ensure
that propellants at the engine
interface are at acceptable
temperatures for engine start,
vehicle re.circulation pumps which
move the warmer fluids from either
the engine interface or from the engine itself back to the propellant tank can be
employed• This approach, proven on the Saturn and STS programs, does add vehicle
complexity with the resultant impact on ground operations needed for check out and
servicing.
To simplify the vehicle systems, the recirculation pumps can be located on the
ground• Additional vehicle to ground fluid interfaces are required.
Bleeding propellants from either the engine interface or from the engine back to
the ground can be used but may not be as effective as pumped circulation. Fluid
interfaces are also needed with this option.
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS). The fu'st option considered for the orbital
maneuvering system (OMS) is similar to that for the current Shuttle orbiter. It uses
nitrogen tetroxide as the oxidizer and monomethylhydrazine as the fuel• Because both
propellants are toxic, special handling is needed, adding to operational costs. The
propellants require either an RCS settling bum or low-G liquid acquisition devices within
the tanks to ensure liquids are supplied to the engines at start. Much of the hardware
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developed for the current Shuttle program can be utilized, reducing development cost and
risk.
i
A pump-fed liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen OMS system has the operational
advantage of common propellants with the main engine system. As with the fast option
above, low-G liquid acquisition is required. The pumps, pump drives, and controls
needed to provide engine chamber pressure can be incorporated into the engine design or
be separate. Either approach adds complexity, increasing hardware and operational
COSTS.
A pressure-fed liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen OMS system shares the common
propellant advantage of the pump system above but provides less overall complexity.
However, the propellant tanks must be heavier to withstand higher pressures than if
pumps are used.
Orbiter And Esca_ Module Reaction Control System (RCS). The orbiter
reaction control system (RCS) based on the current Shuttle system shares the
characteristics of a Shuttle based OMS, including hazardous fluids impact on operations
and low development costs.
A pump-fed liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen orbiter RCS system has the same
characteristics of the pump fed liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen OMS system.
A pressure-fed gaseous hydrogen/oxygen orbiter RCS system must vaporize
propellants, either on the ground or on the vehicle. Engine start is accommodated in
zero-G. The propellant tanks must be heavier to withstand higher pressures than if
pumps are used.
3.4.2. Propulsion System Selections.
A qualitative assessment of the candidate options is presented in Table 3-5 for the
following categories. The selected option for each category is indicated by the "XL
• Meets requirements- How well the candidate satisfies the previously listed basic
system requirements.
• Reduces operations- How effective the candidate is in reducing the cost of ground
and flight operations.
• Reduces DDT&E and production costs- A comparison of candidate non-recurring
COSts.
• Reduces weight- Relative effect on vehicle dry weight.
• Reduces development risk- A measure of relative technology maturity for each
candidate.
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Table 3-5. Propulsion Options
Evaluation.
OPTION
STME
MODIFIED SSME
SUBCRITICAL
TRIPLE POINT
SLUSH
PRESS TRANSFER
PUMP TRANSFER
GRAVITY TRANSFER"
P_QP_EBEG_
FLIGHT PUMPS
GROUND PUMPS
OVERBOARD
BLEEDS
OMS
SHUTTLE
LH/LO2 PUMP
LH2/LO2 PRESS
-BGF__JIB;ZEB
SHUTTLE
LH2/LO2 PUMP
GH2/GO2 PRESS
__o]
SHUTTLE
LH2/LO2 PUMP
GH2/GO2 PRESS
MEETS
REQTS
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
'MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
REDUCES
OPS
HIGH
MEDIUM
HIGH
MEDIUM
LOW
MEDIUM
LOW
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
REDUCES
DDT&E
&PRODC
HIGH
MEDIUM
HIGH
MEDIUM
LOW
MEDIUM
LOW
HIGH
LOW
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
LOW
LOW
REDUCES
WEIGHT
LOW
MEDIUM
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
LOW
LOW
HIGH
LOW
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM"
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
REDUCES
DEVLMT
RISK
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
LOW
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
HIGH
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
HIGH
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
HIGH
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
SELECTED
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
HIGH
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
X
X
X (LH2)
X (LO2)
X
X
X
X
3.5 POWER, EPDC, & ECLSS
Operability is enhanced by using common equipment between the orbiter and
booster wherever they have common requirements. Since the booster is unmanned, it
obviously doesn't need any ECLSS, and those systems are deleted from it. In the area of
power generation and distribution and control, the two major decisions to be made were
the distribution bus voltage level and the role of fuel cell versus batteries. The selection
of a 270-volt fuel cell-powered system in both the orbiter and the booster was driven by
the desire to reduce the size of the power system and reduce the number of different
components being used and, therefore, maintained.
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_,_.1 Electrical Power System (EPS]
Three program requirements impact the conceptual design of the_EPS. The first
requirement on the EPS is that power must be supplied to three distinct vehicle elements.
These elements are the Orbiter, the Escape Module, and the Booster. Each system
element must be able to operate independently during an abort emergency. A separate
power source is needed for each vehicle element. Thus, the AMLS EPS will consist of at
least three power sources.
The program also mandates dual fault tolerance upon all subsystems. The
purpose of this mandate is to increase the probability of mission success. This
requirement means that every system and subsystem must tolerate two failures before
leading to an abort situation. As with all other subsystems, the EPS must also meet this
fail-operational/fail-safe (FO/FS) requirement.
In order to reduce program risk and development costs, the program also requires
that all technologies used in the AMLS be rated NASA technology level 6 by the year
2000. This also allows maximum use of technologies developed for other vehicles
(NASP, SSTO, ALS, NLS).
Before identifying which types of power sources, bus voltages, etc. should be
used in the EPS, it is necessary to determine how much power and'what voltage the
vehicle's components require. Examination of the three vehicle elements results in six
power load categories: avionics, aero-surface control, thrust vector control (I'VC),
environmental control and life support systems (ECLSS), payload/workstation systems,
and recovery systems. Since both the Orbiter and Booster share the launch and glide
back loads, the two elements share similar loads during those portions of the mission.
Under these circumstances, it is desirable to use common EPS components in the Orbiter
and Booster. This approach may lead to reduced Design, Development, Test, and
Engineering (DDT&E), manufacturing, and operational costs.
To define the power (peak, nominal, minimum) and energy requirements for the
AMLS, a power history was generated for each vehicle element. Orbiter and Booster
peak power loads were estimated based on three assumptions. The worst-case loads were
assumed to occur when all electromechanical actuators (EMAs) used for TVC are
required to move at 100% of their rated capacity. The EMAs used for AMLS TVC are
assumed to draw 23 kW at 100% power (1/2 Shuttle equivalent). This is unlikely during
a normal launch, but could occur during an abort maneuver. All other vehicle
components were also assumed to be drawing maximum power. These include
components from the avionics, ECLSS, etc. Known hardware loads were used when
possible.
The FO/FS mandate also enters into the determination of EPS requirements, since
sufficient power and energy capacity must remain after a single failure to perform the
mission normally. The actual amount of extra capability carded on-board depends on the
architecture of the EPS.
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Themission timeline and activity plan contributes to the definition of the energy
requirement. Since the AMLS mission is assumed to be five (5) days, de energy
requirement may be the most important criteria for the selection of the power source
types and quantities. Also, the selection of power source type should not preclude
missions of longer duration.
The power history for the Orbiter and Booster is shown in Figure 3-16. The
launch and descent/glide back portions of the power profile for both the Orbiter and
Booster are very similar. Both the Orbiter and Booster have peak power requirements
between 235 kW and 245 kW during launch and 25 kW to 35 kW during glide back.
Therefore, as anticipated, using common EPS components for both elements is feasible.
The most notable difference in the two profiles is the effect on total energy capacity that
the longer duration of the Orbiter has. The total energy capacity is def'med by the areas
under each of the respective curves. The Orbiter requires 665 kW-hrs and the Booster
requires 75 kW-hrs. The Orbiter's energy capacity must be nine (9) times greater than
the Booster's. If common EPS components are to be used, then the dissimilar
components must be capacity related.
Various options to meet the high rate requirements of both vehicles and the high
capacity requirement of the Orbiter are listed and qualitatively assessed in Table 3-6.
The fast option listed is to combine a Shuttle-type fuel cell (long dhration) and batteries
(peak power augmentation) to meet the Orbiter requirements. The fuel cell may be
eliminated on the Booster since its mission duration is short. This option efficiently
fulfills the power and energy requirements using two power source types. Both of which
provide high performance. However, this performance does not come without penalties.
Batteries capable of supporting the high power requirement of the AMLS must have very
high discharge rates. These batteries require substantial development and have numerous
safety concerns. Also, the Shuttle-type fuel cell has failed to reach its designed
POWER
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Figure 3-16. Power History.
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maintenance schedule and is difficult to service.
The second option listed in Table 3-6 is to replace the batteries with a auxiliary
power unit running on hydrogen and oxygen (H2/O2 APU). The H2/O2 APU is
currently under development and could generate the high power required for the TVC.
(Similar to the storable APUs on the Shuttle). The H2/O2 APU may have poor
reliability as is true for the current Shuttle APUs.
The third option listed in Table 3-6 is to use the High Power Density (HPD) fuel
cell (under development at International Fuel Cells) to provide all of the Orbiter's and
Booster's power and energy requirements. The HPD fuel cell offers very high
performance (projected current density of 4000 amps/ft2 compared to 250 amps/ft2 for
Shuttle-type fuel cells) but
will likely suffer the low
Mean Time Between
Maintenance (MTBM) rates
of the Shuttle-type fuel cell.
The final option listed
in Table 3-6 is to use a dual
mode H2/O2 APU. The dual
mode H2/O2 APU combines
a high rate and low rate
turbine to efficiently provide
both high and low power
performance. This
technology is very immature
but could be used to meet the
high power-short duration
and low power-long duration
requirements. Since the dual
Table 3-6.
Rate and Capacity.
FOUR SYSTEMS WILL MEET BOTH
REQUIREMENTS:
Power Source Options Need to Balance High
THE POWER AND ENERGY
BENEFIT LIABILITy
ORm/,-H/BOO'_I_.R
1. BATTERIES" (PEAK POWER) SEE BELOW SEE BELOW
FUEL CELL (DURATION) HIGH kW, Wh/Ib LOW MTBM
2. H2/O2 APU (PEAK POWER) HIGH kW POOR MTBF
FUEL CELL (DURATION) HIGH kW, Wh/Ib LOW MTBM
3. HIGH POWER DENSITY (HPD) HIGH kW, "WMb LOW MTBM
FUEL CELL
(PEAK POWER/DURATION)
4. DUAL MODE APU HIGH kW, Wh/Ib POOR MTBF
NON-RECHARGEABLE LITHIUM
RECHARGEABLE LITHIUM
RECHARGEABLE SILVER-ZINC
VERY HIGH Wh/Ib SINGLE USE
HIGH Wh/Ib INAPPROPRIATE
AVAILABLE -1995 FOR HIGH POWER
MATURE, SPACE VERY HEAVY,
QUALIFIED 270 DAY UFE
mode H2/O2 APU will be more complex, its reliability will probably be worse than the
single mode H2/O2 APU mentioned above.
The HPD fuel cell option is recommended as the power source for both vehicles.
The selection of the HPD fuel cell is justified in three ways. Since all options except the
dual mode H2/O2 APU include a fuel cell, the substitution of the HPD fuel cell for the
Shuttle-type fuel cell has a minimal impact. If the substitution is made, then the batteries
and the APU of the first two options are unnecessary. The selection of a single power
source type also yields numerous operational benefits during ground processing. The
components, facilities, ground support equipment (GSE), personnel, procedures, etc. are
all reduced if only a single type of power source must be serviced. For this reason, only
the HPD Fuel Cell and the dual mode H2/O2 APU are acceptable. The HPD Fuel Cell
was selected over the dual mode H2/O2 APU because it is further along in its
development and will likely have higher reliability and lower maintenance requirements.
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In order to minimize the number of wiring harnesses and wire sizes, the EPS will
distribute power at only a single voltage level. Three bus voltages are available for use
on the AMLS: (1) 28 Vdc (military/general aviation), (2) 130 Vdc (Space Station
Freedom), or (3) 270 Vdc (NASP). In the first table in Table 3-7, the Orbiter loads are
broken-down by voltage into 28 Vdc, 130 Vdc, and 270 Vdc loads. The energy required
at each voltage is also shown. The Booster's electrical distribution will be identical to
the Orbiter's. Since power using both 28 Vdc and 270 Vdc must be provided, power
conversion will be required. Current technology in power conversion provides 95%
efficiency when dropping the voltage but only 65% efficiency when boosting the voltage.
The power and energy losses resulting from the conversion process are shown for each
voltage in the middle table of Table 3-7. The power source must provide power and
energy equal to the sum of the Orbiter loads and the power conversion losses. The final
table in Table 3-7 displays the results of this summation. The 270 Vdc is clearly the best
option since both the power level and energy capacity are minimized. Line losses were
not calculated but given the same power requirement for either transmission voltage level
the current level of the 28 Vale lines would be an order of magnitude higher than the 270
Vale lines. Since line losses are directly proportional to current level the 270 Vdc option
would also minimize line losses. Therefore, the 270 Vdc bus voltage will be used.
Since the results of the preceding analysis depends on the efficiency of the power
conversion process, the impact of increasing efficiency (by technology advancement)
was studied The left graph in Figure 3-17 represents the relationsltip between boost
conversion and drop conversion based on the estimated Orbiter loads. The relationship is
characterized by the equation: Nb * P270 = Nd * P28 (where, Nb is the boost efficiency,
P270 is the 270 Vdc power requirement, Nd is the drop efficiency, and P28 is the 28 Vdc
power requirement). The shaded region of the graph indicates those combinations of
Table 3-7. Selection of Bus Voltage Impacts Power and Energy Requirements.
ESTIMATED VEHICLE LOADS
'Component
Voltage
28 Vdc
130 Vdc
270 Vdc
TOTAL
Peak Power Energy
kW , kW-hr
10 { 490
- na - - na-
230 175
I 240 I 665
POWER CONVERSION EFFICIENCIES:
VOLTAGE BOOST - 65%
VOLTAGE DROP - 95%
LOSSES DUE T ° CONVERSION
Buss Peak Power
Voltage kW
28 Vdc
Energy
kW-hr
81 61
130 Vdc 81 86
270 Vdc 1 25
POWER SOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Buss Peak Power Energy
Voltaqe kW kW-hr
28 Vdc 321 i 726
130 Vdc 321 ( 751
270 Vdc 241 I 690
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Figure 3-17. Power Conversion Technology Impacts Bus Voltage Selection.
boost and drop efficiencies which favor the 270 Vdc bus voltage selection. As shown,
the boost efficiency must be increased to nearly 100% for the 28 Vdc bus voltage to be
favored. The fight graph in Figure 3-17 shows the same relationship between boost and
drop conversion but comparing energy losses. Again, the 270 Vdc option is favored over
the 28 Vdc option. However, the energy losses are more sensitive to increasing boost
efficiency. Still, the boost efficiency must exceed 95% to favor the 28 Vdc bus voltage.
Figure 3-18 shows a schematic representation of the Orbiter and Booster EPS.
The Orbiter's EPS will consist of four (4) HPD Fuel Cells generating 80 kW each at 270
Vdc. Only three are needed during the launch phase to meet the 240 kW peak power
requirement. The fourth fuel cell is to ensure that the loss of a fuel cell during ascent
will not lead to an abort situation (groundrule). Once in orbit, two of the fuel cells will
be shut down since only two fuel cells are required for reentry and glide-back power. In
the event of a failure on-orbit, one of the dormant fuel cells can be restarted. The fuel
cells are integrated with the ECLSS (potable water generation) and OMS/RCS (common
H2/O2 tankage). The electricity produced by the fuel cells is distributed to the
components over a 270 Vdc bus. All power conversion is done at the component level.
The Escape Module's EPS will consist of two lithium thynol-chloride (Li-SC102)
batteries. The batteries will provide 270 Vdc power to the same bus as the Orbiter EPS
to simplify integration of the emergency power supply. The lithium batteries (not
rechargeable) have a active open circuit life of several years with some loss in efficiency.
Therefore, they can be activated when they are installed and replaced when needed. The
power and energy loads required for the Escape Module have not been estimated but are
thought to be very low.
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Figure 3-18. Orbiter and Booster Utilize Common Components.
The Booster's EPS will be nearly identical to that of the Orbiter's, except that
only three fuel cells will be used, to produce the same degree of redundancy as in the
orbiter, and there is no interface with an ECLSS. The fuel cell product water will be
dumped directly overboard. In all other respects the two systems will be identical.
Maximum similarity was selected to reduce ground operations.
3.5.2 Environmental Control And Life Support System (ECLS$)
The normal operations of the AMLS requires that the Orbiter provide a long-
term, safe (even comfortable) environment for the crew and a benign environment for the
many subsystems and components. The ECLSS requirement is derived from the need to
increase the probability of mission success and applies throughout the three mission
phases: Ascent, On-Orbit, and Descent.
During an abort situation where the need exists to separate the Escape Module,
the ECLSS requirement is different. Now the emphasis of the ECLSS is simply on
providing a short-term, survival-oriented environment. The crew will egress as soon as
possible after the water landing. It is assumed that the crew may remain in the vehicle
for up to six (6) hours after impact to allow ample time to remove injured personnel.
There are nine (9) functions that will be considered under the heading of ECLSS.
These functions are def'med below:
....,,¢
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• Atmospheric Pressure and Mixture Control: Provides a 14.7 psi, oxygen/nitrogen
atmosphere at sea-level conditions.
• Carbon Dioxide (CO 2) Removal: Removes metabolically-generated CO 2 from the
cabin atmosphere to maintain acceptable CO 2 levels.
Trace Contaminant Removal: Removes trace contaminants such as carbon
monoxide, methane, and ammonia which are also metabolically-generated.
Additional contaminants result from off-gassing from cabin materials.
• Thermal Control: Regulates the temperature of the cabin air, the water supply,
avionics, and other components. Also provides heat rejection from the vehicle.
• Humidity Control: Regulates the cabin dew point to minimize moisture-related
equipment problems and crew discomfort.
Fire Su_oression: Eliminates combustion inside the cabin and neutralizes the
source of the fire. Give fire warning to the crew.
• Water and Food Supply: Provides drinking/cooking (potable) water and food for
the crew depending of mission length. May also include water for hygiene use.
• Waste Manaeement: Handles all forms of liquid and solid wastes, in particular,
human excrement.
• Crew Accommodations: Provides sleeping, food preparation, storage areas as
required. Includes human factor issues which affect the crew's performance.
The ECLSS duration requirements for the normal operation of the Orbiter are
identical to those for the Shuttle. All Shuttle, and even some SSF requirements must be
met. During the abort Table 3-8. Duration Determines Which ECLSS
operation, the ECLSS duration Functions Are Required And At What Level.
requirements are less stringent.
It is necessary only to ensure
the crew's safety until the crew
exits the Escape Module.
Table 3-8 lists the duration
requirements for each of the
ECLSS functions under
normal and abort operations.
Of the nine (9)
functions that the ECLSS must
provide, five (5) entail
technology selections which
tuNe.oN
OPERATIONAL DURATION
ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE CONTROL
ATMOSPHERIC MIXTURE CONTROL
CO2 REMOVAL
TRACE CONTAMINANTS REMOVAL
THERMAL CONTROL
HUMIDITY CONTROL (DEW POINT)
RRE SUPPRESSION
WATER AND FOOD SUPPLY
WASTE MANAGEMENT
CREW ACCOMMODATIONS
NORMAL OPS ABORT OPS
35+ MAN-DAYS <6 HOURS
14.7 psia TBD
20% 02/80% N2 TBD
ppCO2 c0.3 psi NONE, VENTED
YES NONE, VENTED
65°F - 85°F TBD
40-60 NONE
YES YES
YES, SHOE SURVIVAL
COMMODE, TRASH NONE
STORAGE
SLEEPING AREA, LIFE RAFT,
GALLEY RESCUE GEAR
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will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Wherever possible options that are "off
the shelf" will be used to reduce DDT&E costs and/or regenerative options will be used
to reduce consumables and enhance mission duration..
The atmospheric consumables (oxygen and nitrogen) can be stored as either gases
or as liquids (cryogens). The gaseous storage is simple and has no boil-off losses but
requires large, heavy tanks. Liquid storage, on the other hand, has lower volume
requirements, but has boil-off losses that become more important as the mission duration
increases. The ECLSS will supply liquid oxygen from the common
ECLSS/EPS/OMS/RCS tankage. Nitrogen for leakage make-up and repressurization will
be provided from gaseous storage.
Carbon dioxide removal can be accomplished with lithium hydroxide (LiOH)
canisters (used on Shuttle), solid amine (like the HS-C material used in the Regenerative
Carbon-dioxide Removal System (RCRS) for the Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO)), or
zeolite beds (used on Skylab). The LiOH canisters provide simple, efficient CO 2
removal, but must be replaced periodically during the mission. The last two options give
regenerative CO 2 removal which eliminates consumables but increases the complexity of
the system. Carbon dioxide removal from the cabin by the RCRS is recommended. The
RCRS may be used for short periods (-20 rain) during ascent and descent without an
external vacuum. For any additional requirement, up to several hours, an open loop
system without CO 2 removal will be adequate.
Two thermal control approaches are considered. The passive cooling approach is
to conduct heat loads from low power components into the vehicle's structure. The
active cooling method uses convective heat transfer to carry the energy to the heat
rejection system. A radiator, flash evaporator, or cryogenic fluids are used for heat
rejection.
Thermal control will be achieved in three ways. Since most components on the
AMLS vehicle use little power, these loads will be conducted into the vehicle's structure.
The ECLSS and the EPS both require active cooling. A fluid coolant loop will interface
with a condensing heat exchanger (CHX) in the ECLSS and the fuel cells in the EPS.
The coolant loop will transport heat to a body-mounted radiator on the sides of the
transfer tunnel and/or to a cryogenic heat exchanger in the MPS. The cryogenic heat
exchanger will boil-off and vent some of the MPS residuals. Several times the amount of
MPS residuals needed for thermal control will be available. The radiator is the primary
heat rejection system while on-orbit and the cryogenic system is the only heat rejection
used during ascent and descent and will handle peak on-orbit requirements.
Removal of cabin humidity is accomplished by condensation (in a condensing
heat exchanger), absorption (in silica gel, etc.), or adsorption (limited in the RCRS). The
condensing heat exchanger and the RCRS are regenerative Shuttle hardware. Silica gel
offers a simpler but heavier system. The condensing heat exchanger will be used to
provide humidity control and will interface with the potable water storage. This is
identical to the current Shuttle system.
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The fire suppression systeni should use either Halon 1301 (Shuttle), carbon
dioxide, or nitrogen to smother the fire. The last two options integrate other ECLSS
systems to reduce the need for a separate system. Halon 1301 will require a separate
ECLSS system to perform the function. Based on its technical maturity Halon 1301 fire
suppression system will be used in all habitable volumes. The system will include both
built-in and portable fire extinguishers.
Trace contaminants are neutralized with an ambient temperature catalytic oxidizer
(ATCO) as is done on Shuttle. Additionally, the RCRS has shown some capability of
trace contaminant removal. This capability is being evaluated under IR&D.
Because of the abort scenario's short duration a different ECLSS approach is
used. The crew will wear partial pressure suits during the launch. If there is a need to
abort the mission and separate the escape module, oxygen (gaseous storage) will be
provided through the partial pressure suit. Cabin pressure will be maintained by adding
nitrogen (gaseous storage). The carbon dioxide and trace contaminants will be exhausted
overboard as the cabin vents. No active removal is required since the crew would have
to remain in the vehicle in excess of 8 hours to raise the CO 2 concentration to dangerous
levels.
Since the crew will wear the Shuttle partial pressure suit, st/rvival equipment and
supplies will also be included. This equipment will include back-up oxygen supply, an
individual life raft, a small supply of stored water, and miscellaneous search and rescue
(SAR) aids.
The workstation and escape module ECLSS are integrated during normal
operation, see Figure 3-19. The RCRS, CHX, and ATCO are located in the Workstation.
The cabin atmosphere is recirculated between the escape module to the workstation
through ducting inside the transfer tunnel. Oxygen and nitrogen are added to both the
escape module and workstation to meet consumption and leakage requirements. Water
produced in the fuel cells and the CHX is stored in a water accumulator inside the
workstation. During an abort, the escape module carries its own stored oxygen and
nitrogen but uses the same distribution system that the integrated system does.
The thermal control for the Booster will share common components with the
Orbiter. Since the Booster is not a manned vehicle it does not require a radiator or any
ECLSS interfaces. Therefore, all thermal loads will be conducted to the Booster's
structure or sunk into the MPS cryogenic residuals. An estimate of cryogen boil-off
indicates that less than 15% of the MPS residuals are required to support the heat
rejection requirement.
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Module
Figure 3-19. Workstation and EscapeModule Use Integrated ECLSS.
3.6 AVIONICS
The avionics systems of the AMLS will make major use of off-the-shelf
equipment. In many aspects the requirements of the AMLS are no different than any
other commercial airliner and benefit is made of this by using existing equipment with
well established operating histories and repair records. This philosophy will also result
in the availability of a large number of spares and the ability to replace component boxes
without regard to manufacturer since components meet common specifications.
Besides the AMLS functional requirements that have been addressed in previous
space vehicle designs, the one area which will be implemented in depth is total vehicle
self-check with auto re-certification capability for quick turn around after verifying all
systems to be nominal. Advances in data storage technology and processing capability
will allow for full automated maintenance and check-out support. Principal avionics
functional requirements are listed below:
• Guidance, navigation, and flight control
• Communications and tracking
• Displays and controls
• Instrumentation
• Data processing
• Support for all mission/mission phases
• Uplink/downlink capability
• Telemetry
• Health monitor parameters
• Redundancy status
• Performance parameters
• Communications
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• Faultmanagement
• Autonomous fault detection/fault isolation using bit/bite technology
• Distributed processing using dynamic resource allocation
• Status reporting to designated health monitoring cpu(s) _
• Redundancy based on "probability of failure" at the functional level
• Satisfies fail op/fail safe
• Onboard automated maintenance support
• Automatically identifies hardware anomalies to board level
• On-line service manual for technicians
• Automatic re-certification
• In and out of cockpit operations
This section describes features of the selected AMLS avionics system concept and
architecture which enable the cost-effective operation of the system as a whole. The
flight articles provide rapid and efficient access to all the avionics systems for inspection
and maintenance. The avionics system design reflects modem commercial and military
approaches to integrate avionics systems and provides an effective system for continuous
and automatic vehicle health monitoring. Finally, candidate instrumentation items and
their functions are described.
3.6.1 Accessabilitv
Access to facilitate ease of maintenance for subsystems in general and avionics in
particular have been a major design emphasis. The preferred location is the underside of
the vehicle where access can be gained without GSE. Since access when the vehicles are
mated was also desired the underside location was only feasable for the booster. The
location choosen for the orbiter is the side of the body, above and just aft of the wing
leading edge. This location was felt to be the best possible for the orbiter since it
provides good accessability at all times, and is in what is expected to be a low heating
area thereby minimizing possible TPS sealing problems. On the booster, the vehicle's
skin forms the base of the avionics rack which drops down on four linear actuators. In
the down position the multi-tier rack is accessable from all sides. On the orbiter the
vehicle skin acts as a hinged door. Avionics boxes are mounted to the inside of the door
and in the compartment to maximize accessability and effective use of the available
space. In either vehicle no boxes will be mounted behind another.
3.6.2 Candidate Architecture
The selection of an advanced cost-effective avionics architecture for the AMLS
from off-the-shelf systems is the result of years of IR&D at Rockwell to analyze optimal
configurations and select ideal components directly applicable and readily available with
minimal applications-unique hardware and software modifications. Many advances have
been made in data processing, health monitoring, navigation, displays and controls and
data communications since the development of the Space Shuttle avionics suite. Other
areas such as transponder technology, RF Communications, telemetry systems, and
power control circuitry have been more evolutionary and refinements have been more
subtle.
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Figure 3-20 outlines a concept for a simple, highly reliable, contemporary
avionics design for the AMLS which allows for fail-operational, fail-safe vehicle
performance over the mission profile. A feature of the architecture condept presented
here is the similarity of architectures between the recoverable booster and the recoverable
space vehicle. During the boost phase, the avionics systems of both vehicles, while
independent, can share each other's resources via the redundant FDDI-type, bi-directional
high speed optical links, which soft-disconnect during separation using "trans-opticals"
and "rec-opticals" at the interface. This allows up to six voting processors to participate
if necessary in all boost phase operations, utilizing space vehicle processors and the space
vehicle redundant high speed optical disk memories for contingency reconfigurations.
The heart of the data processing complex is a triple redundant card cage, two
voting processors per card cage design driving four data busses, configured in such a way
that any processor or data bus can perform all mission requirements if necessary, with
small sacrifices in operational capability.
High speed microprocessor technology and VHSIC (Very High Speed Integrated
Circuitry) has made the Shuttle main data processor obsolete because of the inherent
speed and memory limitations of last generation technology. The Shuttle processor
depended upon a complex processor/input-output processor architecture and a unique and
complex software language (HAL/S). HAI./S was developed for the AP-101 derivatives
on Shuttle is all but unknown to present day programmers.
Contemporary card-mounted processors, such as ASCM (IBM and Honeywell),
JIAWG (many companies), Honeywell B5 or other processor families with 1553 and
very high speed fiber and copper direct buss architectures supported in Ada will be the
optimal choice for the next generation vehicles because of their availability, ease of
produceability, relative low cost, adaptability of Ada software from advanced airline
applications, and modular nature allowing rapid configuration for differing levels of
required mission reliability.
A feature of contemporary processor technology is the inclusion of health check
and vote-control busses for buss cross-strapping, two-out-of-three box voting for mission
critical events, and cyclic overhead ultra-high speed processor self-test verifying
processor performance at varying rates dependent upon the operation being performed.
To minimize or eliminate the need for costly and time consuming pre-flight I-
load/verify procedures air data from advanced sensors on both the booster and orbiter
(for redundancy) will be available during the boost phase. This will allow closed loop
control of the vehicle's orientation (weather-cocking) during boost thereby minimizing
aerodynamic structural loads to the vehicle's during ascent. The advanced air data
system required for this is in development and will also be used by the orbiter during re-
entry and landing.
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Figure 3-20. Generic AMLS Avionics System Architecture.
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S-band and telemetry components will be selected from existing booster and
space vehicles programs presently in production. First choice is compatibility with the
Space Station Approved Parts List. e
GPS and Glonass with further refinement will provide the primary navigation
references and vehicle orientation for the combined or separated vehicles. The optical
IMU's and accelerometers are updated by satellite references at periodic intervals. Texas
Instruments has shown vehicle orientation as well as position in space is determinable
with GPS. Earth limb or sun sensors can be provided for back-up, if necessary.
Experience may delete the requirement for the back-up sensors, if the GPS/Glonass
system has inherent redundancy.
The potential use of GPS for category 1II (fully blind) landings has been
sucessfully demonstrated by Honeywell and Langley dramatically revealing the
possibilities of differential GPS for autoland. While the tests did reveal a little better
"tightness" of deviation from centerline with the Microwave Landing System, it is felt
that the Microwave Landing System should be included on early flights until it is
demonstrated that the GPS autoland is equally capable.
In accordance with the present move away from hydraulic controls and
maintenance-intensive hydraulic APU's, electro-mechanical actuators (EMA) have been
selected for the AMLS. The aerosuffaces are controlled by EMA's: utilizing 270 volt DC
actuators. The elevons, the RCS, the pressurization, landing gear deployment are all
EMA and solenoid driven.
Key power supply circuits will be made inherently redundant using such elements
as the Autonetics Power Voter, with partial failures flagged during box-by-box vehicle
status word check. The radar altimeter will be used for vehicle(s) re-entry and for
assisting in the docking maneuvers of the Space Vehicle with Space Station. A battery
powered GPS with the alternative of a star tracker is maintained in reserve in the Space
Vehicle for absolute limp-home manual return to Earth. It is truly not felt this will ever
be required, but is part of the vehicle manifest.
Space vehicle control is dual, with right and left seat having interchangeable
displays much as contemporary 767/777 aircraft cockpits. Vehicle instrumentation is of
the glass cockpit type, eliminating the maintenance requirements for mechanical type
instruments. Current all purpose displays have MTBF's of 10,000 hours using best
commercial grade components. Multiple displays with full switchover capability will
yield mission reliabilities in the "least likely to fail" range.
Borrowing from a technique used in the next generation commercial aircraft
equipped with "glass" cockpits, an emergency self-powered independent processor
monochrome 0ow current demand) flight director will be central to both sides of the
pilot seating for flight support during a major loss of avionics power, or other anomoly
causing failure of the glass cockpit instrumentation system.
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3.6.3 Avionics System Characteristics
The primary design philosophy behind the modem aircraft avionics system is the
integration of very large quantities of information about the aircraft itself, its flight
characteristics and its environment. The primary method of integration is through the
Electronic Flight Instrument Systems (EFIS) being provided by all of the major avionics
manufactures.
The primary method of display for EFIS is by Fiat Panel Display (FPD). Here
the advantages are higher reliability, lower cost, a smaller package, and improvement in
alpha/numeric and graphic display capabilities over Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)
technology.
The major thrust in avionics integration is the computational heart of the EFIS.
In the case of Collins' Pro Line 4 system, this is handled by the Integrated Avionics
Processing System (IAPS) which is similar to the Integrated Avionics Computer (IAC)
of Honeywelrs Primus 2000. The main feature of these systems is to provide a central
maintenance function which supports maintenance monitoring for performance of the
avionics and all aircraft systems and environments. The system is capable of handling
any sensory input and applying logic to it while replacing all the normal annunciator
lights with messages that appear on one of the displays in priority order.
Coupled with the EFIS is an on-board Aircraft Communications Addressing and
Recording System (ACARS) which is a digital data link used to replace voice
communications for routine types of functions to provide a downlink of maintenance
information. Here the return on investment would come in the form of reduced down
time for the vehicle.
Using a laser inertial reference system such as Honeywelrs LASEREF II Inertial
Reference System (IRS), which is built around a compact ring laser gyro, integrated with
a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver will provide a bounded 100 meter position
error and offers the capability to re-initialize an IRS in-flight without loss of accuracy.
Additionally the EFIS allows integration of the Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance Systems (TCAS) and Mode-S transponder to provide a mini-air traffic control
display with heading and azimuth to other aircraft along with integrated aircraft response
for operation in crowded airspace.
3.6.4 Candidate Instrumentation
To minimize program costs and provide maximum utility, ARINC 600 spec high
MTBF avionics are selected where applicable, with proven performance histories to
guarantee success and minimize support logistics. Fiber optic data busses, "glass
cockpit" displays, redundant processors, heads-up-displays, and guidance/navigation
avionics will be off the shelf components. Selection criteria for AMLS are listed below:
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• Supports pad activities via telemetry
• No T-O umbilical
• Minimize GSE i
• Reduces pad manpower requirements
• Self check on power-up only
• No routine ground checkout
• Automated power up from launch complex
• Failure data stored in non-volatile memory at lru level
• Reduces bus/cpu activity
• Failure data down linked during "non-critical" flight periods
• Easily accessible avionics
• Drop down/swing out avionics bay
• All "de" electrical system
• Fiber optic data buses
• Medium rate flight control actuator
• Glass cockpit
• LRU
• Passive cooling
• ATR rack mounting
• Components per ARINC 600 using blind mated assemblies
• Off the shelf
• High MTBF
• HUD functions
• On-orbit
• Atmospheric flight
Electronic Cockoit Controls. Review of available advanced technology displays
and control systems has focussed upon glass cockpit systems developed by
Rockwell/Collins and Honeywell for advanced aircraft systems. The system developed
by Collins for the Saab 2000 fighter aircraft appears to best meet the present AMLS
requirements and selection criteria. A qualitative assessment of the displays and controls
candidate options is shown in Table 3-9.
 laxigal   aa
Attutude. The navigation
and attitude systems will be
based upon laser flberoptic
gyros and Global
Positioning Satellites
(GPS). Recent
developments in GPS
applications demonstrated
that GPS can also provide
attitude control, either
direct or as periodic updates
to a conventional ring laser
Table 3-9. Displays And Controls Candidates.
COMPONENT/FUNCTION BENEFIT
COLLINS IN SERVICE WITH SAAB
2000 AND BEECH
STARSHIP. AVAILABLE.
WILL HAVE AT LEAST A
10 YR OPERATIONAL
HISTORY.
HONEYWELL
ADVERTISED IN BOEING
777 AS MOST
ADVANCED GLASS
COCKPIT. WILL HAVE
AT LEAST 5 YEAR
OPERATIONAL HISTORY.
DISADVANTAGE
MAY BE MORE
ADVANCED _YSTF.M$
ON MARKET BY 2000
FIRST USE 1995. NOT
ALL SYSTEM DETAILS
RELEASED.
COLLINS SYSTEM
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Table 3-10. Navigation Candidates.
CQMPONENTIFUNCTION
IMU
LASER FIBEROPTIC
GAS BEARING
MECHANICAL
RECOMMENDATION
BSNEFIT
LOW DRIFTING RATE.
LOW POWER
CONSUMPTION. GPS
UPDATEABLE.
GREATER OPERATIONAL
HISTORY. MORE
ACCURATE THAN LASER
DR FIBER OPTIC.
DISADVANTAGE
LIMITED OPERATIONAL
HISTORIES. NOT AS
ACCURATE AS GAS
BEARING OR MECH.
HIGHER POWER
CONSUMPTION.
COMPLEX. HIGH
MAINTENANCE COSTS.
gyro (RLG)/accelerometer
system. A simple horizon
scanner can provide backup
for enhanced reliability. A
qualitative assessment of
the navigation and attitude
candidate options is shown
in Tables 3-10 and 3-11,
respectively.
HIGHLY ACCURATE HIGHER POWER Atmosoheric Fli_ht
CONSUMPTION. OLD. - -
HIGH MAINTENANCE _,__o T_e
LASER IMU COSTS.
atmospheric flight and
landing systems will be
based primarily upon a
combination of differential GPS and a microwave landing system (MLS). Recent tests
by Honeywell with NASA Langley have revealed differential GPS autolandings
consistently within the accuracy of the microwave landing systems. This method should
provide a low cost core technique for AMLS landings. A qualitative assessment of the
atmospheric flight and landing candidate options is shown in Table 3-12.
Vehicle Instrumentation. The total vehicle instrumentation'including the
autonomic health monitoring system cannot be determined yet, since the total vehicle
subsystems require detailed definition prior to the selection of the health and
performance monitoring system. However, the ARINC specification for the SAAB 2000
aircraft will be an initial guideline for the system, see Table 3-13. Considerable progress
and application has been achieved with health monitoring of contemporary aircraft.
Rockwell-Collins and Boeing are jointly developing health monitoring hardware and
software which will be directly applicable to the AMLS. This will result in significant
AMLS program cost savings.
The recommended avionics system is a fully integrated spacecraft/-aircraft
system. Easy-to-use, built-
in diagnostics dynamically
report the system operating
status. This simplifies
system maintenance and
minimizes use of carry-on
test equipment. The
avionics system contains
enhanced versions of
contemporary avionics and
also features an integrated
avionics processor assembly
(IAPS), a Mode-S
transponder, and advanced
Table 3-11. Attitude Candidates.
COMPONENT/FUNCTION
GPS RECEIVER(S)
STAR TRACKERICOAS
HORIZON SCANNER
RECOMMENDATION
GPS RECEIVER WITH
HORIZON SCANNER
BACKUP
BEBEE_
HAS MULTIPLE USE
PROVEN TECHNOLOGY
SIMPLER DEVICE THAN
STAR TRACKER.
CAPABLE OF PROVIDING
ACCEPTABLE ACCURACY
FOR ATTITUDE
REFERENCE.
DISADVANTAGE
LIMITED OPS HISTORY
HIGH MAINTENANCE
COSTS. COMPLICATED
EXPENSIVE.
LIMITED OPS HISTORY
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electronic flight instrumentation system (EHS) as commonly employed by the latest
commercial aircraft. In addition to the IAPS typical commercial aircraft contain at least
the following subsystems:
• Instrument Display System
• Attitude Heading System
• Flight Management System
• Weather Radar System
• Air Data System
• Flight Control system
• Radio Sensor System
• Aircraft Data Acquisition System
The 4-tube system is a
symmetrical configuration.
A Primary Flight Display
(PFD) and Electronic Flight
Display are on the pilot side
of the instrument panel; a
Navigation Display and a
Multifunction Display are
on the copilot side of the
panel. This system features
PFD backup and radar
displays for both pilot and
copilot Options include
VNAV, dual ADF, dual
VLF, dual Flight
Table 3-12. Atmospheric Flight and Landing Candidates.
COMPQNfNT/FUNCTION
MICROWAVE LANDING SYSTEM
DIFFERENTIAL GPS
VORTACRLS
RADAR ALTIMETER
PITOT STATIC LASER AIR
DATA SYSTEM
ALL OF ABOVE
PROVEN TECHNOLOGY.
PROPOSED FOR EXISTING ILS
REPLACEMENT.
LOW COST. WORLD WIDE
LANDING CAPABILITY
LAND AT ANY COMMERCIAL
OR MILITARY RUNWAY.
PROVEN TECHNOLOGY.
PROVIDES LOW ALTITUDE
TERRAIN.TRACKiNG AND
ALTITUOE SENSING.
ACCURATE ALTITUDE AND
SPEED INDICATION. NO
PROSE.
DISADVANTAGE
REQUIRES GROUND STATION A1
PRIMARY SITES
REQUIRES DIFFERENTIAL GPS
AT EACH AIRPORT
REQUIRES ADDITIONAL
EQUIPMENT ON BOARD
REQUIRES ADDITIONAL
EQUIPMENT
LIMITED OPERATIONAL
HISTORIES
Management Systems, a second Multifunction Display (installed instead of a Navigation
Display on the pilot side), and turbulence detecting radar.
tTommunication and Tracking. The selection of communication and tracking
components will be determined when the AMLS flight profiles and communication
interfaces are def'med. S-band will most probably be required, and GPS L-band, or
UHF-VI-IF ATC comm and TACAN are still under consideration. A qualitative
assessment of the potential candidates is shown in Table 3-14.
Table 3-13. Instrumentation Candidates.
COMPONENT/FUNCTION BENEFIT DISAD_LT__I:
HEALTH MONITORING IMPROVED OPERATIONS. LIMITED
DIAGNOSTIC NETWORK REDUCED LIFE CYCLE OPERATIONAL
COSTS. HISTORIES
PERFORMANCE
MONITORING IMPROVED LIMITED
OPERATIONS/SAFETY. OPERATIONAL
REDUCED LIFE CYCLE HISTORIES
RECOMMENDATION COSTS.
PER ARINC SPEC FOR
SAAB 2000
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Table 3-14. Communications and Tracking Candidates
COMPONENT/FUNCTION BENEFIT DISADVANTA_
S-BAND REDUCED COST, LOW DATA RATE
COMPLEXITY
L-BAND LOW DATA RATE
REDUCED COST,
TDP, SS COMPLEXITY COMPLEX. HIGH
MAINTENANCE.
KU-BAND HIGH DATA RATES
COMPLEX. HIGH
ATC COMM UHFtVHF ON-ORBIT RENDEZVOUS MAINTENANCE.
RECOMMENDA_ON
TBD COMBINATION OF
ABOVE
COMMONALITY WITH
EXISTING
COMMUNICATIONS
SYSTEMS
LOW DATA RATE
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4.0 ACQUISITION PHASE DEFINITION
This section documents the definition of the acquisition phase; it presents planning
data for program phases A, B, and C/D. These data have been developed based upon
accomplishing the specific major activities related to design, development, production, test,
verification, safety, reliability, quality assurance, and management and control for both
hardware and software. The AMLS program master, the manufacturing flow and build plans
and the work breakdown structure information matrices are part of this data and are
presented in this report. Life cycle cost (LCC) data worksheets have been developed and are
presented in (Reference 4-1).
4.1 MASTER DEVELOPMENT SCHEDULE
The preliminary master schedule developed for the AMLS reference concept defines
the major program events and their interactions. These schedules will be expanded and
improved during the trade study phase of the study to allow the development of subfiered
schedules in other task areas.
The Preliminary Master Program Schedule, Figure 4-1, was developed for the
reference concept to provide a set of key milestones for all elements, so that subschedules for
each subtask can eventually be produced. Preliminary schedules are provided for all of the
following activities:
Engineering
Facilities/Tooling
System Development and Test
Flight Operations Capability Development
Production
Orbiter Test
Orbiter - Crew Module - Test
Booster Test
PCS Test
The LCC analyses and products reflect the milestones in this Preliminary Master
Program Schedule. The functional task areas: Subsystem Design, Manufacturing and
Verification, and Operations and Support will each be constrained by the milestone
established by this schedule.
4.1.1 Program Milestones.
The Preliminary Master Program Schedule was driven by the assumption that the
Phase C/D ATP would occur at the beginning of fiscal year 2000. This places the Phase A
start at the beginning of fiscal year 1997, followed by Phase B start in the second quarter of
fiscal year 1988. A summary of the Preliminary Master Program Master Schedule is
presented in Figure 4-1. The Phase C/D activity will be discussed in more detail later.
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4.1,2 Schedule Overview.
The following sections address the content of each page of the P/eliminary Master
Schedule, with a few words of clarification. See Figure 4-2.
Fdiginggiill_ The engineering effort will support the PDR and CRD program reviews
with 95% design release at the beginning of fiscal year 2005. Design engineering will
support the production, qualification, verification and flight test validation activity.
Facilities/Tooling. The majority of new facilities are at the launch site and will be on
line to support facility checkout and the orbital flight test programs. The production and
operations tooling will be available to support all key milestones.
Systems Development and Test. All system development and test programs will be
extensive, assuring a mature design for the operational phase of the AMLS program.
Flieht Ooerations Capability Development The flight operations capabilities
developments addresses all the mission support and crew training activity required to support
the flight test and operational program.
I:KIp.ilgI.z_T.e,_- The orbiter test program consists of a structural test article for static
and dynamic testing, main propulsion test article for orbiter and infegrated propulsion testing
with the booster, orbiter for the approach and landing tests at Edwards AFB in California,
and the first flight vehicle to support the orbital flight test program.
Orbiter - Crew Module Test. The crew module test program consists of a structural
test article for static and flotation testing, dynamic test article for vibro-acoustic and thermal
vacuum testing and integration dynamic testing with the orbiter, and boiler plate flight test
articles to support the parachute and escape system development testing. An flight test
article will be produce for both the approach and landing, and orbital flight test program.
Booster - Test Articles. The booster test program consists of a structural test article
for static and dynamic testing, main propulsion test article for booster and integrated
propulsion testing with the orbiter, to support the approach and landing test at Edwards AFB
and the first flight booster to support the orbital flight test program.
Payload Containment System - Test Article. The payload containment system has a
unique structural test articles, in addition to test articles for the integrated orbiter dynamic
tests, approach and landing and orbital flight test.
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4.1.3 Flight Test Program.
The crew escape module, orbiter and booster vehicles and systems will be tested and
verified during the following flight test program.
parachute. Water Impact and LES Tests The following qualification sequence for
the AMLS crew escape module parachute system was obtained from Pioneer, the developer
of the Shuttle orbiter drag chute. The parachute design is based on an existing design, sized
to satisfy the AMLS requirements.
Five bomb drops and 25 full three parachute tests are scheduled in the Orbiter (Crew
Module) - Test schedules. The bomb drops would be with single parachutes and a
dead weight equal to the design requirement. All parachute drop tests will be made
from a large type air transport, like a C-5 or C- 17.
Twenty three of the three parachute tests will be drop tested with full up parachute
system, mortar, and drogues. These tests will use one of four crew escape module
boiler plate vehicles, which will have appropriate instrumentation for the drop tests.
The boiler plate vehicles will be repaired as required to complete the parachute test
program. To demonstrate robustness in the parachute system design, two chute
drops, simulating a parachute failure, would be performed. Water impact tests will
be performed in an appropriate water tank facility following the parachute drop tests.
Two of the 25 three parachute tests will be two full up Launch Escape System tests,
which will include an instrumented crew escape boiler plate vehicle and simulated
front end of the AMLS orbiter, SRM's and parachutes and their systems.
• The crew escape boiler plate test vehicles will be available to perform other tests and
fit checks as they become defined during follow-on phases of the AMLS study.
Approach and Landin_ Test (ALTL The orbiter and booster ALT programs validates
the following AMLS system capabilities in a very controlled environment.
• Autoland Performance
• Landing Gear and Brake Performance
• Low Speed Aerodynamic Control Authority
• Cross Wind Landing Sensitivity
• G. Envelope Sensitivity
• Maximum Weight Vehicle Performance
• Final Approach Energy Management
There are three proposed ALT flights for both the orbiter and booster. Both the
orbiter and booster ALT vehicles will be modified to orbital flight configuration, following
the ALT flights.
-...,,,¢
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Orbital Flight Test (OFT_. The OFT program of the AMLS system verifies it is
operational by validating the folio/ring analytical models developed to describe flight
performance and environment:
• Aerodynamics
• Aerothermal
• Thermal - TPS/TCS
• Vibration/Acoustics *
• Loads *
• Venting
Those models marked with an "*" are limits the vehicle cannot exceed in flight since
they have been verified by ground testing. The OFT program also establishes crew
confidence in the AMLS flight worthiness design, operations, performance and handling
quality.
The test results from each flight may result in changes: to the control loop lead, lag nr
gain: to follow-on fight test requirements: or operational flight limits. Final test results could
also affect the subsystem design, like supplemental or reduced TPS requirements in local
areas.
4.2 PRODUCTION
Manufacturing and system validation plans identify the production requirements,
time lines (critical paths), issues/risks, facilities (requirements and recommendations), major
equipment (including engine test stands, mock ups, test beds, iron birds, and simulations
laboratories), testing and test articles, and integration approaches for the AMLS.
AMLS reference system manufacturing flow and build plans (MFBP) have been
developed. These plans have been developed based upon the study ground rules
(Reference 4-7), the technology development plan (References 4-2 & 4-8), the acquisition
plan (Reference 4-8), operations support analysis (References 4-5 & 4-8), hardware/software
design descriptions (Reference 4-9). The MFBP's display key fabrication sequences of the
AMLS reference system. Accompanying detail narrative descriptions are provided below.
4.2.1 Aco_uisition Phase.
The AMLS objective is to design a safe, durable, low life-cycle-cost vehicle.
Obtaining this objective starts by emphasizing producibility and maintainability in the
preliminary design concepts. If it's designed and built correctly, it should be affordable. The
design will be driven by operations and maintainability requirements and assured by an
integrated system engineering, a total quality management (TQM) (Reference 4-3) approach
and the USAF, R&M 2000 Process (Reference 4-4).
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The first efforts associated with the development of our operations concept were to
develop a series of functional flow block diagrams (FFBD's) that would capture the
operational functions associated with the AMLS. The addition of the DDT&E blocks
associated with "capabilities development" and operational flight test (OFT) verification
provided the important links to the pre-production and operational periods that are necessary
ingredients in our "design for operations" philosophy. Operations lower level flows are
found in Reference 4.5.
AMLS program management has placed operations, maintainability and producibility
in priority position of importance. This system will be producible within the boundaries of
being first maintainable and operable. The key word is "access"! See Figure 4-3. The best
examples of this are: the exterior access to systems through panels and on doors; and the
manufacturing access openings in the crew escape module and the forward payload
containment system section.
Removable panels provide exterior access to systemsand systems mounted on
doors, opening to the vehicles exterior, provide access during manufacturing and
during operations.
Manufacturing access openings in the crew escape module and the forward PCS
section and the will provide significant intangible benefits to the AMLS
Program, as a similar access opening in the Space Shuttle Orbiter crew module.
Additional benefits can be derived through the mechanical closure/opening, if and
when it would be required to disassemble the transfer tunnel from the crew escape
module. Improved manufacturability
Fabrication of all AMLS vehicles and test articles in one production run is cost-
effective for the program, since each Shuttle Orbiter was built with a personnel
turnover rate of 70 percent. Continuous build will require only one facility and
tooling setup, a minimum amount of retraining, and a one-time procurement of
items including those with long lead times. Early planning will assure the
operational spares requirements are included in the production order. The
cumulative results of these actions will result in a cost effective manufacturing
program and would support DRM-1 requirements (Reference 4-7).
Fast turn around requires accessibility. To comply with that requirement, most
avionic systems and other systems historically requiring operations attention are
located on the exterior crew cabin structure, within accessible exterior
compartments. In addition to accessibility, the systems will use mature, state-of-
the-art techniques, including self-test.
The electric system is direct current, thus simplifying or eliminating heat-
producing conversion devices. The actuation systems are electro-mechanical,
avoiding APU/hydraulic fluid problems.
9O
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Figure 4-3. Producibility Influence On Design.
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4.2.2 Manufacturin_ Flow and Build Conceot - Booster.
The Booster fabrication (see the manufacturing flow and build plan (MFBP) consists
of the:
3Y.iag_fa  
]_._The wing body is fabricated of graphite polymide (Gr Pi) skins (box beam
construction) with solid stiffened spars and ribs. The spars are solid laminates with
stiffeners. They are layed-up and cured in an autoclave. The ribs are open truss plates
made of Gr Pi laminates. A root rib provides support for the forward spar and for the
vertical link attachment to the LH2 tank. There are two main spars which carry the
loads to the rigid attachment at the aft structure. The solid edges of the honeycomb
sandwich skins are mechanically fastened to the internal structure. The leading edges
are fabricated of titanium stiffened sheet in sections and are mechanically fastened to
the wing front spar. The control surfaces consist of a box beam construction and are
Gr Pi honeycomb sandwich panels, with solid stiffened spars and ribs. They are hinged
to the rear spar. Electrical actuators are used. The personnel access cover panels are
Aluminum-Lithium (Al-Li) panels machined, trimmed to size and mechanically
fastened. Access holes in the upper surfaces of the wings provide access to the interior
for manual or robotic assembly and inspection. The main landing gear supports are
truss beams that are part of the Gr Pi wing box beams.
Wing Carry-Through The wing carry-through consists of Gr Pi honeycomb skins with
solid stiffened spars and ribs, formed into the wing box/transition skirt structure with
Al-Li integrally machined, removeable panels and no insulation.
Wine-Body Fairing. The wing-body fairing is constructed of light weight Gr Pi, layed-
up, pressed and mechanically fastened. Expansion joints provided by oversize fastener
holes permit relative thermal expansion between the wing and the tank.
Tin Fins. The tip fins consist of a Gr Pi box beam, layed-up and pressed, honeycomb
sandwich skins, solid stiffened spars and ribs, graphite bismaleimide moveable
surfaces, full depth honeycomb core with no TPS, the leading edges are titanium,
conventional aircraft construction. The tip fins are attached to the wing structure and
movable control surfaces are attached at two hinges. Electrical actuators are attached
to the moveable surfaces. Control wires are routed along the wing trailing edges.
 .o_ _Camua
_Y_92g_._aga_ The nose cap consists of a titanium "beanie" that covers the external
foam insulation and AI-Li support structure. The assembly is mechanically attached to
the tank forward extrusions. Assembly requires drill plates/holding and handling
fixtures.
V
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lntertank Section. The intertank section is Constructed of AI-Li panels, mechanically
fastened to internal frames arid stiffeners. It has external foam insulation, large
personnel access panels on both sides and hardpoints for maintenance hardware
attachmenL The internal frames and stiffeners are machined and mechanically
attached. The access panels are of cabinet opening type and contain door mounted
components for easy interior access and maintenance. The nose landing gear supports
are fabricated of aluminum-lithium alloy frames and stiffeners. They are mechanically
fastened to the lower intertank structure.
,4ft Structure. The aft structure is A1-Li structure, mechanically fastened to the aft
LH2 tank skirt. It includes the wing carry-through and ties the wing to the body. The
upper part of the aft structure includes the orbiter interface fittings. The aft structure
also includes fixed frames that support removable engine fairing panels.
Engine Fairing Panels. The removable engine fairing panels are made of light weight
Gr Pi material. The panel assemblies are layed up and autoclave cured in a one-piece
assembly. They are then trimmed, drilled and mechanically fastened to the aft
structure frames using quick release high shear fasteners.
Main Propulsion Thrust Structure. The MP thrust structure consists of an Silicon
Carbide-Aluminum (SiC/A1) shell. Heavy SiC/AL longerons, mechanically attached,
stiffen the shell structure. The engine interface ring is forged, machined aluminum.
Body Flap. The body flap is composed of laminated graphite polymide box beams and
spars. The skins are honeycomb sandwich panels. The body flap is hinged to the aft
structure and driven by electrical actuators.
Base Heat Shield. The base heat shield has solid stringers and spars and is covered
with machined Gr Pi honeycomb sandwich skins, mechanically fastened. Insulation is
attached to the skin panels.
Orbiter Interface Structure. The Orbiter interface structure (to separation) consists of a
2 point attachmenL The internal frames and longerons axe machined and mechanically
attached.
Propellant Tanks
Hydrogen Tank. The hydrogen tank consists of Al-Li domes and barrel sections
welded together. The domes are each made up of four identical quarters, made from
Al-Li panels with internal frames and stiffeners. The welding process can be laser or
high frequency (ultasonic) on automated, robotic fixtures and handling equipment. The
domes are stretch formed, them milled, and welded together on automatic fixtures.
The two domes have personnel access panels that include line penetrations in the access
panels for systems, inspections and maintenance. The barrel sections are shaped fusion
welded assemblies made of Al-Li integrally stiffened skin panels, which have been
machined from plate stock on numerically controlled (NC) mills. These skin panels
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includeprovisionsfor mounting support fittings for external propulsion line and cable
trays. Tapped holes are provided with threaded inserts in the skin panels for
installation and support fittings. Bosses are machined into the lonl_itudinal stringers.
The vortex baffle assembly is located at the siphon outlet having four identical baffle
webs extruded and riveted with bracing rods to provide additional support to the
assembly and screen assembly. Level sensors are installed in the forward and aft
sections of the tank.
• IJ:[2 Insulation. The LH2 insulation is exterior cryogenic SOFI/Rohacell foam with an
ablative coating, that is to be developed.
12xggga.T_a/ag_The oxygen tank consists of AI-Li aft dome, ogive nose section, slosh
baffle and cylindrical barrel section. Each is shaped, stretched formed, them milled,
and welded together in automatic fixtures. The dome is made up of four identical
quarters and the ogive is made up of four identical quarters, made from AI-Li panels
with internal frames and stiffeners, shaped and welded. The welding processes can be
laser or high frequency (ulta sonic), on automatic, robotic fixtures and handling
equipment. The aft dome has a personnel access panel that includes line penetrations in
the access panel for systems, inspections and maintenance. The barrel section is a
fusion welded assembly made of A1-Li integrally stiffened skin panels, which have
been preformed and them milled from plate stock. These skin panels include
provisions for mounting support fittings for external propulsibn line and cable trays.
Tapped holes are provided with threaded inserts in the skin panels for installation and
support fittings. Bosses axe machined into the longitudinal stringers. The vortex baffle
assembly is located at the siphon outlet having four identical baffle webs extruded and
riveted with bracing rods to provide additional support to the assembly and screen
assembly. Level sensors are installed in the forward and aft sections of the tank.
• LOT. Insulation. The LO2 Insulation is exterior cryogenic insulation, SOFl/RohaceU
foam with an ablative coating, that is to be developed.
• _ The nose gear is a purchased component [DC 10-30 derivative, 2-wheel,
steerable] - installed, integrated, and checked-out.
• _. he main landing gear are purchased components [Boeing 767 derivative
two - 4 wheel truck] -installed, integrated, and checked-out.
_ain Propulsion
• F,ng/t_. The engines are purchased components [SSME derivative] [five engines] -
installed, integrated, and checked-out.
• _. The engine gimbals are purchased components - installed, integrated,
and checked-out [ 1 gimbal and 2 actuators/engine]
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• Engine Mounted Heatshields. The engine mounted heatshields are insulated blankets,
mechanically fastened around the engines.
Pressurization System. The pressurization system consists of purchased tanks, lines
fabricated from stainless steel material, brazed/welded, with A1-Li support/brackets
fabricated and mechanically fastened.
Lines and Manifolds. The lines are fabricated from welded stainless steel tubing, the
manifold components are purchased and the system is assembled, integrated and
checked-out.
Propulsion. Rcs
• Thrusters. The thrusters axe purchased components - installed, integrated, and
checked-out. [7 front; 10 rear - Vernier]
Thruster Supports. The thruster supports are purchased components - installed,
integrated, and checked-out.
• Pressurization System. The pressurization system is manufactured from stainless steel
tubing - installed, integrated, and checked-out.
Lines. Man_'olds and Tanks. The lines are manufactured from welded stainless steel
tubing. The tanks and manifolds are purchased components. The components are -
installed, integrated, and checked-out.
Prime Power
• Fuel Cells. The fuel cells are purchased components - installed, integrated, and
checked-out.
• Reactant Dewars. The reactant dewars are purchased components - installed,
integrated, and checked-out.
Electrical Conversion And Distribution
• Power Conversion. The power conversion components are purchased components -
installed, integrated, and checked-out.
• Electro-Mechanical Control Units. The EM control units are purchased components -
installed, integrated, and checked-out.
Cabling & Wiring. Avionics power; actuator power and other systems power - The
cabling and wiring are manufactured components - installed, integrated, and checked-
out.
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Actuators
I
• Elevons: Tip Fins: and Body_ Flap. The EM actuators are purchased components -
installed, integrated, and checked-out.
Avionics
Guidance. Navigation and Control: Health Monitoring: Communications and
Trackine: Dist_lavs and Controls: Instrumentation System: and Data Processine. The
- v
avionics hardware components are purchased components - installed, integrated, and
checked-out.
• _l/.._2fll£R_. The flight software is developed, system integrated and checked-out.
Environmental Control
• Thermal Control. Thermal control is provided by using the main propulsion cryogens
as a heat sink.
Tank Purge. Helium is used to purge the tanks. It is held in liquid storage tanks
[purchased components] that are mechanically fastened to the vehicles secondary
structure. The lines are manufactured, the system integrated and checked-out.
Auxiliary Recovery Systems
Orbiter Seaaration. The Orbiter separation includes explosive nuts [purchased
components] that are mechanically attached then severed during the separation
sequence. All separation debris is contained.
4.2.3 Manufacturing Flow and Build Concept - Orbiter.
The Orbiter fabrication (that includes the crew escape module and payload
containment system).consists of the following elements:
Jd_!ag_. The wing body is constructed of titanium-aluminum (Ti-A1). It is in a box
beam geometry with three spars. Two spars carry the wing bending through the aft
fuselage. The forward spar is run through the intertank structure. The spars are Ti-AI
sine wave and spars attached by welding them to the upper and lower flanges. The
ribs are tubular trusses of Ti welded to Ti end fittings and mechanically attached to the
spars and skin panels. Welding fixtures, holding f'txtures, X-ray and dye penetrant and
handling fixtures are required for fabrication and inspection. Secondary structure is
fabricated, integrated and installed for internal lines and cable supports. Wing skins are
Ti-Al stiffened skin panels, superplastically formed and mechanically attached to the
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internal structure.Theleadingedges are fabricated of Advanced Carbon-Carbon
(ACC) in sections and are mechanically fastened to the wing front spar. The ACC
components are purchased components, integrated and installed. The control surfaces
consist of ACC components, hinged to the wing aft spar. The wing upper surfaces
structure have no TPS, access doors fabricated of Ti-AI stiffened skin and provides
access to the wing interior. The lower surfaces have durable, hard surface TPS tiles,
mechanically attached. The main landing gear supports are Ti-A1 construction,
mechanically attached to the wing structure.
Wing Carry-Through. The wing carry-through is a part of the aft structure connection.
It ties the wing to the body. It is of Ti-A1 which is mechanically attached to the A1-Li
aft structure. Titanium thermal isolators attach the wing carry-through box beam to the
A1-Li tank skirts.
Wing-Body Fairing. The wing-body fairing is constructed of light weight Gr Pi,
trimmed, layed-up on molds for contour, fabricated then mechanically fastened to the
structure. Expansion joints provided by oversize fastener holes permit relative thermal
expansion between the wing and the tank.
Tin Fins. The tip f'ms consist of Ti-AI stiffened skin panels, spars and ribs, ACC
leading edges, durable TPS and secondary structure for cables and wiring supports.
Access f'LxtUreS, drill fixtures and lay up fixture are required {o support construction.
The tip fins are attached to the wing structure and ACC movable control surfaces are
attached at two hinges. Electrical actuators are attached to the moveable surfaces.
Control wires are routed along the wing trailing edges.
Nose Section. The nose structure is fabricated of AI-Li with mechanically attached
frames and stringers. The aerodynamic nose cone is ACC mechanically fastened,
similar to the space shuttle orbiter nose cone. The nose landing gear support consists
of aluminum-lithium alloy frames and stiffeners.
Crew Cabin/Escat_e Module. The crew cabin structure is a welded cylindrical shaped
unit constructed of A1-Li super plastically formed extruded rings, longerons and
stiffeners that are laser welded. The shape is supported by machined rings and
longerons with stiffeners that are mechanically fastened. The crew module separation
systems includes shape and linear charges with guillotines to sever the module from the
tank structure. There are housings and thrust supports fabricated of AL-Li to contain
the tractor rockets and support equipment required for escape. The crew module
escape battery is a purchased component, located in the separations systems housing.
The parachute system is located in the rear of the crew escape module, attached to the
structure. The compartment contains a cartridge assembly for the drogue parachute and
main parachutes with lanyards stowed in a laminated holding cabinet. Positive opening
of the doors is assured through the use of explosive bolts. The design consists of
standard aircraft construction.
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Intertank Section. The inteffank section is a semi-monocoque structure, of A1-Li, with
flanges at each end for joining the LO2 and LH2 tanks. Its primar_ function is to
receive, distribute and transfer loads between the tanks. The use of the intertank makes
it possible for the orbiter to have separate propellent tank bulkheads, thus avoiding the
design complexity and added operational constraints associated with common bulkhead
configurations. A filament wound thermoplastic stiffened shell with internal frames
and externally bonded stiffeners are used for the TPS panels that are mechanically
attached, to the lower surface only. There are large access doors provided on each side.
&t_t_C.llt_. The aft adapter is A1-Li structure, mechanically fastened to the aft LO2
tank skirt. The aft adapter provides the connection between the thrust structure and the
LO2 tank.
F,o.gi/ig..EaiL_g. The aft structure is made of light weight Gr Pi panels that are hinged,
contain edge seals and have external AFRSI blankets for insulation. The Gr Pi material
is sheared, layed-up on a splash mold, trimmed, drilled and mechanically fastened. It
includes the wing carry-through and ties the wing to the body. The lower part of the
aft structure includes the booster interface fittings constructed of Al-Li with machined
spars and ribs, mechanically connected to the frames and shell structure. The upper
part of the aft structure includes the aft attachment of the payload carrier.
Main Prooulsion Thrust Structure. The MP thrust structure consists of an Silicon
Carbide-Aluminum (SiC/Al) lobed conical shell. The engine interface ring is forged,
machined aluminum. There is no TPS.
• Access Tunnel. The access tunnel consists of formed Al-Li panels that are welded into
a cylinder 7 foot in diameter with openings at the front and rear.
Base Heat Shield. The base heat shield has solid stringers and spars and is covered
with machined Gr Pi honeycomb sandwich skins, mechanically fastened. Insulation is
attached to the skin panels.
• Body Flap. The body flap is an ACC assembly with Ti attachments. Its EM actuator is
located inside the body aft structure.
• Dockine Mechanism. The docking mechanism consists of the National Space
Transportation System standard in bay device.
Pro_llant Tanks
• Hydrogen Tank. The hydrogen tank consists of:
E.O2:F.ar.d..dO2_d. The forward domes are made of A1-Li quarter sections. These are
machined and welded to form ellipsoidal shells. The welding processes can be laser
or high frequency (ulta sonic), on automatic, robotic fixtures and handling
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equipment. A1-Li sheet is formed and welded, with bosses and stiffeners to distribute
loads.
A1Zdo.l_. The aft domes are similarly constructed into quarter sections that are
shaped, stretched formed, chem milled, and welded in/on a rotating weld fixture,
using support holding fixtures. Penetrations to the interior of the tank, such as for
filFdrain and purge/vent, are incorporated into the quarter section domes.
_. The tapered and cylindrical lobed sections consist of machined or
extruded y-section longerons of A1-Li, used at the joint between the shell and the
web, single curvature stiffened skins and a central web. External stiffeners are used
on the lower part of the LH2 tank. The upper portion of the LH2 tank has internal
stiffeners. The skins are welded to the supporting frames and stringers. Secondary
structures and associated details are installed prior to final closeouts. Slosh baffles
are machine fabricated and are mechanically and weld attached to support frames.
The hydrogen tank cabling, instrumentation and lightning protection are supported via
secondary structure components. These items may be detail purchased or fabricated,
then integrated during tank build up after initial welding. The internal frames and
external stiffeners are AI-Li welded. Chemically milled weld lands are provided along
the skin panel edges and ring frame junctures. Local weld lands are provided for the
welding of fittings to support the LH2 recirculation line, pressurization line and level
sensors. Included in this fabrication are the use of handling, transportation, welding,
X-ray, dye penetrant equipment, access stands and facilities.
L//__. The LH2 insulation is multi-layer cryogenic insulation (MLI) panels
bonded to the structure interior. Gaps are sealed with thermoplastic tape using a heat
gun or laser equipment. Formed foam blocks are used to insulate the internal frames,
stiffeners, and webs. The foam blocks are covered with an impervious film on top and
covering the foam block to MLI intersection to prevent LH2 migration. These covered
formed foam blocks are bonded over the internal frames, stiffeners, and webs.
O.a:y.gt,fl..Ta_. The oxygen tank consists of AI-Li domes, slosh baffle, central web, and
lobed cylindrical barrel section welded together. The welding processes can be laser or
high frequency (ulta sonic), on automatic, robotic fixtures and handling equipment.
Heavy cusp longerons are welded in at the top and bottom. The domes each are made
up of four identical quarters, shaped, stretched formed, chem milled, and welded in
automatic fixtures. The domes have personnel access panels that includes line
penetrations in the access panels for systems, inspections and maintenance. The barrel
section is a fusion welded assembly made of A1-Li integrally stiffened skin panels,
which have been preformed and chem milled from plate stock. These skin panels
include provisions for mounting support fittings for external propulsion line and cable
Ways. Tapped holes are provided with threaded inserts in the skin panels for
installation support fittings. Bosses are machined into the longitudinal stringers. The
vortex baffle assembly is locate at the siphon outlet having four identical baffle webs
extruded and riveted with bracing rods to provide additional support to the assembly
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andscreenassembly.Levelsensorsareinstalledin theforward andaft sectionsof the
tank.
I
/d__. The LO2 Insulation is multi-layer cryogenic insulation (MLI) panels
bonded to the structure interior. Gaps are sealed with thermoplastic tape using a heat
gun or laser equipment. Formed foam blocks are used to insulate the internal frames,
stiffeners, and webs. The same impervious film used over the foam blocks in the LH2
tank will be used in the LO2 tank to prevent the LO2 from reacting with the foam
blocks.
Thermal Protection System
Exte_a/. The external insulation consists of durable, hard surface TPS tiles on the
lower surface and blankets on the upper surface. The external tiles are mechanically
attached to the vehicles skin. The nose and wing leading edges axe ACC, mechanically
attached. The upper body surfaces are covered with bonded flexible ceramic blankets -
AFRSI/TABI bonded to the structure. There is no TPS on the wing upper surface.
I.aadiag.F.t  
• Nose Gear. The nose gear is a purchased component [DC 10-30 derivative, 2-wheel,
steerable] - installed/integrated/checked-out.
• Main Gear. The main landing gear are purchased components [Boeing 767 derivative,
two 4-wheel trucks] -installed/integrated/checked-out.
Main Propulsion
Edag/t_. The engines are purchased components [SSME derivative] [five engines] -
installed/integrated/checked-out.
Engine Gimbals. The engine gimbals are purchased components -
installed/integrated/checked-out [1 gimbal and 2 actuators/engine]
Engine Mounted Heatshields. The engine mounted heatshields are insulated blankets,
mechanically fastened around the engines.
Pressurization Svstent The pressurization system consists of purchased tanks, lines
fabricated from stainless steel material, brazed/welded, with A1-Li support/brackets
fabricated and mechanically fastened.
Lines and Manifolds. The lines are fabricated from welded stainless steel tubing, the
manifold components are purchased and the system is assembled, integrated and
checked-out.
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Propulsion. RCS
• Thrusters. The thrusters are purchased components - installed, integrated, and
checked-out. [front: 9 vernier; rear: 12 Vernier, 18 primary]
Thruster Supports. The thruster supports are purchased components - installed,
integrated, and checked-out.
• Pressurization System. The pressurization system is manufactured from stainless steel
tubing - installed, integrated, and checked-out.
Lines. Manifolds and Tanks. The lines are manufactured from stainless steel tubing.
The tanks and manifolds are purchased components. The components are - installed,
integrated, and checked-out.
Propulsion. OMS
• Thrusters. The thrusters [3] are purchased components - installed, integrated, and
checked-out.
Thruster Supports. The thruster supports are purchased components - installed,
integrated, and checked-out.
• Pressurization System. The pressurization system is manufactured from stainless steel
tubing - installed, integrated, and checked-out.
Lines. Manifolds and Tanks. The lines are manufactured from stainless steel tubing.
The tanks and manifolds are purchased components. The components are - installed,
integrated, and checked-out.
Prime Power
• Batteries. The battery is a purchased component, installed, integrated and checked-out.
• Fuel Cells. The fuel cells [4] are purchased components - installed, integrated, and
checked-out.
• Reactant Dewars. The reactant dewars are purchased components - installed,
integrated, and checked-out.
Electrical Conversion And Distribution
• Power Conversion. The power conversion components are purchased components -
installed, integrated, and checked-out.
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• Electro-Mechanical Control Units. The EM control units are purchased components -
installed, integrated, and che_ked-ouL.
i
• Cabling & Wirine. Avionics power; actuator power and other systems power - The
cabling and wiring are manufactured components - installed, integrated, and checked-
ouL
Actuators
• Elevons: Tip Fins: and Body Flap. The actuators are purchased components -
installed, integrated, and checked-out.
Avionics
• Guidance. Navigation and Control: Health Monitorine: Communications and
-- v
Trackine: Disolavs and Controls: Instrumentation System: and Data Processine. The
avionics hardware components are purchased components, installed, integrated, and
checked-out.
• _. The flight software is developed, system integrated and checked-out.
Environmental Control
Air & CO2 Removal; Equipment Cooling; Heat Transfer Loop; Heat
Rejection System fFES); and Radiators - The ECS hardware components are
purchased components - installed, integrated, and checked-out.
• Thermal Control. Provided by using the main propulsion cryogens as a heat sink in
conjunction with externally mounted radiators.
_. Helium is used to purge the tanks. It is held in liquid storage tanks
[purchased components] that are mechanically fastened to the vehicles secondary
structure. The lines are manufactured, the system integrated and checked-out.
Personnel Provisions
Galley: Personnel Hygiene: Trash: Storage: Seats: Sleep Stations: Fire Detection and
Suppression: Medical Equipment: and Food and Potable Water. Purchased and
government furnishedequipment -installed,integrated,and checked-out.
Auxiliary Recovery Systems
• Personnel Raaid Eeress. TBD
Payload Containment System
• Forward PCS Workstation. The forward PCS workstation will form an integral part of
the orbiter and will be constructed of A1-Li sheet, mechanically fastened to spars and
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stringers. The forward PCS workstation is a conical pressure vessel of A1-Li
construction with stringers and stiffeners. It is permanently attached to the orbiter. It
houses some consumables, crew storage, sleep station,gaUey and systems, air lock
assembly and docking work station. The forward PCS assembly attaches to the tunnel
assembly and the forward outer section has TPS for thermal protection.
Aft Payload Canister. The aft payload canister is removable from the orbiter. The
payload support compartment construction is of A1-Li sheets over stringers. Provisions
for supports and brackets for additional support for the payload, such as, tanks, lines,
wiring and instrumentation are provided. In addition, access panels and interconnect
panels are provided. Critical structural provisions of the PCS include two ball-joint
fittings on the aft structure and associated supporting internal structure. These are
machined of Ti with Al-Li machined supporting structure and internal frames.
The forward payload canister support is a hinged link which is mounted on a LH2 tank
frame. Included are thermal isolators for the forward support link. A retractable
electrical/data interface plate will be fabricated of A1-Li. Laminated Gr Pi fairings will
be provided to seal against pressure differentials. TPS blankets will be fabricated with
attachment fairing connections. The payload bay is fabricated using the mid body
space shuttle orbiter construction concepts of ribs, spars and stringers with Al-Li sheet
paneling.
Graphite epoxy doors for access/removal of payloads during flight are fabricated using
standard manufacturing concepts. Doors are electro-mechanically operated.
Wiring/cabling and provisions for pneumatic lines for payloads will be fabricated using
brackets/standoffs and secondary structure.
• PCS Mount Hard Points. There are six PCS mount hard points for attachment of the
PCS to the orbiter.
4.2.4 Manufacturin_ Master Schedule.
The Manufacturing Master Schedule, has been developed using program-level
milestones. It references the program schedules in Section 4.1.1 of this report, which
support system requirements and integrated task time estimates. The schedule provide
optimum support for the manufacturing program in all areas, including engineering,
facilities, material procurement, manpower loading and tooling, and application of
comparative measurements of historical Space Shuttle performance.
System support hardware will be fabricated via a blended schedule to maintain
systems used throughout the vehicle. All other schedule bars are major components and
hardware groups of the overall vehicle and, as such, stand alone with their own flow plans.
Final assembly and checkout will be the point in time when the major vehicle components
are mated, allowing systems integration and subsequent testing. Flow plans may be
established for each major component/hardware group shown on the master schedule,
providing an orderly time phasing for Manufacturing production activities. The schedules
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serve as the basis for manpower loading, material need, and facility and equipment usage.
Optimum control points will be estabLished to provide performance controls, change control,
and status information that will be measured against the master scheduld.
4..3 TEST AND VERIFICATION
Manufacturing and fabrication of flight hardware includes the verification of system
operation, both individually and integrated. The system will be validated during the
operational phase of the contract. The following definitions are being used by the study:
• _: All tests (and/or checkout) performed prior to validation of the system
• Validation: Certification of the system performed during the operations phase of the
contract (such as space vehicle flight readiness review sign-off or flight
worthiness-aircraft certification)
4.3.1 Philosoohv.
The testing philosophy is to achieve system validation without overkill. The aircraft
industry approach to verification and validation has been reviewed and evaluated to
determine the most efficient and effective manner of achieving validation.
Emphasis on development testing will provide assurance of a sound product and
generate high confidence in a successful qualification test program. A robust development
test followed by a high-fidelity integration test will lead to a flight worthy, low-risk system.
The flight test segment will be planned to provide evidence that flight boundaries and
requirements have been met. Guided by lessons learned, the testing concept developed here
supports the basic philosophy of assuring a safe, durable, cost-effective AMLS.
4.3.2 Life Cycle Develooment..
Development test and evaluation (T&E) serves a number of useful functions. It will
provide information to AMLS decision makers responsible for making cost and risk
decisions which impact life cycle cost and reliability over the life of the system, such as early
selection of system elements that will satisfy specification requirements, definition of
subsystem element performance and compatibility with the evironments, and proof of interface
compatibility between subsystems.. T&E will be conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of
design approaches, to minimize risk, to identify design alternatives, to compare and analyze
tradeoffs and to estimate operational effectiveness and suitability. As the AMLS undergoes
design and development, the emphasis in testing will move gradually from development to
operational T&E. The later phase will focus on questions of operational effectiveness,
suitability and supportability. As noted, T&E is a process that will be continuous through
the development and operational phases, A,B and C/D, (Figure 4-4).
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PhaseA, or Conceptual
Exploration, is the time frame when
the T&E Master Plan (TEMP) is
conceived. The TEMP is the basic
planning document for all T&E
functions. The TEMP is the guiding
manual for planning, reviewing and
approving T&E programs and provides
the basis and authority for all other
detailed test related documents. It will
identify all critical technical
characteristics, operational issues and
T&E schedules. The TEMP will be
reviewed and updated as the program
matures. Key topics contained in the
TEMP are shown in Figure 4-5. In
addition to development of the TEMP,
development testing will begin during
Phase A and continue into Phase B.
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Figure 4-4. Test and Evaluation Phases.
4.3.3 Test Documentation and Certification.
l_,lllnglllali_. Test documentation is a major part of the test program and can be a
significant contributor to test program cost and therefore must be efficiently managed.
AMLS test documentation cost will be held to a minimum, consistent with good
management practices. A detailed documentation water fall listing, in appropriate order, test
documents from top to bottom has not as yet been developed: however, such a list is
expected to contain the documents, or comparable ones, noted in Table 4-1, Test
Figure 4-5. AMLS Test and Evaluation Master
Plan.
Documentation Tree. It is assumed
that NASA will publish a master
verification plan similar to the Shuttle's
and it will guide, in part, test
documentation orientation for AMLS.
Though a formal document list has not
be developed, a number of documents
axe planned starting with the TEMP.
_,Ilifi_li_. Certification is
the act of declaring that a subsystem,
system and/or vehicle has satisfied all
conslraining requirements and is ready
for the next major event. The
certification process to be followed for
the AMLS program is depicted in
Figure 4-6.
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Table 4-1. Test Documentation Tree.
MASTER VERIFICATION PLAN
MIL-STD-1540B (USAF) TEST REQUI_ FOR SPACE VEI_CLES
MIL-HDBK-340 (USAF) APPLICATION GUIDELINES F:DRNIIL-STD- 1540
TEST REQUIREMENTSFOR SPACE VEHICLES
E_/VIRONMENTAL ACC_'TANCE TESTING
I_VlRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS AND TEffF CRITERIA
DeVELOmn_TAND_xt.n_c.x_oN TESTm_Q_m_ocrs
sys'r_ _ slmsys-r_mc_r_cAa_O_
cmmncRaloN m_aREME_rrs
PROCUREMI_ SPECIFICATIONS
"rEST I_.ANS
_ PROCEDURES
I'EST REPORTS
I__O ANALYSIS _RTS
43,40ualification Test Approach..
• Qualification of a space
transportation system requires both
ground and flight testing and each
plays a unique roll in the process of
achieving flight certification. Design
requirements of a space vehicle system
are basically derived from the results
of math and other technical models that
were modeled from past experience,
new techniques and mission
requirements. Testing is the method
used to verify that the models and the
products generated from the model
data satisfy requirements and depict the
correct environment.
Ground testing is the primary
means of verifying that the vehicle
design satisfies the structural, dynamic
Figure 4-6. Certification Process.
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and thermal requirements as defined by the models and wind tunnel tests. Ground testing is
also the general format for verifyifig components, assemblies, subassemblies and integrated
systems comply with stipulated requirements and performance parameters. It is generally
impractical for a space vehicle to fly the boundaries of design during qualification testing so
the models and other technical data used in the design of the vehicle are verified through
flight testing. A simplified overview of the process that will be followed to achieve
verification is illustrated in Figure 4-7. The verification plan sets the stage for verification
and, ultimately, certification for operational flights.
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Figure 4-7. Verification Process.
Ground Test Proeram. Ground tests will expose AMLS equipment and structures to
environments that are calculated to be at least equal to and in some cases substantially exceed
the expected operational environment for marginal assessment. Exposure may be through
similarity, analysis, demonstration and/or test. Similarity and/or analysis are the preferred
methods from a cost and time standpoint and these methods will be used whenever the risk is
consider acceptable. Candidates for acceptance through similarity/analysis are components
previously employed in non critical space applications which have displayed a high
reliability factor. The purpose of the ground test and its objectives for AMLS are defined in
Table 4-2•
The flight hardware qualification test portion of the integrated test program will be
structured to ensure that design performance can be realized under mission environments.
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Table 4-2. Ground Test Program Objectives.
GROUND TESTING ISTI_ PRIMARY ]I_AN$ (_ VlmUFY_O THAT THI_ V_'a(_LE DESIGN
SAllSI_S 11_ SlltUCIl,'RA_ DIl_J_]C. _ _'D _ _ AS
D_qN'ED BY _ AF_ WI_ _ TI_TS.
Gi_ID TEs'rl _ L5 ALSO THE Qlmqm_L PORidAT FOR _O OQMPO/_.
._3SEMBLIES, S_L._S, AND _TI_ SYSTEMS C01_LAN(_ WITH
SFI PULATED REQUIREM]E_TS A,_) _C_.
OB._CTW_ ASSURE THAT THE SYST_( WILL M_T FLIGHT OB_'HV_ WHILE
N_ING M_D M_HT._iI_IG A LOW Ln_ CYCI.E CE6"T PP._
MAX_ TEST PARAMETERS WILL INCLUDe"
STRESS TIBSTTHE STRUCTURE AJ_) (:2fEW _ _ AITACHMI_TS TO
_TED c_'rERb_. CONDrnoN$ INO..UD_NG HIGH Q, _ GH |'S, WAI'B_
_P/_'r, THERMAL YIBRATORY, AND _ • LANDING CGNDrlIoN$
_ TEST 1"i_ LANDING GEA_ AND BRAXE SYST_4S TO MAX_dUM
_G LOADS WITH LIMIT CROSSWIND CONDITIONS
STRESS 3_ST _ AYI_'JCS. POWn.._qD E_SS SY_:
o OVER AND UNDER RATED POWER LEVE_
o _ FA/LURES
o ANOMALY SOF/"WARE COMMANDS
o WOSST CM_E ENTEY _
o EX'FEN'DED I,_SSKx_r PRORLES
Figure 4-8 provides an outline for
ground qualification of all flight
hardware phased t6 support the first
test article. Subsequently, these test
data will be supplemented with flight
data from ALT and OFT flights as a
means of certifying for AMLS
operational use. The environments
established for qualification will be
tailored to each hardware item based
upon individual sensitivity to the
mission environmental conditions,
flight criticality, safety, mission
success considerations, ease of
maintainability and historical
experience.
Qualification requirements will
encompass the environment associated
with transportation, handling, ferry
conditions as well as those associated with the mission. The general approach for the AMLS
program will be to make ground conditions appropriate for the mission profiles.
Environmental qualification test requirements will be determined by comparing mission
profile environments to the sensitivity of individual components. The decision will take into
account the state-of-the-art (maturity) of the hardware and cost and risk. Mature commercial
and military avionics considered applicable but sensitive to space environment will be
modified and upgraded for
AMLS application.
Qualification testing
will require test specimens. A
portion of these specimens will
first be subjected to design
performance limits under
environments applied
sequentially for design proof at
the component level. Other
specimens, as required, will be
tested as an integral part of a
subassembly, when practical,
and exposed to single and
combined environments to
determine interface
compatibility and verify
operational life capability. The
specific qualification
• IIASKI) tIN NASA TKCIINI)I.IX;Y LEVEl. 6 fly YF,AR 20110
Figure 4-8. Qualification Test Logic.
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requirements and the selected test or analysis approach will be addressed in the certification
plan and defined in the individual iest plans.
Ground/Flight Verification Tradeoff. Flying without prior ground testing would
impose unacceptable risks, and qualification of all hardware totally by ground test would
minimize flight risk but would result in much higher cost. The key objectives, then, are to
determine how much testing must be done on the ground to optimize the risk-cost trade and
what level of assembly, what environmental levels, and what durations should be used to
attain a reasonable flight -worthiness level. Consistent with these objectives, ground test at
the appropriate level, duration and/or safety factor will be required to demonstrate a specific
number of missions or total design life when hardware is flight critical or has an adverse
history.
All noncritical and relatively non-sensitive hardware will be subjected to flight
worthiness testing for selectively determined duration. Flight worthiness testing will be
conducted for a period determined to exceed the "infant mortality* period to detect failures
likely to occur early in qualification testing. This will be based on space and aircraft
program experience. Additional life test data will be accumulated on noncritical hardware
during the flight test program. Flight worthiness concept for cost avoidance is justified on
noncritical hardware based on AMLS failure-tolerant design, including fail safe (minimum
design), fail operational/fail safe for functionally critical items and self test capability.
Performance data on both critical and noncritical hardware gathered during the
testing phases will be disseminated and modeled to establish limits on vital parameter data
which will be monitored to determine the health of the hardware.
The airlines have correlated ground test duration to the number of flight hours
planned prior to scheduled major inspection. The airline approach to certification prior to
allowing passenger flights will provide guidelines relative to the number of AMLS missions
that should be simulated on the ground on noncritical hardware prior to flight.
Except for very thermal sensitive items that may require over temperature stressing, it
is anticipated that segments of the orbiter and booster will be subjected to thermal-vacuum
testing. Critical subsystems sensitive to thermal/vacuum environments will be life tested
using accelerated thermal test techniques.
It is also anticipated that segments of the orbiter and booster will be subjected to
vibro-acoustic environments. The vibro-acoustic environment has not been modeled for the
AMLS. If the predicted environment is sufficiently mild it may be risk tolerant and cost
effective to subject only critical items with vibration sensitive components to a vibro-
acoustic environment. The qualification logic for vibro-acoustics and thermal-vacuum are
shown in Figure 4-9.
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Figure 4-9. Vibro-Aconstics/Thermal-Vacuum Qualification Logic
Off-Limit. Overstress and Abort Testing. Off-limit and over stress testing will be
performed to identify design margins on flight critical hardware, when design margins are
relatively small, on long lead items or items difficult to replace and when uncertainty exists
in environmental data for abort conditions and single failure points. A Shuttle orbiter study
indicated that approximately 25% of the vehicles hardware parts were candidates for
overstress testing. Use of current state-of-the-art components and mature hardware should
substantially reduce the percentage of candidates on AMLS.
Off-limit and over stress testing will subject hardware to conditions that exceed the
design and qualification requirements. Test objectives will be used to determine how much
excess stress/environment critical units can withstand prior to reduced performance or
malfunctioning to provide confidence that identified failure modes related to potential flight
safety failures will be minimized if not eliminated. Orbiter studies have shown that off-
nominal abort conditions could generate the most probable over stress conditions. These
tests will provide confidence towards achieving low life cycle costs.
Subsystem Testing. Test requirements for the AMLS will be derived from lessons
learned from the orbiter, predicted environments and applicable military and NASA
specifications. The logic planned to achieve structural verification is illustrated in
Figure 4-10.
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Figure 4-10. Structures Verification Logic.
The structural ground test program will begin with material evaluation. Material
testing will fall into four categories: material control, fracture control, material
characteristics development, and processing development. Though the AMLS program
intends to use mature, proven products, there may be some areas where new light weight
state-of-the-art non-metallic materials will require life cycle testing for untried applications.
Structural development tests will be performed to develop design optimization and develop
confidence in the approach. Verification of the structure subsystem for critical design limit
and ultimate loads will utilize fuR-scale structural articles. These tests, subsequent to
structural development testing, will be carried to the point of destruction to develop
performance data on overstressed conditions. The structu_ testswill be performed as the
program matures and the purpose of these tests are noted on the figure. Modal frequencies,
shapes and damping characteristics will be measured through ground shake testing to
validate the dynamic math models.
Landing/I)eceleration. The landing gear systems consist of a conventional tricycle
landing gear with nose wheel steering and electric actuated brakes and anti-skid system. The
intent is to use the landing gear system of a proven military or commercial aircraft modified
to meet system requirements. This approach should bypass the landing gear problems
experienced by the orbiter. After the landing/deceleration system has been verified in the
lab, a suitable aircraft will be equipped with the AMLS gear to further verify performance
and capability before the Approach and Landing Test (ALT).
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D_Oglhiag. The orbiter's upper, forward portion of the housing for the payload
containment system, PCS, will coritain the structure and mechanisms to acquire and interface
with the proposed space station docking system. The docking test progrCam will verify
structural integrity, mechanism performance, ability to dock and lock under various
conditions of alignment, and demonstrate the emergency separation system.
Thermal Protection and Control. Wind tunnel tests and math modeling of the orbiter
for ascent, on orbit and decent profiles will provide the design-to requirements for thermal
protection (TPS) and control (TCS). Initial development and testing of the TPS, which is
expected to be part new materials and part refinement of the orbiter TPS, will be performed
at the supplier. Principal TPS tests will verify thermal properties and performance
characteristics, structural integrity, ability to adhere to the substructure, wear and handling
properties and repair capabilities. Thermal control tests will verify heating and cooling
performance.
Orbit Maneuverin2 (OMS) and Reaction Control fRCS) Systems. The OMS and
RCS are functionally independent but have the common purpose of powering the vehicle in
orbit. Both use pressure-fed LO2/LH 2 propellants contained in tanks and distributed to the
propelling thrusters through lines and valves. The intent is to use proven
components/systems adapted/modified to AMLS requirements which would minimize
development testing. The OMS and RCS static firing test programs will be conducted to
verify subsystem performance, response and the integration with r_lated segments of the
avionics and structural subsystems. Related ground support equipment (GSE) will be also be
verified during this this test program.
Abort Seoaration Motors. The development and testing of the abort separation
motors will be the responsibility of the suppliers using AMLS program generated
requirements. Integration tests will be conducted to verify trajectory performance, ballistic
reproducibility, interface release system and structural integrity. The separation motors will
be tested with a crew compartment boilerplate to assure that the crew compartment will
separate properly from the orbiter for abort activities.
Avionics. The avionics consist of hardware and software that provides sensing,
computation, display controls and communication functions. Avionic testing as well as other
test programs will be influenced by the test philosophy of the airline industry. Current
studies are in work to review airline testing methods and the philosophy behind these
methods and procedures to be able to apply cost and time saving measures which, hopefully,
will add little or no risk to the verification program.
The process for verifying AMLS avionics is depicted in Figure 4-11, which begins
with requirements and concludes with flight testing. Principal avionics test requirements to
be imposed on the AMLS program are listed below:
• Establish interface compatibility among newly designed, modified, and mature
equipment and performance
• Verify adequacy of EMC measures
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• Verify adequacy of fault detection, tolerance and recovery during time-critical
hard-over flight control' failures
• Establish avionics compatibility with non-avionic interfaces
• Verify booster unmanned flight capability
• Verify man-machine interface
• Verify software and the ability of interfacing computation systems to meet
requirements
• Verify communication systems
• Verify navigation systems
• Verify adequacy of power and its distribution system
• Verify self-test capabilities
• Verify hardware replacement capabilities
• Validate ground checkout processes
CEll I II"ICA'I'IIIN i'oINrIP
Figure 4-11. Avionics/Electronics Test Logic
Environmental Control and Life Suooort (ECLSS). The ECLSS provides
atmospheric revitalization, thermal control and life support functions. The atmospheric
revitalization subsystem controls the crew cabin environment and manages the avionics and
mechanical equipment heating and cooling requirements. Life support provides for food and
waste management and fire control. It is anticipated that most if not all of the ECLSS
components will be developed and individually verified by suppliers. The principal tests to
be performed include:
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Atmospheric Revitalization:
• Demonstrate air cabin temperature con_ol
• Verify performance of 02 control
• Verify air distribution, temperature and humidity control with in cabin and
avionics compartmen_
• Evaluate all materials used in cabin for toxicity and fire resistance
Life Support:
• Verify function of food and waste management subsystem in a zero-g
environment
• Verify performance of the atmospheric contaminant and fire detection system
Parachute and Water Impact Tests. Unmanned boflerplates of the crew compartment
will be subjected to ground and water impact tests. The boilerplates will have form, fit and
CG and will contain mockups of equipment not uniquely required to support the tests. After
the parachute design is adequately verified through analysis and single chute drops,
boilerplate vehicles equipped with flight configured parachute system will be jettisoned from
the cargo bay of a large aircraft, possibly a C-5A or a C-17.
4,3.5 Flight Test Program.
The AMLS flight test program will be designed to validate the models used to predict
environments and flight parameters, mission compliance, and dem6nstrate separation,
landing/deceleration and turnaround capabilities. It will be organized into segments adressing
Approach and Landing Tests and Orbital Flight Tests.
Approach and Landing Test (ALTL The ALT is a suborbital flight test program
designed to achieve the objectives listed on Table 4-3. There will be three ALT flights each
for the orbiter and booster. Both the orbiter and the booster will be modified to provide for
attachment points to permit latching the vehicles to suitable aircraft. Current design may
require the orbiter to be piloted by a
Table 4-3. Approach and Landing Test. single crew member. This constraint is
THE ALT PROGRAM IS _ TO tIEMONSTRAT[_ THAT TIlE ORBrTBz AND
BOOS"TEZ CAN la_RIIORM AS INTENDED IN THE ATMC_i:Iaq'EI_ BY
'l'r_ OBJ_CTW_ LIS'r]_ BIK.OW:
op.n_-rwl__.
o AUTOLAND PE_=OP3,/ANC_
o LANI_NO CLEAR.TIRE & BRAKE _KMAN_
o LOW SP_[]D _YNAIV[IC CONI_OL _
o 03. ENVELOPE SENSrI1vITY
o C_OSS WIND _ $1_IsrrlvITY
o VEHICL.E _ UNDIm WEIGh'FED CONI)rI3oNs
o FL_I'_ _RO_H _OY MANAGEMENT
governed by cabin size which has room
for only one ejection seat and still
provide adequate ingress and egress.
The single pilot, which reduces human
risk, will be supported and backed up
by autoland capabilities. The ALT
orbiter will be further modified by not
incorporating the propulsion systems,
docking system, portions of the ECLSS
and power systems and passenger seats
and provisions. It is not anticipated
that the ALT orbiter will be serviceable
as an orbital craft. Similar deletions
and modifications will be made to the
booster.
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Table 4-4. Orbital Flight Test Objectives.
THE ORBITAL FLK3ffI" TEST PROGRAM IS DESIGNED TO VALIDATE MOD£]-3 AND
ANALYSES USED TO PRE_CT P.NV_ONIdENTS AND FLK3HT CONTROL
PARAMEI111_ ANDTO DEMONSTRAT_ SEPARATION, LANDING, AND
"I't_OUND PEP.POPJdANC_
THE (MATH) MODELS AND ANALYSES TO BE VERIFIED INO.,,UDF-.:
o AERODYNAMICS
o THERMAL -'rPs/Tcs
o V_ROACOOSTK3
o EXTERNAL LOADS
o VI_TING
o AI_OTHEXMAL
o _OL LOOP PARAMETERS
Orbital Flight Test (OFT). The
orbital flight test program will satisfy
the objectives listed in Table 4-4, and
demonstrate the orbiter's flight
worthiness and mission capability
extending the flight envelope to
include mated ascent, separation, orbit
insertion, on-orbit operations, and
entry. The OFT program comprises
four orbital flights, with two possible
contingency flights (one or more of
these may be unmnanned). The
contingency flights are planned in the
event anomalies or natural causes
prevent satisfying stipulated
requirements within the allotted flights.
During both the ALT and OFT programs, operational instrumentation, OI, will be
supplemented with development flight instrumentation, DFI. The DFI will be oriented
towards acquiring data not normally addressed by OI but in some cases as extension of OI.
Both the OI and DFI data will be used to validate models and provicle information regarding
the performance of the AMLS. A master measurement list for all OI and DFI will be
generated prior to the flight test programs and maintained throughout the life of the AMLS
program.
At least one of the orbital test vehicles will be load calibrated to establish a yardstick
for the installed strain gauges to assure accurate stress analysis. The DFI will be removed or
at least substantially reduced at the completion of the orbital flight test program.
 kf Ear, ililt¢ 
Based on the work break down structure, the MFBP's, the recommended test plans,
available make/buy information, the program and manufacturing schedules, potential major
sites and facilities for manufacturing and test were identified. Basic initial facilities area
requirements for: Rockwell International, Space Systems Division: Downey and Palmdale,
CA, and Kennedy Space Center (KSC), FL; North American Aircraft: Tulsa, OK, Palmdale
and E1 Segundo, CA; Johnson Space Center (JSC), Houston, TX; Edwards Air Force Base
(AFB), CA; Langley Research Center, Va. and White Sands, NM were determined.
The highlights of the integrated test program configured for the AMLS have been
delineated in the body of this report. During the early portion of the test program, emphasis
will be placed on building a firm foundation through aggressive development testing to
achieve low cycle costs during the operational phase. This approach will be further
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enhanced through selection of proven products With reliable up to date state-of-the-art
properties. Stress testing will be ihaplemented in phase A and continue throughout the
ground test program to detect design flaws that could perturbate operati6nal costs and
detrimentally effect turnaround times.
Since it is anticipated that a major portion of the AMLS development and product
program will be farmed out to subcontractors, the subcontractors will be required to operate
under comprehensive test requirements and guidelines with SSD personnel in constant
contact and periodic attendance.
Military and commercial airline test program procedures and policies will be
reviewed and studied in SSD's approach to definitively develop the most cost effective, risk
acceptable integrated test program for the AMLS that will achieve reliability at low life
cycle costs. Furthermore, costs will be controlled through avoidance of proliferation of test
articles and requirements for new facilities by:
Providing a systematic method for identifying, screening and allocating test
requirements using analysis and simulation to supplement testing and satisfying
multiple subsystem test requirements on major test articles.
• Minimizing single purpose high cost test hardware.
• Avoiding new construction by utilizing existing facilities to the maximum extent.
• Accomplishing the final interface checkout of the launch facilities by using the
first flight article rather than a special "test only" vehicle.
• To assure that no loss of design maturity or hardware integrity is incurred as a
result of minimizing tests and test articles, SSD plans to:
Qualify all hardware through maximizing the use of analysis and similarity to
supplement testing and using data from previously run programs, where feasible,
to minimize qualification testing.
• Incremental certification to assure that each subsystem and system is ready for the
next milestone.
Ground support equipment, GSE, is an integral part of the AMLS integrated test
program and full attention will be paid to its need and development to assure cost effective
applications.
116
4.4 SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
The aspects of safety and reliability were addressed during the study, but no formal
safety plan or hazard analysis was performed. The reliability requirements for design,
logistics and operations are defined in Reference 4-5.
The AMLS design requirements have been developed with full understanding that the
number of potential hazards are influenced by the design itself. The preferred AMLS
concept has many design requirements characteristics that will reduce the number of hazards
requiring control. For example:
• Electro-mechanical Actuators (EMA's) - Hydraulics and auxiliary power units
(APU's) are not necessary to support he aerosurfaces, landing gear and brakes.
• Advanced TPS design - Reduction of mission to mission maintenance.
• _ - Design to accommodate maximum weight and landing crosswinds.
• Avionics -Failure tolerant design to allow mission continuation after failure.
A detailed hazards analysis for the AMLS will be performed during a later
development phase. The intent of any design and specifically the AMLS is to reduce or
control the number of hazards the final design presents to the operational phase of the
program. Two hazard levels which can not be eliminated, but all initial and t'mal design
effort should try to control them. They are; (1) Catastrophic hazard, like the loss of the
booster due to time critical failure, and (2) Critical hazards requiring an emergency action by
the crew or system. These must be addressed, understood, and controlled or risk understood
and approved by the program office.
4.4.2 ReliabiliW,
In addition to reliability data presented in Reference 4-5 the approach to redundancy
of critical paths should be examined. Redundancy increases system reliability, but at the cost
of increased complexity in fault detection, isolation and control. A study needs to be
performed to establish a system to balance the gains in reliability vs. the impact on
operations and mission success resulting from false alarms.
System reliability can be increased with good system design and not increase
maintenance requirements, by the selection a good overall system architecture and reliable
parts selection and placement in critical areas/functions.
The probability of crew survival and mission success should determine redundancy
levels. It can easily be shown that a system that has 3 or 4 strings or a fail operational/fail
operational/fail safe (FO/FO/FS) using poor quality parts and a poor system design could
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have a probability of mission success less than a FS system with quality parts and a clever
system design.
i
Even when parts and architecture are optimized, redundant systems often add
complexity to other systems. For example, one must incorporate more sensors, and MDM
like interfaces, etc., to be able to detect a fault in a system. These extra components reduce
the reliability in other systems by adding parts and complexity. In addition, the adding of the
fault isolation and control functions also includes the possibilities of errors in fault detection.
In other words, false alarms resulting from detection complexity could reduce overall
mission success probabilities as well.
A compromise must be reached between reliability, maintainability and redundancy
levels. One of the most difficult engineering decisions is what success probability is
acceptable.
4.5 QUALITY ASSURANCE
This subject will undergo perhaps the single most significant series of changes during
the AMLS program life cycle. The quality program specifications developed during the
1960's and 1970's will undergo a fundamental refocus of requirements, which incorporates
the precepts of the TQM (Reference 4-3) initiative of the 1990's info the objectives of the
quality specifications. This is not to imply that these will or should be discarded, for one
significant factor to success in manned spaceflight has been that of strict and disciplined
attention to details - a well-known characteristic of quality programs.
The quality programs of the 1970's/1980's were also generally not addressed with any
significance until the Phase C/D arrived, the premise being that emphasis on compliance,
controls, procedures, and verification did not occur until then. The AMLS quality program
will have its formal beginning during Phase A. It will be a dedicated emphasis. It is
particularly important because of the transitional nature of TQM expansion across
industry/government during the same time frame as the AMLS program. Elements of this
TQM emphasis are already beginning to be reflected in this DRD. Operations/Maintenance
emphasis is, we believe, a strong "Customer Want" for improving turnaround efficiency and
lowering the life cycle cost. The MFBP concept is the very beginning of development of
detailed process flows and process capability assessments, providing efficient blending with
the Government's IQue oversight initiative.
4.5.1 Phases A and B.
During Phase A, it is extremely important that the top-level quality functional
deployment (QFD) matrices be addressed. The basic premise of "Total Quality" starts with
true understanding of "what the Customer _ wants" and approaches to help provide it to
him. Since approaches can impact basic architectures (e.g. the maintainability approach),
they need to be addressed as early as possible to avoid costly engineering changes later in the
V"
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program. This is a characteristic of our Japanese competitors. They "drive out" changes
before commitment to manufacture.
Two of the highest correlation "wants" (QFD terminology) to implement, for
example, have been those of: (1) systems simplicity and (2) that of defining the operational
fault tolerance needed and the redundancy management schemes to support it. This
correlation is increased when moderate-to-extreme weight/volume and resultant performance
sensitivity exists from the very beginning. One example, is performance margins which can
tolerate a major failure condition right after launch commitment. The impact of this example
to the Phase C/D quality program to be implemented is orofound! Understanding of
processes, their variability and reduction of their variability are main themes. As fault
tolerance declines, permissible variation rapidly declines. A program intolerant to variation
can emerge. Conversely, with a fault tolerant design approach, variability reduction can be
implemented (as well as better understanding obtained over those areas still remaining
which remain intolerant).
Phase B should then form the next set of quality program foundations. This phase
must see convergence of a number of efforts, (for example: QFD/sub-tier matrices,
development convergence with MFBP, design system organization with MFBP (part, sub-
assembly, assembly number "trees", critical process definition and flow down into process
requirements/capabilities trades (starting here also to bring the knowledge of critical
subcontractors onto the team). The initial formation of formal simffltaneous engineering
teams takes place. The quality program for Phase C/D needs to be specifically and fully
planned here specifically including the particular MIL-specification/TQM transition timing
as discussed earlier. Advanced technology integration, in the process of historical hard
interface control tooling vs. electronic interface control, and related process control
parameters, needs to be specifically defined.
As the MFBP continues development, definition of process parameters also will
continue. This includes an objective of measurements made of products conformance in as
real-time as possible (such as, weld ultrasonic head mounted right behind weld head). Use
of statistical process control (SPC) (Reference 4-6) also needs to be structurally organized
during this phase, so that SPC is not just a "randomly-applied" tool.
4,5.2 Phases C and D.
The quality program needs to focus on as many of the "fundamentals", now
integrated into TQM initiatives. The focus is initially on prevention of defects, development
of process flows and capabilities determinations, application/clef'tuition of "work teams"
(cross-function), training of teams, readiness to perform tasks and increased individual
involvement in doing the right things right, the first time. These "work teams" are
expansions of the "design teams" from the prior phases.
The quality program must here maintain fundamental assurances of stability and
control to the Customer. Therefore, calibration validity of measurements, engineering
change control (which should be minimized with the up-front Phases A and B emphasis),
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nonconforming parts/materials control, test and records integrity, etc. must be addressed and
any issues resolved by the assigned "work teams". The objective of achieving program
success, by providing outstanding value to the Customer with outstand_g first-time thru
quality at reasonable cost and a dependable schedule, is fully def'mitized and implemented
during this phase.
The quality program requirements specification [MIL-Q-9858 A] tailoring activity
was deferred during the Pre-Phase A Study Contract, as identified in DRD-2
(Reference 4-7), until hardware procurement in Phase B and/or C/D. Tailoring of the
specification will be an on-going process as part of refuting the acquisition plan.
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5.0 OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT ANALYSIS
• o
This section documents the Operations and Support Analysis portion of the study
concentrating on the scenarios developed for ground, flight, and mission using an airline
type approach to minimize manhour requirements and to provide effective and efficient
operations. Selections and definitions for ground processing manhours, ground
processing support staff, flight and mission staffing for support and training,
mission/flight requirements, mission timeline, facility requirements, software analysis,
Ground Support Equipment (GSE), and logistical support analysis procedures are
documented in this report.
5.1 OBJECTIVES
The primary objectives for this phase of the study were to perform operations and
support analyses for the _ vehicle mission to the Space Station Freedom (SSF).
The operations and support activities included: 1) an assessment of the Reliability and
Maintainability (R/M) features, 2) the definition of the ground operations requirements
and the facilities and processing requirements, 3) the definition of flight and mission
operations requirements for the AMLS, and 4) the definition and quantification of the
support system and spares required to meet the AMLS flight rate.
5.1.1 Operations and Suooort Ground Rules
Many ground rules and assumptions were followed during the study to determine
the most operationally efficient and effective ground, flight, and mission operational
scenarios. These ground rules are documented in Section 2 of this report. The following
is a summation of groundrules which apply directly to all phases of AMLS operations:
• NASA technology level 6 or better at expected Initial Operations Capability
(IOC) date
• Orbiter and booster designed for vertical lift off
• Autonomous operations from pre-launch through landing within the limits of
program constraints
• On-pad evacuation of AMLS within 3 minutes
• Continuous escape/abort capability
• Single main engine failure permitted on each flight element
• Common propellant for all AMLS propulsion systems
• EVA provisions for two trained crewmen
• Kennedy Space Center (KSC) is the primary launch and landing site
The following summarized groundrules are directly applicable to ground
operations and were used during the development of operational scenarios and concepts:
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Orbiter and Booster "
• Aircraft-like techniques and methodologies where appropriate with a
progressive program of scheduled hardware and software maintenance
activities
• Ease of access for maintenance and inspections
• Minimized/eliminated: I) number/types highly toxic or corrosive fluids, 2) use
of pytotechnics
• Adequate spares to avoid cannibalizing
• Cleanliness levels within the AMLS crew module to comply with Space
Station Environmental Requirements
• Elements capable of ferry by land, sea, and air using existing commercial or
government Iransport systems with minimum specialized GSE
• All unique AMLS facilities at the launch site are new
Payload Containment System ff'CS_
• Modularized PCS with customized PCS's for alternate Design Reference
Missions (DRM)
• High degree of payload manifesting capability with numerous discrete
attachment points
• AMLS orbiter provides safety status monitoring of payload functions (direct
and relay telemetry and command with attached and released payloads)
• Standardized power and environment levels supplied through standardized
interfaces (Power/environment in excess of standard values provided by and
charged to the payload)
• Late payload access for minimal service at the launch pad (not nominal, but
payload option)
The following summarized groundrules directly applicable to mission operations
were used to develop flight and mission operational scenarios and concepts:
• Two crew and eight passengers to and from the SSF at 220 NMI (250 NMI
maximum) at 28.5 degree inclination
• 72 hour mission duration plus 12 hours for contingency (35 man-days)
• Deliver/return 15 ft diameter by 30 ft length payload, maximum weight of
40,000 lbs.
• Booster unmanned with glide back to launch site runway
• Autonomous variable launch azimuth capability
• AMLS orbiter active vehicle when docking with the SSF
• Autonomous vehicle operations while docked to the SSF
• Mission sequences automated with crew take-over capability
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5.1.2 Assumotions "
Along with the ground rules provided above, the following assumptions were
followed to provide operational benefits including design drivers for: 1) accessibility, 2)
maintainability, 3) maintenance, 4) health monitoring requirements, and 5) use of
BIT/BITE circuitry.
• Standardized flight operations Goads and missions) to reduce support resources
needed to reconfigure and plan each flight.
• On-boardhealthmonitoringduringmissionstoprovidethehistoricaldatabase
usedfordeterminingmaintenanceactivities.Only thosesystemsrequiring
repairwillbe recertified,followingaircrafttypeoperationalscenarios.
• GenericAirframeand Powerplant(A & P) personneltoreducethenumber of
skillmixesrequired,thusminimizingprocessingtimeand technician
requirements.
• Low costaircrafttype(openbay)orbiterand boosterprocessing,mating,and
storagefacilities,builtus ngstandardconstructiontechniquesand materials,
providingflexibilitya a low cost.
• Multiplematingand processingbaystoensureintegrationcapability.
• Open bay facilitysizingtopermitcontingencyoperations,uchas the
replacementofa largestructureorthepositioningofGSE requiredinan
emergencysituation.
• Payload Containment System Processing Facility (PCSPF) to use standardized
procedures and operations to accommodate three types of PCS operations:
• PCS arrivingfullyintegrated,
• SinglelargepayloadrequiringPCS integration,and
• Multiplepayloadsrequiringintegration.
• Minimal payloadcheckoutand verificationoperationsperformed.
• Pad staytimeminimized.
• AccesstopayloadsatthepadlimitedtoaccesstotheouterPCS shellwhere
operationsuchasbatterychangeoutmay be performed.Payloadoperations
willnotbe considereda "normal"operation.
• SingleLaunch/MissionConl_olCenter(L/MCC) locatedatthelaunchsiteto
permit consolidationflaunchcommit criteriaand permitefficientand
effective use of resources and personnel. Common operational data base
utilizedtosupportalloperational phases.
• Initial fleet sizing assumptions of five orbiters, five boosters, and ten PCS's
(See Section 5.3.2. for fleet sizing analysis).
5.1.3 Study Tasks
The study concentrated on determining the ground, flight, and mission
requirements associated with the AMLS mission to the SSF. A database was developed
to support this activity and includes the following study tasks results:
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• R/M Tables to identify maintenance and operations impacts for the AMLS
configuration. Data was developed using the MAtrix model and is in the same
format provided previously for Study Tasks 1 and-2.
• Facility requirements for ground and flight processing activities and
organizations.
• Timelines reflecting orbiter, booster, and PCS processing, integration, launch,
and mission operations.
• Manpower tables reflecting the allocation of personnel.
• Software analyses for ground and flight mission phases.
• Recommended spares tables for the orbiter and booster elements reflecting
AMLS requirements.
Functional flow block diagrams were developed to help develop the ground and
flight operational scenarios. In addition, various top level trades were performed to
determine the most efficient and effective operational scenarios and facility
configurations.
5.2 RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY
Comprehensive R/M analyses and assessments have been conducted on the
orbiter and booster vehicles and their major systems and components. These quantitative
R/M analyses provided the "yardstick" to measure the degree of R/M and Supportability
inherent in the candidate design configurations. Objectives of the R/M analysis and
assessment activity were to:
• Identify unacceptable R/M characteristics of the evolving AMLS designs such
that undesirable features can be eliminated prior to the initiation of detailed
design. Similarly, R/M analyses identify the need for design and support
features that should be incorporated. Results indicate, for example, that
booster avionics, from a mission reliability perspective, may not need
redundancy provisions but that triply redundant avionics appear to be
warranted for the orbiter.
• Provide numerical R/M parameter values for use by the Operations, Logistics
and Life-Cycle Cost disciplines.
• Provide R/M data for use in trade studies.
The R/M analysis and assessment activity was accomplished utilizing a model
entitled "MAtrix," a parameU'ic RIM estimating tool developed by Rockwell specifically
for use in conceptual and preliminary design phases. MAtrix estimates values for key
R/M parameters (at the vehicle, system and component levels). Recently developed
subroutines provide for the estimation of Mission Completion Success Probability
(MCSP). Numerical values for the following parameters were estimated for the orbiter
and booster, and their major systems and components.
• MTBM (mean-time-between-unscheduled maintenance).
• MTBF (mean-time-between-failure).
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• MTBR (mean-time-between-removal).
• MTBCF (mean-time-before-critical-failure).
• MT_ (mean-time-to-repair). --
• Unscheduled Manhours per Mission
• Scheduled Manhours per Mission.
• MCSP (Mission Completion Success Probability)
5.2.1 Preliminary R/M Assessment
A preliminary parametric analysis with MAtrix yielded a set of design-related
R/M parameter values at the system and component levels. Inputs to MAtrix were
exclusively derived from LaRC-fumished system definitions and estimated weights. The
document entitled "AMI.,S Two-Stage LaRC Baseline Vehicle Description" was used for
additional information and guidance. Current technology levels (i.e., technologies
available off-the-shelf in FY 1991 - Avionics systems utilized 1985 technology level
[0.004942] and all other mechanical and structural equipment utilized 1965 technology
level [0.013319]) were assumed for this and subsequent R/M analyses. This assumption
provided conservatism in all R/M analysis results. Preliminary assessment results,
formally provided to NASA during the June 4 - 5, 1991 Interim Review at LaRC, are
displayed in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1. Preliminary AMLS R/M Assessment Results.
MATRIX INPUTS/OUTPUTS ORBITER
Flight DuratioG (Hours)
Main EngineBurn Tune (Hours)
Unscheduled Maintenance Actions/Mission
72.000
0.136
112.150
BOOSTER
0.239
0.333
18.970
COMBINED
131.120
Removals/Mission
Failures/Mission
Unscheduled Manhours/Mission
Scheduled Manhoms/Missioe
Mission Completion Success Probability
31.580
48.1000
504.670
277.570
0.9855
5.010
6.830
85.360
49.950
0.9970
36.590
54.930
590.030
327.520
0.9825
* Note: Preliminary R/M assessment based on weights from initial LaRC analys_s
_.2.2 Updated R/M Assessment
Subsequent to the June 4 - 5, 1991 Interim Review at IaxRC, additional design
data became available as a result of RockweH's in-house AMLS activities. In particular,
this data provided estimates of the _ of Line Replaceable Units CLRUs) expected
to comprise the various orbiter and booster systems. LRU quantity dataheretofore had
not been available. This new data alsocontained revisionstoestimated system weights.
As a result,a more thoroughR/M analysiswas conductedand,asa result, preliminary
resultswere considerablyenhancedand updated.Resultsofthis econditerationare
summarized inTable5-2.The MCSP rangeof0.9688to0.9907isa functionof
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Avionics System redundancy options. The orbiter baseline value of 0.9688 (no
redundancy) increases as the reduridancy is increased (0.9868 if 1 of 2 avionics LRUs is
required for mission success and 0.9907 if 1 of 3 avionics LRUs is required for mission
success). The resulting range represent the options available, subject to trade studies
involving weight, cost, etc.
Tables 5-1 and 5-2 both indicate that significant differences exist between the
orbiter's and the booster's estimated expenditures for maintenance. At first, the
difference may not seem reasonable considering the similarities in sizes and complexities
of the two vehicles. The orbiter's dry mass is about 1.5 times the dry mass of the booster,
and each vehicle has the same number of SSME-derivative Main Engines. All other
things being equal, one might reasonably expect the orbiter to require 1.5 to 2 times as
much maintenance per mission as the booster. However, analysis reveals that the orbiter
will require about 8 times as much maintenance per mission as the booster.
The significant difference is almost solely attributable to variations in mission
duration and Main Engine burn times. The orbiter's nominal mission duration is 72
hours, while the booster's is less than 0.25 hours. Moreover, the orbiter's Main Engine
bum time of 0.136 hours is approximately 4 times longer than the booster's Main Engine
burn time of 0.033 hours. When the orbiter's mission time is reduced to match the
booster's mission time the differences in their maintenance requirements become more
intuitively satisfying. Figure 5-1 illustrates how orbiter unscheduled maintenance actions
per mission approach booster unscheduled maintenance actions per mission as orbiter
mission time is reduced to approach that of the booster. With a mission time of 0.239
hours each, the orbiter's unscheduled maintenance actions are 1.5 times the booster's
unscheduled maintenance actions, a result consistent with the relative sizes and
complexities of the two vehicles.
Table 5-2. Updated AMLS R/M Assessment Results.
MATRIX INPUTS/OUTPU'I_ oRBrr 
Fright Duration (Hotws)
Main Engine Burn Tune (Hours)
Unscheduled Maintenance Actions/Mission
72.000
0.136
123.920
BOOSTER
0239
0.033
15.930
COMBINED
139.850
Removals/Mission
Failures/Mission
Unscheduled Manboms/Mission
Scheduled Maohonrs/Mtssion
24.800
44.170
557.660
306.710
4.190
5.98O
71.700
39.440
28.990
50.150
629.360
346.150
Mission Completion Success Probability 0.9688
-0.9907
0.9973 0.9662
-0.9880
The R/M Analysis process yielded the steady-state R/M values that can
confidently be expected when the AMLS is put into operations. The analysis was
suitably factored to account for reliability growth based on observed Shuttle Orbiter
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experience.
MAtrix.
Table 5-3 presents a _presentative section of our detailed R/M analysis with
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Figure5-I.A GraphicalDisplayofHow Orbiterand BoosterMaintenanceExpenditures
Relate to One Another.
Table 5-3.
ORBITER (_TY UN1TWT
(LBS)
grmg Group - -
Wing Body 1 14,023.0
Gear Support, I 13,106.0
Fairing, TipFins
TailGroup
F'm (Not Used) 1 0.0
Body Group
Hydrogen Tank
Structure 1 19,379.0
I_ulafian I 3,232.0
Section
TOTAL WT MTBM MTBR MTBF MTBCF
(LBS) (FLT (FLT (FLT (FLT HRS)
HRS) HRS) HRS)
27,1293..0 29 107 84 226,963
14,023.0 56 207 162 439,174
13,106.0 60 222 174 469,704
0.0
0.0
61,831.0 14 52 40 119,933
22,611.0 35 127 100 272,331
19,379.0 40 148 116 317,763
3,232.0 242 895 702 1,904,762
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To achieve analytical credibility, as well as to provide traceability, it is often
desirable to compare the R/M projections for a conceptual design (such as the AMLS
orbiter) to the actual R/IVIexperiences of a similar, but mature operational, design. With
the exception of the Shuttie-Orbiter, no known vehicle exists for direct comparison with
either the orbiter or the booster. The USAF C-5A cargo/transport aircraft provides some
help in this regard since it is large, complex and contains systems functionally similar to
AMLS orbiter and booster systems.
A summary of C-SA maintenance characteristics at the major system level is
shown in Table 5-4. This data, reported by the USAF, encompasses a reasonably large
experience sample (54,000 flying hours). Average flight duration was 1.39 hours. Note
that the unscheduled maintenance actions per 1.39 hour mission (UMAs PER MISSION)
were 9.984. These unscheduled maintenance actions required an expenditure of 46.537
unscheduled manhours (UMMH PER MISSION).
Table 5-4. USAF-Reported C-SA Maintenance
Characteristics
C-SA AIRCFIAFT
USA__r-.REPORTED DATA FOR AN
AVER.%n_:_ FLIGHT OF 139 HOURS
IdTBM
(HOURS)
8.3752
3.0900
S.2247
UGHTING SYSTEM 4.1264
HYDRAULIC/PNEUM_A_TIC POWER 3.0960
4.6948
19.6696
4.4084
-10.0000
AUTOPILOT 0.4841
_UAI_I:UNCTION DETECTION
UHF COMMUNICATIONS
1.OOlS
_4.3002
138.0000
77.8194
IFF
14.9477
72.9927
29.5858
DIO NAVIGATION 21.7391
NAVIGATION 7.7640
18.7970
344.8_76
Q.1392
PER
0.6690i 2,
0.94631 4,
0.38201 2.
1.20271 6,
0.1194J 0,
0.19141 0,
0.24241 0,
0.32301 1
0.20431 1
0.10001 01
0.1647[ 1
0.04101 0
0.01201 0
0.04601 0
0.12881 0
0.00291 0
MISSION MISSION
1.598 6.983
3.276
6.386
3.707
The booster estimate of 15.93 unscheduled maintenance actions per mission is
close to what one might expect. A booster mission requires about as much maintenance
as does two (2) typical flights of the C-SA. Since the USAF literally flies hundreds of C-
5A flights per day, booster maintenance expenditures should be a negligible burden on
NASA resources.
No aircraft routinely remains airborne for 72+ hours. However, it is possible to
project what would happen, maintenance wise, if one did. Given that an adequate R/M
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history exists for known flight durations, and knowing what systems have cycle-based,
time-based (or combined) failure dependencies, flights of any duration can be postulated
and analyzed. Moreover, by substituting the less rigorous space environment for the
terrestrial (aircraft) environment it is possible to hypothesize the maintenance outcome of
long space missions flown by C-5As or any other aircraft.
Table 5-5 provides the results for a hypothetical 72 hour C-5A space-based
mission. Note that 171.837 unscheduled maintenance actions are projected to occur per
mission (UMAs PER MISSION), which will require the expenditure of 803.341
unscheduled manhou_ (UMMH PER MISSION). Observe, also, that Landing Gear
requires the same number of unscheduled maintenance actions per mission (UMAs PER
MISSION) as required for the Figure 5-4 (case 1.314). This result is due to the fact that
Landing Gear has a cycle-based failure dependency. The C-5A's Landing Gear is used
only during takeoff and landing, and is safely stowed during all other mission phases.
Landing Gear maintenance is a function of missions flown, not hou_ flown.
Table 5-5. Projected C-5A Maintenance Characteristics for a 72 Hour Space
Mission.
r_
11
12
13
14
23
24
41
42
44
45
46
47
49
61
62
66
61
62
03
04
66
60
71
72
91
07
C-$A AIRCRAFT
FOR A HYPOTrlETICAL 72 HR MISSION
IN THE SPACE ENVIRONkENT
AIRFRAME
COCKPIT/FUSELAGE COMPARTMENTS
LAND_ri_ GEAR
FLIGHT CONTROLS
TURiOFAN PO_-ERPLANT S¥o_.-M
AUXIUARY FOWERPLANT
AIR CONDITIONING_PR ESSURrZATION
ELE_iCAL POWER
LIGHTING $¥._T_-M
HYDRAULIC/PNEUMATIC POWER
RIEL$¥_i_M
OXYGEN S¥=,: _vl
MISCELLANEOUS UTILITIES
_=)| MOMENTS
m
(HOURS)
2.3804
4.0904
54.9451
7.1531
2.1327
22.631'
8.4741
14r3472
11.2613
|.474i
13.4041
AUTOPlLOT
MALFUNC-i-r_N DETE_TioN
HF COMMUNICATIONS
VHF COMMUNICATIONS
UHF COMMUNICATIONS
Ih I _NPHONE
IFF
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS
RADIO NAVIGATION
RADAR NAVIGATION
EMERGITIiCY EQIi_.N_
!r-XPLOSNE DEVICES
TOTAL SY_I_M_ffi
PER FH
g.4201J 1.8361
0.20451 0.063¢
0.01821 0.0887
0.13081 0.9761
0.46691 1.915|
0.04301 0.2606
0.11001 0.4429
0.06671 0.2733
0.08801 0.2424
0.1100] 0.4052
0.07461 0.5161 i
0.06!
The C-5A's approximately 803 unscheduled maintenance manhours for a
hypothetical 72 hour space mission can be compared with the orbiter's projected
expenditure of 558 unscheduled maintenance manhours for a mission of the same
duration. One orbiter mission of 72 hours will require about 70% of the unscheduled
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maintenancemanhours that a C-5A theoretically would require for a 72 hour space
mission. Considering the relative si'zes, weights and complexities of the orbiter and the
C-5A, this result seems reasonable. • •
Landing gear maintenance needs were derived directly from the USAF C-141
transport. USAF's DO56 reported experiences (from over 181,000 C-141 landings) were
converted to unscheduled maintenanceactions, failures and removals _ and
then used as the per-landing values for the orbiter. For the C-141 the Mean-Time-
Between-Maintenance (MTBM) for landing gear was reported to be 5.04 hours, but for
the orbiter it will be 226 hours. This significant difference is due to the fact that the
average C-141 flight is 1.57 hours while the orbiter's average flight duration will be 72
hours. (The C-141 and the orbiter both experience the need for unscheduled maintenance
on the landing gear approximately once every_ 3 landines, on the average). For the
booster, maintenance actions, failures and removals were adjusted downwards due to the
simpler and lighter landing gear system planned. Booster landing gear MTBM will be
only 1.4 hours however, due to the booster's mission duration of only 15 minutes. This
converts to a need for unscheduled maintenance on the booster landing gear once every_
._zlalll_[ill_ (on the average).
Comparable data for DC-8 landing gear experiences was not available from
airline sources. The USAF accounts for _ manhour expended, thus the DO56
reported information includes all the unscheduled maintenance conducted. Airlines are
not required to maintain elaborate maintenance data collection systems such as the
USAFs DO56 system,thusairline-reportedmaintenancedatamust be usedwithcare.
5.2.3 Main En_ne Reliability_ Analysis
SSME-derivative engines are planned for both the orbiter and booster. A
reliability analysis of the proposed derivative engine was conducted to" provide data for
operations, maintenance and logistics planning purposes. Data for the reliability analysis
was extracted from Rocketdyne's document entitled "SSME RELIABILITY
DETERMINATION", March 31, 1990. Moreover, this data provided important physical
relationships for incorporation in the continuously evolving MAtrix R/M Model.
Figure 5-2 illustrates the effect that SSME thrust levels have on SSME in-flight
shutdown rates. Note that at 104% thrust the in-flight shutdown rate is about 2.8 times
the rate at 100%. At 109% thrust, the rate of shutdown is about 17 times the 100% rate.
The degree of sensitivity to thrust level is significant, especially at 104% and above.
Figure 5-3 depicts Cluster Reliability of SSME engines as a function of thrust
level and quantity of engines per cluster. Burn times of 490 seconds were used for each
of three cases plotted. The cases plotted are:
• Four (4) of five (5) SSME-derivative engines required (AMLS Baseline).
• Five (5) of five (5) SSME-derivative engines requited.
• Three (3) of three (3) SSME engines required (current Shuttle Orbiter).
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Assuming that the SSME-derivative engines planned for use on the orbiter are
equal in reliability to today's SSME engines, a high order of-reliability will be realized
since only 4 of 5 are required for AMLS orbiter and booster mission success.
Figure 5-4 was developed using the same SSME data used in preparation of
Figure 5-3. In this instance, however, bum times of 120 seconds were used for all cases.
Assuming that the SSME-derivative engines planned for use on the booster are equal in
reliability to today's SSME engines, an exceptional degree of reliability will be realized
since only 4 of 5 are required for mission success. The Shuttle-Orbiter's SSME
reliability (for a 120 second bum) is shown (3 of 3 required).
Derivative SSME engines will probably be even more reliable than today's SSME
engines, therefore the Figures 5-3 and 5-4 orbiter and booster SSME-derivative engine
reliability projections are conservative.
Figure 5-5 depicts overall Launch Reliability for combined orbiter and booster
SSME-derivative engines. Included are orbiter engines with bum times of 490 seconds,
and booster engines burning in parallel with orbiter engines for 120 seconds. All data
plots are based on at least 4 of 5 engines per vehicle operating without critical failure.
The Combined plot is the mathematical product of the individual orbiter and booster
plots.
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Figure 5-2. Relative Shutdown Rates vs. Thrust Levels.
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5.2.4 Mission Comnletion Success Probability Analysi,_
Recently developed algorithms within MAtrix provide for the estimation of
MCSP (Mission Completion Success Probability). MCSP is a measure of each vehicle's
ability to conduct its planned mission and return safely and uneventfully to earth.
Combined MCSP is the product of orbiter and booster MCSPs. Combined MCSP is the
probability that on a single mission the booster and the orbiter will both safely and
uneventfully return to their designated landing sites after successfully completing all
mission objectives. Mission aborts due to other than vehicle-created causes (weather,
crew incapacitation, etc.) have not been considered.
MCSP is a function of two key parameters, Mean-Tune-Before-Critical-Failure
0VlTBCF) and mission duration. MTBCF, used in conjunction with mission time,
uniquely determines Mission Completion Success Probability (MCSP) according to the
relationship:
MCSP = e -Mission time / MTBCF
To put MTBCF into perspective, actual MTBCF achievements for a range of
contemporary USAF aircraft are delineated in Figure 5-6. Figure 5-6 illustrates the
MCSPs which result for given values of MTBCF and mission time. Note that mission
times are in the range of 1 to 2.4 hours, and that MTBCFs are 1,000 hours or less, and
that the resultant MCSPs are 0.99+. For the USAF aircraft cited, the overall rate of
critical failure averages 0.52% of the reported hardware failure rate (i.e., 1 failure in 200
is mission critical).
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To realize an MCSP of 0.99+ for a 72 hour mission the MTBCF must be at least
7,000 hours. The best reported MTBCF for aircraft was 1,042 hours (B-52G/H). A
dramatic improvement is required to achieve the 7,000 hour MTBCF required for an
MCSP of 0.99. For spacecraft, however, a number of factors help. The space
environment, once orbit is achieved, is appreciably more benign than is the aircraft
environment. This fact alone results in an improvement in component failure rate by a
factor of 2 - 16, depending on the duration of the mission.
Table 5-6. MTBCFs for a Ran
AIRCRAFT
F-15C
i;-s2cea
C-0141A/B
e of Contemlx
MISSION
TIME
1.33
rary Aircraft
MCSP
0.9979
MTBCF
(HOURS)
633
2.40 0.9977 1042
1.60 0.9976 666
C-5A 1.68 0.9955 372
F015A/B/D 1.29 0.9946 238
OV-10 1.01 0.9935 155
B-1B 0.87 0.9928 120
A-10 1.77 0.9921 223
FB-I 1IA 1.90 0.9890 172
MCSP has been estimated for each vehicle. The range of MCSP values estimated
for the orbiter represent the range of technically feasible numerical values which result
from specific avionic redundancy assumptions. MCSP estimates for the orbiter and
booster are as follows:
Orbiter =
Booster =
Combined =
0.9688 - 0.9907
0.9973
0.9662 - 0.9880
Figure 5-6 illustrateshow Mission Completion Success Probabilityvariesas a
functionof the amount of avionicsredundancy provided. Separatecurves areshown for
the orbiterand the booster. Four differentavionicredundancy configurationswere
examined, foreach vehicle,using the MAtrix Model. These cases are:
• No redundancy. A single LRU per Avionic System was assumed and that
single LRU was required to function for mission success.
• Baseline. Redundancy levels varied by system
• Single fault tolerant.
• Two fault toleranL
The effects of redundancy are clearly illustrated on Figure 5-6. For the booster,
the MCSP improvement as redundancy is added is slight compared to the effect on the
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orbiter. The sensitivity, or lack the.reof, is due to the significant variations in mission
time and Main Engine burn times.
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5.3 GROUND OPERATIONS
The ground operations analyses to determine the ground operational scenario and
supporting facility, software, GSE, manpower estimates, and timelines were performed
by Rockwell and Johnson Controls teams at Downey, CA, and Cape Canaveral, FL. The
processing approaches were analyzed using an airline approach to ground processing,
verifying only those systems on which routine and non-routine maintenance was
performed.
As baselined for the PLS, Air Transport Association (ATA) specifications should
be adopted and used for the development of technical documentation, allowing a
common standard system identification process for drawings, manuals, work documents,
and other technical data.
A continually updated maintenance specification, controlled at the launch site
with NASA concurrence, will baseline all maintenance and inspection requirements.
Specification changes will be based on actual operating experience and trend analysis.
Computer based work instructions consisting of work cards support the detailed,
accurate, complete manuals. The use of highly trained and experienced A&P
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technicians will improve work quality and permitmore responsibility and accountability
at the source of the work.
• .
_.3.1 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The major ground rules and assumptions followed while performing the ground
operations analysis include the following:
• Aircraft-like techniques and methodologies
• Ease of access for maintenance and inspections
• KSC primary launch and landing site
• All unique AMLS facilities at the launch site are new
• Vertical lift off
• On-pad evacuation of AMLS within 3 minutes
• Common propellant for all AMLS propulsion systems
• Modularized PCS with customized PCS's for alternate DRM's
• Late payload access for minimal service at the launch pad (not nominal, but
payload option)
5.3.2 Fleet Sizing Analysis
Fleet sizing analysis provides the definition of the fleet size that will have to be
produced during the manufacturing production run. The analysis is based on the traffic
model in DRD 2 and review of the Civil Needs Data Base (CNDB) for compatible
payload for the AMLS program. The results shows the need for a five system fleet size
to support up to ten flights per year between the year 2010 to 2040.
Traffic Model Assumntions and Definition. In order to use the Space
Transportation Architecture in the traffic model analysis (Figure 5-7, provided by LaRC
at the November, 1990 kick-off meeting), the following assumptions need to be stated:
• An alternate manned access to space exists, like a PLS.
• A heavy lift launch vehicle exist, like ALS or NLS.
• SSF crew exchange is part of cargo mission (no missions added to
accommodate a SSF crew rotation requirement)
• AMLS is the Shuttle replacement for up and down cargo and crew exchange.
• Other forms for access to space were not considered, like NASP, NDV or
SSTO.
• All CNDB payloads that were within the AMLS capability were used to
establish flight rate.
• No DoD payloads were addressed in the analysis.
• The AMLS transition start point is the year 2010, with shuttle retirement in
2020.
v
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Figure 5-7. Space TransportationArchitectureOption.
The CNDB was enhanced to include required servicing missions for the years
beyond 2011. These additional missions were created by adding the repeating servicing
event patterns between 2001 and 2010 to the CNDB mission model between 2011 and
2020. This increased the total number of events in the mission model by approximately
30%. Long payloads, geosynchronous and bulk propellent transfer missions were
eliminated from consideration by AMLS. All down payload would be handled by
AMLS beyond 2020.
The averagepayloadlengthwas determinedforremaining payloads inthe
CNDB. Totalengthwascalculatedbymultiplyingthetotalpayloadeventsforeach
programbythepayloadlength.The sum ofprogramtotalengthswas thendividedby
the sum of alleventsin which a deliverylengthwas defined (alargenumber of programs
inthe CNDB do not have any dimensions listed).This processyieldedan average
lengthof 9.5 feet.The average number of payload events(with dimensions) per year
was 24, with a standarddeviationof 6. With a payload bay lengthof 30 feel three
average payloads per flightcan be accommodated. Therefore,from a payload length
perspective, the AMLS flight rate is estimated to be 8 ± 2.
Payload mass flow for all non-excluded payloads was summed and divided by the
AMLS capability to LEO, due east from KSC. This capability was used since only one
event in the data base has an inclination greater than 28.5 degrees between the years 2010
and 2020. Average annual mass flow is 328.5K pounds with a standard deviation of
25.8K pounds, providing an estimate of 9 ± 1 flight per year.
These estimates can be increased by adding manifesting inefficiencies or by a
more detailed manifesting approach. One approach to adding manifesting inefficiencies
is to limit the maximum number of average payloads to two per flight changing the rate
from 8 ± 2 to 12 ± 3. A second is to limit the mass manifesting approach to 80% of
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capacity. This would change the mass estimate rate from 9 ± 1 to 11 ± 1. For the Task
3 study, a flight rate of ten flights per year was selected.
Fleet Sizin2 Using Vehicle Loss Rate. The fleet sizing analysis was performed
with an assumed reliability of 0.990. Ground operations can support ten 72 hour
missions per year with one flight system, satisfying the CNDB analysis above. A second
flight system would be needed to support cargo missions to station in case of an
contingency.
System Attrition. The traffic model (ten flight per year) would have AMLS
support a ten year transition a the beginning of the flight program and five years
transition at the end of the flight program, a total of 150 flights with 75 performed by
AMLS. Fifteen yeats of full AMLS operations would add another 150 flights, for a total
of 225 flights. Based on an assumed loss of one flight system per one hundred missions
(reliability of 0.990), three additional flight systems would be needed to support attrition.
The total fleet size would be five flight systems.
Flight probability. The initial approach was to f'Lxthe flight rate at 2.5 flights per
year per launch system (Figure 5-8). Also, the new vehicle delivery schedule was one
new launch system per year. This analysis resulted in a maximum flight rate of 11.8 per
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Figure 5-8. Traffic Model with Constant Flight Rate.
year in the frith year, reducing to 6.1 flights per year in the 30th year.
Then an iterative analysis approach was used which allowed the flight rate per
launch system to be increased to maintain 10 flight per year (Figure 5-9. The annual
flight rate per launch system was increased when the desired traffic model (shown in
dashed lines) was approached. The steps in flight rate (Fight 5-10) were large and the
v
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flights performed exceeded the traffic model total by 11 flights. The flight rate at the end
of 30 years was 3.5 flights per yea/per system. At the end of 30 years only 2.64 AMLS
systems remained, thus satisfying the initial requirement of two vehicle available to
support all contingencies.
Evaluation of the data in Figure 5-10 shows that a flight system would be
considered lost when the remaining fleet flight rate exceeds 2.5 and 3.33 flights per year
or one flight system loss every ten years. These system losses would not necessarily be
catastrophic failures with loss of crew, but could be loss of a booster and/or orbiter with
safe escape and recovery of the crew.
The AMLS fleet size consists of five flight systems (five orbiter
and five boosters). A future trade and analysis may determine that five orbiters can be
supported with less than five boosters. Beyond the year 2020, the AMLS will be the
only means of down cargo as shown in Figure 5-7.
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Figure 5-9. Traffic Model with Iterative Flight Rate.
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Figure 5-10. Annual Number of Missions Flown per Surviving Flight System.
5.3.30nerational Scenario
The operational scenario (Figure 5-11) features:
• Horizontal processing of orbiter, booster, and PCS elements
• Horizontal integration of the booster to transporter, orbiter to booster, and PCS
to orbiter
• Separate processing, storage, and integration facilities for the orbiter and
booster elements
• Vehicle rotation to vertical at the launch pad using an inplace erection
mechanism.
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Figure 5-11. AMLS Processing Scenario.
The orbiter and booster elements arrive at the launch site landing strip from a
returned mission or from the manufacturer on a carrier aircraft. Elements returning from
a mission are towed on their landing gear to the Horizontal Processing Facility (I-IPF)
processing bays. Elements arriving from the manufacturer are towed to the HPF mating
bays for removal from the carrier aircraft before they too are transferred to the processing
bays.
Elements will undergo processing operations indicated by on-board health
monitoring flight data. After preparation for integration with the other AMLS elements,
the elements are towed to either a mating bay or to a storage bay.
Integration of the AMLS vehicle will begin with the positioning of the transporter
in a mating bay. A booster element is moved into the center mating bay, is lifted and
transferred over the waiting transported, and is lowered and mated to the transporter.
Next, an orbiter element is then positioned next to the booster/transporter, lifted,
wansferred, and mated to both the booster and the transporter. A PCS, which has
undergone checkout and verification in the PCS Processing Facility (PCSPF) is then
lifted and mated to the orbiter. The PCS mating operation is the final operation
performed before the AMLS vehicle is transported to the launch pad. This minimizes the
time the payload can not be accessed.
The vehicle is transported to the pad, where the supporting structure of the
transporter is mated to the in-place erection mechanism. The lower motor units of the
transporter are unconnected, and the erection mechanism is used to rotate the vehicle to
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vertical. After umbilical and interface connections are made and the vehicle is
hardmounted to the pad, the transp6rter structure is returned to its horizontal position.
The motor units are re-attached, and the entire transporter is-removed from the pad area.
Operations at the pad are minimal and will include propellant loading, pyro arming, and
crew ingress.
Pad stay time will be minimized to approximately 18 hrs (less than 2.5 calendar
days with 1 shift operation), including translating the vehicle to vertical. Access to
payloads at the pad will be limited to access to the outer PCS shell where operations such
as battery change out may be performed. Payload operations will not be considered a
"normal n operation.
5.3.40t_rational Timelines
Timelines representing mature operations were developed for the major AMLS
elements: Booster, Orbiter, and PCS. The timelines were defined based on: 1) design
characteristics, 2) R/M maintenance estimates, 3) STS experience in determining
manpower and resource requirements, and 4) AMLS manhour and technician estimates.
The level of technical personnel (by skill type) required to handle rapid turnaround was
minimized. The timelines were used to develop probable technician and manhour
requirements.
Timelines were based on a single shift, five day per week schedule. Use of two
or three shifts or an extended work week would decrease the time period required for
processing.
Booster Timeline. Booster processing can be accommodated in 18 days ( 24
calendar days) in a single shift operation. The timeline presented in Figure 5-12
illustrates booster processing from return from mission through processing and mate to
the transporter. Landing site operations are completed in approximately 2 days,
including 12 hours provided for propellant venting. Fifteen days (21 calendar days) are
required for booster processing, and I day is needed for mating the booster to the
transporter in the I-IPF mating bays prior to orbiter mating operations.
Orbiter Timeline. The integrated vehicle timeline presented in Figure 5-13
illustrates a 33 calendar day (25 working days), 8 hours per day, processing flow
beginning with orbiter return from a mission through processing, integration, and launch.
The flow was developed to accommodate ten launches per year using one vehicle and
normal processing.
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Figure 5-12. Booster Timeline.
Approximately 24 calendar days (16 working days) are required for orbiter
processing in the HPF. Mating operations in the HPF mating bays are completed in
approximately 6 calendar days (4 working days). Approximately 2.5 days are required
for vehicle operations (including transport) at the pad. The two days shown erecting the
AMLS on the pad includes eight hours for pad preparations prior to vehicle arrival. The
timeline depicts pad activities using the single eight hour shifts; however, it is likely that
three shift operations would be used, reducing vehicle pad stay time to approximately 18
hours.
Payload Containment System Timfline. The timeline detailing the operations
required to process a PCS from a returned mission is shown in Figure 5-14. After the
PCS has been removed from the orbiter in the HPF and transferred to the PCSPF,
approximately 14 days (18 calendar days) are required for payload removal and returning
the PCS to its generic configuration. Due to each payload's unique requirements, the
time required for installation into the PCS is variable, but not expected to exceed
approximately 30 days (38 calendar days).
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Figure 5-13. Orbiter Integrated TLrneline.
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,_.,,_..Eagilili_
Five major facilities (four new) are required for AMLS processing (Figure 5-15).
They are the: 1) Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), Horizontal Processing Facility
(consisting of processing, storage, and mating bays), Payload Containment System
Processing Facility (PCSPF), launch pad, and Launch/Mission Control Center (L/MCC).
These facilities are described briefly below.
Shuttle Landin_ Facility (SLl_. The SLF runway will be used for orbiter and
booster elements arriving at the launch site from the manufacturer on a carrier aircraft, as
well as orbiters and boosters returning from missions. The landing site may also be used
for the arrival of payloads or integrated PCS elements. Boosters returning from a
mission are to be towed to the far end of the landing site for propellant venting.
Horizontal Processin_ Facility fflPF_. The HPF will be used for processing,
storing and integrating the booster and orbiter AMLS elements. The facility complex
consists of three main buildings: Processing (four open bays), storage (four open bays),
and integration and storage (three open mating bays adjacent to four open storage bays).
The open bay concept permits easy access to the AMLS elements and provides enough
room to perform contingency operations. The facility is constructed using conventional
building techniques and materials to reduce fabrication costs.
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Figure 5-15. Summary Launch Site Facilities.
In addition to normal integration operations, the mating bays may be used for
removal of the orbiter or booster elements from the carrier aircraft. Preliminary
estimates indicate that approximately 210 working days per year are available for this
operation (260 working days per year - 5 days booster/orbiter/PCS integration for 10
flights).
Payload Containment System Prgcessing Facility ff_CSPF). Payloads arriving at
the PCSPF will be ready for integration into the PCS. The facility will be capable of
processing the three types of payloads: I) PCS with integrated payload(s), 2) Single
large payload to be integrated into the PCS container, 3) Multiple payloads to be
integrated into the PCS container. Payload processing required at the launch site will be
performed in one of the existing payload facilities before the payload is transferred to the
PCSPF.
Payloads are checked out and verified before the PCS is transferred to the I-IPF
mating bay. The mating is the last operation performed before the vehicle is transported
to the launch pad, minimizing the period in which the payload can not be accessed.
]Almgh._. The pad structures will be limited and wig consist of a tower with
access to the crew module and to the outer portion of the PCS. A "duct" type escape
system (with slide wire backup) will be located on the tower to permit the crew to egress
the pad area in less than 3 minutes.
Operations at the launch pad are limited to reduce on-pad stay time for the
vehicle. Access to the vehicle will be limited to crew ingress and egress. Payload
operations will be permitted, but are not to be a "normal" operation. Battery change out
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and other operations that can be performed by accessing the outer portion of the PCS will
be permitted. Further trades are required to determine the feasibility of denying access to
the payload at the pad. "
Launch/Mission Control Center (L/MCC). A comprehensive operations concept
for the AMLS encompasses launch processing, flight operations, sustaining engineering,
and logistics activities. A combined L/MCC supports these functions with a common set
of databases, operational tools, and management tools. In addition, a L/MCC at the
launch site would separate AMLS crew training from that the for the SSF.
The three story L/MCC, located near the HPF and PCSPF, will provide:
• Launch and Mission control Rooms
• Training simulators, 0-g/1-g trainers
• Ground/launch mission viewing and evaluation rooms
• Software laboratories
• Mission data recording facilities
• Technical Library Support
• Office space for support areas
5.3.6 Manoower Reauirements
The detailed staffing levels for mature operations for the orbiter, booster, and
PCS were determined based on appropriate $TS, airline, and R/M estimating factors.
Hands-on technical support and support personnel/management staff'mg are detailed
below.
Hands-On Technical Support. AMLS processing tasks will be performed using
highly trained, skilled and disciplined A&P type technicians. Skill categories will
include avionics, electrical, thermal protection, and mechanical/system, with cross-
training and intensive training in specific skills. Technicians will use technical
documentation which is complete, correct, and in ATA format.
The hands-on technicians for combined orbiter, booster, and PCS processing are
tabulated in Table 5-7. The table includes the technician requirements for normal
processing and major inspection (heavy maintenance type activities). The elapsed times
and manhours by skill required to perform the processing activities (Figures 5-12, 5-13,
and 5-14) were totaled on a daily basis to determine the total number of technicians
required. An additional 12% was added to the total technicians required to account for
non-productive time for vacations, sick leave, jury duty, etc.
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Table 5-7. Technician Requirements forProcessing and Major I:
Skill Normal Major_pectinn Nomin_
Avionics,
Electrical
TPS
Mex.h/
(includes
tankin-
sulation
/engines)
Total
Processing
Orbiter Booster
2 ,1
3 2
2 1
9 4
16 8
PCS
I
2
0
4
7
lspections.
Non
Orbiter
• °
Productive
Total
Req'd
3 2 9 2 II
5 3 15 2 17
3 2 8 I 9
14
25
6
13
37
69 lO
42
79
Support Personnel/Management Staffing. The support personnel required for the
AMLS were modeled after airline operations with consideration given to spacecraft
operations peculiarities. The staffing developed for the PLS Task 1 were evaluated to
determine the categories requiring additional personnel to support the AMLS mission.
Support personnel are presented in Table 5-8 and include personnel in the following
categories:
* Management and secretarial support
• Clerks - finance and accounting, planning, scheduling work control,
processing,records,stores,and shippingand receiving,
• Technical writers
o Technicians for AMLS orbiter, booster and PCS processing and facility O&M,
communications, and GSE
• Engineers - airframe/systems, avionics/electrical/instrumentation, project, and
mass properties
• Qualityinspectors
• Safety analysts and specialists
. Programmers
. Logistics buyers/expediters
Search and Rescue Manp0wcr. Two emergency scenarios have been identified in
this study:
• Crew emergency after lift-off with the orbiter and booster mated (Figure 5-16)
• Crew emergency after lift-off after booster separation (Figure 5-17).
The ground treatment of the emergency is determined by the ascent flight phase
and the nature of the problem (orbiter or booster emergency, crew capsule problem,
distance/altitude downrange.
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Table 5-8. Support Manpower Requirements.
Omee
Overhead
Mana_in_ Director's Office
Human Resources and Medical
Fmenc_ and Accounting
Personnel
3
8
12
Site Director's Office 3
Legal/Contracts 4
Production Planning and Control
Engineering
Processing Operations
Staff
2O
37
16
Technicians 36
Major Inspection Operations
Staff 10
Technicians 43
Quality and Safety
Support
Logistics
Shops
Total
55
46
26
"52
371
* Shop staff supplemented with processing technicians when not utilized
for processing.
Figure 5-16. Crew Emergency After Lift-off- Mated.
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Figure 5-17. Crew Emergency After Lift-off- Demated.
Tables 5-9 and 5-10 indicate when ground and water forces are required for the
two emergency scenarios.
The cost and manhours estimates for search and rescue preparation for the STS
system versus the AMLS (if performed like STS) versus the AMLS (if performed with
airline approach) is shown in Figure 5-18. The manhours required by the rescue team are
increased when compared to the STS due to the increased number of personnel in the
AMLS vehicle as compared to the SIS. There are over 150 possible commercial and
military landing sites world wide available to the AMLS as unplanned landing sites.
These site will be supplied with a familiarization video briefing (production and
distribution costs = $60K) and accompanying documentation (development and
production costs = $50K). Personnel at the primary landing sites will receive extensive
unplanned landing training. Large cost drivers are detailed in Table 5-11.
Table 5-9. Crew Emergency After Lift-Off- Mated.
Land Fuc/Rescue
Booster _oa
- Booster reun to KSC/SLF
- Booster destruction in safe area
X
X
X
Orbiter
- Return to K__JSLF with PCS
- Jettison PCS (Option)
- Return to KSCJSLF without PCS
- Crew abort in Crew Capsule
Orbiter remm to contingency airport (USA) X
Orbiter return to contingency airport (non-USA) X
Water Fu-e/Rescue
Recovery
Recovery
Recovery & Rescue
k
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Table 5-10.
Abort to Orbit
Orbiter return to contingency airport (USA)
Orbiter return to contingency airport {non-USA)
Jettison PCS _Option)
Crew abort in crew capsule
Crew Emergency After Lift-Off - Demated.
Land Fire/Rescue
X
X
Water Fire/Rescue
X
X
Table 5-11. Cost Drivers.
AMLS Like STS AMLS Like Airline
Pad
Runway
TAL
KSC Ditching
Open Ocean
Ditching
$113K Equip $113K Rescue
& Mods Equip
$522K Rescue Team Equip
$1.4 M Rescue Team Equip (3 Sites)
$722K Rescue Team Equip (KSC
only)
$2.2M Rescue Team Equip (3 sets)
$I 13K (Same)
s522{Same)
$110K Training Materials Development
$78K $38 _ Team Equip
$40K Accident Investigation Kit
$114K Rescue Team Equip (3 sets)
EMERGENCY EGRF.OS AT PAl)
E_=RGENCY EGRESS AT RUNWAY
EMERGENCY EGREEE AT 7AL
RECOVERY IN K$C AREA (TO 2001I
WORLD WIDE SEARCH & RECOVERY
¢iiiiiir_i
EPIIFS,riil,
,_ss,_lllJII
I AMLS CREW COUNT REQUIRES MOREGROUND SUPPORT UNDER STS APPROACH
Total Moils &Equip
AMLS4.1KE STS AMI.S-LIKE A!RLINI_
INII_I Pw _ Inlllsl Pw Iqlllhl I.llkl Pe Fl_lh!
HImlw Nemlw _m_w IIm mlw :rNm NOmlw
$1tgS_K 1111D gW,212K TBO $113K TBD
144 Ir_r 111;NW 240 mhr 1MI iNw 140 INW 20rely
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2._ mll SIII4K
Figure 5-18. Search and Rescue Manhour & Cost Estimates.
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5.3.7 Ground Software
The AMLS lends itself to a comprehensive operations software concept which
encompasses launch processing, flight operations, sustaining engineering, and logistics.
Each of the functions would be supported by a common set of databases, operational
tools, and management tools. Training resources, flight operations systems, and launch
system would all reside within a common complex.
The integrated L/MCC approach allows common operational data to be utilized to
support all respective operations phases. The concept reduces the ground support
systems, resources, and facilities required to perform the mission objectives. The console
configurations for the control center world be a generic baseline which would be
configured for specific support functions through software selection and control. This
provides ground support system redundancy by being able to support any discipline from
any system console by configuration selection.
The launch site/flight operations scheduling would be controlled and managed on
an integrated basis and a great deal of crew interface and payload related integration
activity (i.e., safety review) could occur at one location. This should reduce the amount
of travel required to accomplish these activities (as compared to the NSTS environment.)
The L/MCC will not provide payload support or training. This support will be
provided by a remote Payload Operations Control Center (POCC).
A bottoms up estimate of AMLS ground software lines of code (SLOC)
(Table 5-12) was made based on the following factors:
Vehicle telemetry data will be received from both the orbiter and the booster.
Even with common avionics, unique measurement identifications are assumed
necessary to identify the source of the data.
The ground network will be tasked with validating vehicle readiness for flight,
although this effort will require considerably less ground resources than the
existing NSTS because of the on-board design for testability, on-board
checkout, and health monitoring capability
5.3.8 Ground Support Equipment
New GSE will be required to support AMLS missions. This GSE includes that
required for processing all orbiter, booster, and PCS containers at the landing facility,
HPF (processing, storage, and mating bays), PCSPF, and launch pad.
A facility assessment of the GSE required for AMLS ground operations has
identified 13 distinct categories of equipment which include tools and test equipment for:
I) gaining access, 2) handling operations, 3) specific system servicing and 4)
contingency maintenance. Commercially available "off-the shelf" equipment was
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identifiedwhere possible. The majority of the I83 types of equipment identified are to
enable correction of anomalies diagnosed by the on-board health monitoring system.
-°
Table 5-12. Ground Software Summary.
FUNCTION SOFTWARE (SLOC)
Operating System Commercial Off-the-Shelf
Maintence Tasks 100K
Vehicle Test Programs 1,6OOK
Vehicle Me,as. Database 3OOK
Planning, Scheduling, & Status 1.500K
Logistics Commercial Off-the-Shelf
600K
Netwo_ Interface Software Commercial Off-the-Shelf
Mail System Commercial Off-the-Shelf
Payload Containment System 800K
Range Applications 1,300K
Weather 6OOK
Mission Recording & Post Analysis Commercial Off-the-Shelf
Launch Management System 1,00K
Software Support 13OOK
Costing estimates are provided for all but seven GSE items. The estimates,
derived from a variety of sources, include the purchase price at KSC and the year of
purchase. No cost is provided for the 747 ferry aircraft. This aircraft may be purchased
new and configured at the manufacturer, or may be purchased used and re,configured by a
contractor. Fairings for the orbiter and booster elements during air transport will be
similar in cost and construction to the Shuttle orbiter's fairing.
Two major new pieces of GSE are required by the reference scenario to: 1)
transport and support the vehicle, and 2) remove the de,conditioned SSF crew from the
vehicle at the SLF runway. A horizontal transporter is required to move the mated
vehicle to the launch pad from the HPF integration bay. The new transporter concept
features a removable cradle used to support the vehicle during translation to vertical at
the pad. Four independent computer linked electric drive units at the comers of the
transporter reduces spares requirements and simplifies maintenance. Once at the launch
pad, the transporter will be mated to the in-place erection mechanism, the motor driven
units will be detached, and the structure of the transporter will be used to support the
vehicle during erection to vertical. After the vehicle is mounted on the launch pad and
the erection mechanism has returned to horizontal, the motor units will be reattached to
the transporter support structure and the transporter will be removed from the launch pad.
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The transporter can rapidly move the AMLS, reducing weather exposure and processing
time. No special crawler way will be required.
Deconditioned passengers must be removed from a hatch in the top of the orbiter
at the SLF runway. Two possible approaches are use of a "plane-mate" type lift vehicle
currently used at some airports for passenger handling, or a "cherry-picker" type vehicle
with sufficient capacity, height, stability, and platform size.
5.4 FLIGHT AND MISSION OPERATIONS
Our approach to flight and mission operations was to develop a standard system
for preparing documentation and processes that can be used with minimal update for
flights to the SSF. We identified capabilities which could be automated and baselined
standardization of functions which would contribute to eff'wient flight operations support
requirements and minimize turnaround time. Standardization and reuse of products will
support a short fright preparation cycle and continued assignment of experienced
personnel will reduce training requirements.
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Figure 5-19. Mission Preparation - OFT Flights.
The AMLS baseline mission to the SSF parallels the flight and mission operations
previously developed for the PLS, based on the common mission requirements. The data
developed from this previous study was evaluated and redefined to provide relevant
AMLS data for Orbiud Flight Test (OFT) and mature operations flight preparations
templates and to provide manpower and facility estimates (Figures 5-19 and 5-20).
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Figure 5-20. Mission Preparation - Operational Flights.
5.4.1 Key Mission Ooerations Assumotions.
The following key ground rules and assumptions were followed when performing
the flight and mission operations analyses:
• Accommodate DRM-1 (without precluding other missions)
• Crew/8 Passengers to/from SSF at 220 NM at 28.5 ° inclination
• Deliver/return 15' dia. by 30' length payload, max weight 40K lbs
• Booster - unmanned glide back to launch site runway
• KSC prime launch and landing site
• 72-hour mission duration plus 12 hours for contingency
• Payload transfer to/from SSF may require additional hours
• Shuttle orbiter and SSF interface docking procedure used
• Rendezvous sequence based on PLS
• SSF Remote Maneuvering System (RMS) used for payload removal/loading
• New SSF crew performs payload transfer operations
• Standardized - Flight Profile, Flight Operations Sequence, Trajectories, SSF
Rendezvous/Separation Sequences, Propellant/Consumables Loading,
Procedures/Displays/Formats
155
Standardization Assumnti0ns. Standardization of the AMLS vehicle flight and
mission operations will reduce updates for flight and mission planning, shortening the
flight preparation cycle (Figure 5-20). The AMLS will be designed to operate within
mission envelopes rather than to specific flight parameters, reducing the requirements for
flight redesign from mission to mission. Minimizing the preparation cycle reduces the
manpower and facilities required to support the flight preparation activities. The flight
design analysis for DRM-1 (SSF mission), once performed and verified, should provide a
standard core design that will only undergo minor modification from flight to flight.
Variations in payload and SSF/AMLS flight relationship will cause some mass property
and timeline variations, but the basic mission profde and sequences will be recurring.
Flight operations functions will be standardized for the AMLS booster and
orbiter. The booster re-flight profile will be a standard profile to reach the MECO (Main
Engine Cut Off) and separation conditions. From main engine start through fly back and
roll out, the sequence of events will occur as a repeatable set.The booster profile
envelope should be the same for all DRM-I flights and should support alternate DRM's
within the AMLS requirements.
The flight sequences for all DRM-I orbiter and booster flights will be repetitive.
Some variations in orbiter flight requirements will occur due to payload manifest weight,
RMS support activities and emergency EVA (Extra Vehicular Activity) events. The
complexity of payload transfers will influence the orbiter on-orbit stay time, impacting
the entry phase of the flight. However, after several flights a flight design library would
be established to provide a "most like" starting point for future missions, therefore
minimizing "design" rework requirements. The propellant loading for the booster can be
standardized and therefore the mass properties for flight design can be treated constant
for liftoff and center of gravity determination.
The range safety limits which identify safe flight corridors for the AMLS booster
and orbiter can be standardized for the powered flight phase and for the booster fly back
phase. The number of two engine-out combinations and resulting controllability may
have to be treated as a non-standard condition and call for expert system tools for the
decision making process.
The flight design analysis for the DRM-1 mission will be accomplished for and
verified during the OFT flights and should require only minor adjustments for variations
in time and delta velocity as a result of the SSF-orbiter relationship (phasing orbit).
Telemetry and command formats can be established and maintained for the flight
systems and ground support system with only sustaining engineering changes resulting in
modification to the operational systems for flight design can be treated constant for liftoff
and center of gravity determination.
Verification for DRM-I in terms of flight operations management must occur
during OFT. If OFT test scenarios do not validate operational requirements, the system
_amaf
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should not transition to DRM-1. System management during orbiter flight phases and
the attendant procedures should be _,,alidated during the OFT flights and only be subject
to maintenance due to equipment changes or upgrades. -.
Flight Automation Assumptio0_. A high degree of automated capability must be
designed into the AMLS avionics and support systems in order to support the
autonomous flight operations concept. Decision making criteria must be developed to
define mission phase transition points (i.e., launch to on-orbit, on-orbit to entry, etc.
[Figure 5-21]). Development of expert systems within the flight and ground system
architecture will be required to support mission execution and provide the flight crew and
mission support personnel with the information necessary to perform manual
intervention. Abort calls will probably be at the heart of the expert system requirements.
DOCK I BERTH
RENDEZVOUS
• DISTANCE
ICIRCULARIZE
• ALTITUDE
PHASING ORBIT
• CATCH UP TIME
BOOSTER FLYBACK
PAYLOAD TRANSFERS
CARGO COMPOSITION
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RETURN SITE RELATIONSHIP
DE-ORBIT
• CROSS RANGE
LANDING
Figure 5-21. Flight Profile for Automation.
Flieht Information Management Assumptiop,_, On-board electronic flight
documentation will be used for the AMLS missions. This capability will include the
procedures, check lists, charts, trajectory data, and graphics. This capability will provide
for real time updates or additions through the uplink capability. There will be a certain
number of critical items placed on-board in paper form to ensure backup availability.
The health monitoring data will be available to the crew for system management
purposes and stored on-board for post-flight evaluation. Critical mission phase health
monitoring information will be downlinked to provide real time input in the event of
critical phase anomalies.
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The depth and disseminati6ri of health monitoring information should be to the
level necessary to ensure operational requirements and capabilities are meL
Vehicle communications, which include air-to-ground voice and video, telemetry,
uplink command, and GPS reception, will incorporate state-'of-the art technology and
include provisions for upgrades as technology advances.
5.4.2 Mission Timeline
The mission timeline for the AMLS DRM-1 mission (Figure 5-22) was developed
using the ascent, rendezvous and entry trajectory data previously compiled for the PLS
DRM- 1 "shorter rendezvous" timeline. It has been expanded from 72 to 92 hours for
provisions on flight days 3 and 4 to transfer payload cargo to the SSF and to retrieve
logistics module(s) from the SSF to the orbiter. The timeline provides liberal times to
accomplish the transfers with the AMLS crew awake during these activities. In addition,
the timeline assure the flight crew has had adequate rest before the nominal return
opportunity. As flights become routine and experience is gained on the actual task
accomplishment times, these criteria may change. A shorter timeline must address the
crew rest constraint and make a significant reduction to synchronize the conditions.
However, as a preliminary baseline for the AMLS DRM-1 mission, it seems prudent to
use this criteria to size flight consumables and provisions for the mission.
The SSF RMS will be utilized to extract payloads from the orbiter PCS and to
install logistics modules scheduled for return aboard the orbiter. The space station "up"
crew will be trained for payload and logistics transfer as part of the space station
"increment" preparation. This will also include AMLS RMS training should the mission
manifest require orbiter support.
When the AMLS orbiter is docked with the SSF, the commander of the SSF will
control the flight elements and the Space Station Control Center will control the ground
elements. The AMLS mission manager and communications officer will be in direct
interface with SSCC and AMLS crew.
5,4.3 Flight/Mission Ground Network Canability
The combined L/MCC will allow acquisition of common resomr.e_ and
platforms with functional requirements addressed in the support software. This
commonality will reduce spares inventories and contribute toward economies of scale
during the development cycle and the operational life of the systems. This approach
also allows one set of common personnel to support for all operations (ground and
flight). The general description and physical characteristics of the facility itself were
discussed previously in Section 5.3.5.
158
I rid
lee ,NO
re 1
p!le;_,,
tll_*,
,
F'Dn
I
Ij':
m_e,
I
gl_ll|m
mill,
Ii-.
.?.7,'r.'t,-?.f.?, t , I . Y . T , I . f. I , i , t .Y,5'.Y,Y.';.V'-_'
: :'It Ill r• t II, A • . c
I, C " _EI_I I P_X OPS ill
ll* I¢o i el,ll@
:" _........-_ ";L,I'd=l.J•' _ jim'' -t-__i/ lilll -- -- _-- . /
a" _-'-T p_ _T , --T- ,--r j [ , T ,*_.._J.Jt.
' . ',' . 't . 't . 't . _' . Y . 5" . t . I . I . ! , f . t . f . ! . I . f . ? . ',' . V . V . t , ';' , "
.t=l ' "-£1 1L
. _ , , . _ . i , _ j ,__,._l/_, , ,
/ II l II / It I II I II I 19 I II / I! I I! I II / II / 'p I I_I-IZ II-
..........I I_ ..'"'"1 t......... _,ti ........ r*-l--r-.b_..I_a÷
"- '....
_1 [ ii l Ii [ ii ] Ii |. _11 I Ii I li I li I ii i IT [ ii i Ii i to i ii i dill /
I
,, Y. Y.Y.'t.'t ,'t,Y, I • t .t , I', t , t. I . ! . I . I' .'t.'_.'t.'_'.'t.'t."____
,L,_l__l-/_/.1./,./ ._ I_ Lt ..,I.t.....
. V . 5". Y. ?. Y . Y. '; . T . I . r . ! . f'. f . f . I . ! . f . 't . Y . 't .%_',' . _;_.;; ......
' I I I° I_
• ,e i 19Meu
_LZ--L._,_L-,_J..,_.L.,_L.,..J_,_J_. L__ ,_.L. ,__, ,j__--_ •.L, , i
il i
-r-_ il__i /L_ i - II
- - . -,-,,7- _r__J,_
Figure 5-22. Mission Timeline.
In general, the system has been structured into functional elements consisting of
the: 1) Communications and Data Distribution System, 2) Data Storage and Retrieval
System, 3) Flight Design, Command, and Tuneline System, 4) Operations Support
System, 5) Simulation and Training Systems, 6) Ground Support System, and 7) Ground
System Development.
The use of next generation software, highly structured applications, macros and
"packages", and Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) software will significantly reduce
the AMLS operations support software from comparable NSTS flight operations
systems. The software requirements for the AMLS Right operations are shown in
Table 5-13, along with first engineering development time estimates.
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Table5-13. Hight and Mission Ground Network Requirements.
FUNCTION 'DEVELOPMENT TIME SOFTWARE LINES OF CODE
_rations SuPI_ 42 Months 750K
Data Storage & Retrieval Acquisition Ttme Commercial Off-the-shelf
Flight Design, Analysis, Command, & 48 Months 1.82M
Yimeline
Communications and Data 18 Months 200K
Distribution
CaxamdSupport 36 Months 500K +Comm'l Off-the-shelf
Ground System Development 36 Months IM + Comml Off-the-shelf
Simulation & Training 42 Months IM + Comml Off-the-shelf
5.4.4 Mannower Reauirements
The AMLS flight operations organization is detailed in Table 5-14. The
organization is structured along functional lines with team support. Each function (i.e.,
flight design, training, etc.) works on multiple missions in the flight operations
preparations queue. After OFT flights are complete, the flight operations preparation
process should be stable and repetitive, thus reducing the time and manpower required.
Flight design and planning functions and crew activity planning will address minor
variations in the DRM-1 missions due to payload manifest and varying logistics
supply/return weights and support requirements. Phasing orbit(s) for rendezvous will
have variations due to orbiter/SSF initial relationships. Because AMLS flight will be
standardized, only minor updates to the flight and ground support documentation will be
necessary ff the payload manifest, logistics requirements, or SSF rendezvous phasing
orbits vary significantly from the standard. The standardized training scenario will also
be updated, ff required, to accommodate significant variations. The same staffing that
supports the OFT flights will transition to support the DRM-1 missions.
The organization will be divided into two teams, with each team working on two
missions at a time. Based on a ten flight per year mission model, equal periodic spacing
between flights, and approximately 20 weeks of preparation per mission, normally four
missions will be in various stages of preparation. It is expected that flight operations
preparation activities will take place on a 5 day, 1 shift work schedule.
The individual functions shown in Table 5-14 include the required compliment of
technician support. The integrated operations concept makes it feasible to assume the
technician support could "float" between launch and flight organizations as workload and
scheduling requirements dictate, providing a degree of job diversity.
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Table
Flight _ons Director
5-14. Flight Operations Support Manpower Requirements.
OFFICE ' ' PERSONNEL INCLUDED
3
* Not including common supl
'IECHNICIANS
I
Flight Crews 12 -
Common Support Table 5-8 Table 5-8
Flight Design & Planning 22 5
Crew Activity Planning 12 3
Flight Products & Documentation 17 -
Flight Operations Training 41 9
Flight Operations Support 49 20
To_ * 156 *37
)O1t
The teams preparing the OFT mission (Figure 5-19) will transition to support
operational flights. A total of 608 manweeks are required to support each of the ten
operational flights per year (Figure 5-23), while 1686 manweeks are required for each of
the two OFT flights per year (Figure 5-24). During the OFT phase flight operations, an
additional 50-60% (..840-1010 hrs per mission) will be required for personnel skills
development, production training, certification, system verification, etc. (608 manweeks
* 10 flight/year 152 weeks = 117 men while 1686 manweeks * 2 flights/year / 52 weeks
+ 50-60% = _ 103 men [+12% vacation, etc = 115 men]). The number of personnel
required for each function is shown in Figure 5-25.
M 700
A
N _o
W._O
E 4o0
E 300
K200
lO0
o
TOTAL FUNCTION SUPPORT (MANWEEKS)
84 81
48 35
FLIGHT CREW
DESIGN ACT.
& DATA PLNG.
0) (2)
15
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198
FLIGHT _G 1-(3 SIM. REAL
PROD & TRNG TRNG TRNG TIME
DOC (4) (5) (6) SUPPORT
(3)
14
CREW
(8)
608
TOTALS
Figure 5-23. DRM-1 Production by Function.
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Figure 5-24. OFT production by Function.
The flight operations director will be accountable to the AMLS Operations Center
Director for all flight operations functions. The common support functions (Human
Resources; Finance/Account; Site Directors Office; Legal Contracts; Production,
Planning, and Control; Engineering; QualRy/Safety; Support; and Logistics) are defined
in Appendix D for ground operations support will also support the flight operations
functions. These common support functions would also be accountable to the AMLS
Operations Center Director and would provide matrix support to the flight operations and
launch operations organizations.
Two flight operations real time support teams under the control of the AMLS
Mission Manger consists of:
• Propulsion Officer
• GN&C Officer
• Data Processing System Officer
O_]TER
• Propulsion Officer
• GN&C Officer
• Data Processign System Officer
• Systems Engineer, Communications Officer
• Flight Dynamics Officer
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Figure 5-25. OFT and Mature Operations Mission Production Staff.
Operations control center support is expected to require a full compliment of
console support during ascent, rendezvous and entry. During docked operations, the
mission manager and communications officer will be on duty to provide on-orbit support
with other disciplines on-call.
5.4.5 Facility Reouirements
The facility requirements for flight support of the AMLS are shown in
Table 5-15. As indicated, the training function requires a new 0-O training facility
(Water tank), 1-G training facility, and simulator facility, as well as office space for 41
personnel. The planning function (Flight Design and Planning, Crew Activity Planning
[CAP], and Flight Products and Documentation) requires office space (with PC
workstations) for 40 personnel, with a text and graphics publication system needed to
support the Flight Products and Documentation activity. Real time mission support
functions requires office space for 49 personnel with PC workstation support. In
addition, office space for the 12 AMLS crew members is required. Except for the
training facilities and the operations control center, the nature of the facilities are classic
officeand workstationenvironments. Itwillbe possibleto maintain flightdesignand
crew timeline real time support from the workstation areas with the addition of audio
communication nodes within the respective office areas.
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Table 5-15. Flight Operations
FUNCTION RATIONALE
l_ight Design TeamFlight Design & Planning
Crew Activity Planning Crew Activity Planning Team
Flight Products & Documentation 16 Office Spaces w/Workstations
Training
Facility Requirements.
FACH_rrY RF__UrmEMENTS
16 Office Spaces w/Workstations
8 Office Spaces wN_'orkstations
TexCGraphics Publication
System
41 Office Spaces w/PC Support
0-g Training Facility (Water
tank)
10,000 gift Simulator Facility
51000 sqfl l-g Training Facilit_
49 Office Spaces w/PC Support
Baseline Ops Control Centers
Computer Systems Center
12 Office Spaces w/PC SUplX_
Mission Support
Crew
Flight Procedures & Flight
Data Fde Support
Instructors for Simulator, l-g
& 0-g Trainers
Training System Facilities
Flight Control Support
Support training
Clew requirement
5.5 SUPPORTABILITY
The primary role for the logistics analysis activity has been to provide the
recommended program spares quantities, off-equipment training/certification
requirements, repair estimates, depot support personnel requirements, and predicted
repair quantities based on the Rockwell spares and repair models.
Logistics has been an active member of the concurrent engineering team during
the conceptual design analyses activity. Contributions have been made to: I) influence
design by development of requirements and examination of subsystem configurations, 2)
identification of logistics drivers, and 3) defining off-vehicle ground
operations/processing through support system assessment using various analytical
approaches.
5.5.1 Logistics Suooort Concent
Our support concept is directly traceable to the program goals of reduced
operations costs and ground operations simplicity. Logistics support requirements are
developed and imposed on the system design early to facilitate achievement of the
program objectives.
A planned design and support infrastructure implies that: 1) a maintenance and
operations program will require minimal activity on the vehicle, 2) automation of current
processes reduces maintenance time and the associated administrative activities, and 3) it
takes advantage of multipurpose ground support and test equipment to reduce the range
and depth of required support.
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A reduced initial support investment implies that : 1) the system will utilize
existing assets where practical, and 2) the burden of building a large depot repair
capability and/or spares stock be eliminated by employing repair warranty concepts.
A reduced maintenance demand implies that: 1) every vehicle system will not be
re-certified prior to each flight, and 2) proven hardware with known reliability
performance will be used to reduce maintenance requirements.
No launch delays for normal maintenance implies that: 1) establishment of repair
time requirements, regardless of repair location will decrease risks associated with launch
schedules/windows, and 2) vehicle systems and subsystems will be designed to ensure
achievement of repair time requirements.
The logistics support concept was determined by fast examining the factors that
drive logistics. Off-line maintenance drives the logistics support requirement from a
maintenance aspect. Three types are resources are required: 1) Spare vehicle LRUs and
or maintenance consumables, 2) support equipment, and 3) depot technicians (separate
from those identified for ground/flight processing). There is also a fourth but intangible
resource consumed and that is time. In determining support resources (warehousing,
support equipment spares, test equipment for support equipment, personnel training, and
operations/maintenance instruction) time must be evaluated for turnaround of repair
resources. Spares, support equipment, and manuals are significant drivers of life cycle
costs.
The logistics program costs for the following items were evaluated:
• Depot Support Equipment
• Organization Maintenance
• Depot Maintenance
• Packaging, Handling, Storage, and Transportation
• Depot Manuals
• Organizational Training
• Depot Training
• Consumables
• Warehousing
• ILS Management
The assessment included the following factors:
• Vehicle Description - Crew size, weights
• Operations Description - Number of vehicles, operating hours/years, power on
times
• R/M Factors - reliability, MTBR, MTBM, MH/MA, sufficiency levels
• Depot Factors - turnaround times, mean time to repair
• Logistics Factors - transportation, LRU types, manuals
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5.5.2 Supportability_ Study Results
The tabulated results obtained from the Front-End Analysis of System Equipment
Requirements (FASER) model are shown in Table 5-16. The model used the following
types of data to determine the rate, safety, and condemnation spares:
• Ground Power On Time
• Flights Per Year
• Flight Power On Time
• Total Expected Flights
• Mean Time Between Removals Factor
• Number of Vehicles
• Average Removal Turnaround Time
• Probability of Sufficiency
• Removal Turn Around Time Factor
Rate spares ensure that there are spare assets in the system. When an item enters
the repair cycle, another is available "on the shelf' for immediate installation on the
vehicle. The FASER model employed the Poisson process (similar to that used to
determine NSTS orbiter spares) to determine AMLS vehicle spares.
Repeated removal and repair of a component may fatigue and wear out the
component. The aggregation of component fatigue eventuatly leads to a condition where
repair is not economical relative to the components unit cost. At that time, the
component is "condemned" or discarded. The FASER model condemnation rates are the
same as those used on the Shuttle program (2% - 3%).
When the FASER model analysis did not indicate a need for a rate or
condemnation spare because the item's failure rates are so low, a safety spare is
recommended. Otherwise, if no spates were on hand and a failure occurred, there would
be no replacement items to install while the failed unit was in the repair cycle.
Table 5-16. FASER Model Spares Results.
SPARES BOOSTER ORBITER TOTAL
Rate 8 39 47
Condemnation 28 73 101
Safety 53 55 108
The FASER model was used to perform sensitivity analyses by varying: 1)
Repair Turnaround Tnne, Flight Power On Time, Ground Power On Time, Probability of
Sufficiency, and Annual Flight Rate (See Table 5-17). The results of the analysis
showed for the booster, varying the Ground Power On Time produced the largest effect
(Figure 5-26). No noticeable effect was shown when the Flight Power On Time was
varied due to the extremely short booster flight duration. Varying both the Flight and
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Ground Power On Time produced the largest increase in spares required for the orbiter
(Figures 5-27 and 5-28). The number of spares required for the booster or orbiter varied
negligibly when the Repair Turnaround Time, Probability of Sufficiency, Number of
Vehicles, or Annual Flight Rate was varied due to the vehicle's high reliability.
Table 5-17. FASER Model Sensitivity Analyses Values.
SENSITIVITY BASELINE INPUTS
VARIABLE
RepairTumam_dT_e
ORBITER
90 days
90 hours
BOOSTER
90 days
0.25hours
VARIANCES
ORBITER
30 - 180 days
90 - 168 hoursFlight Power on Tune
Ground Power on Time * 24 hours 38 hours 24 - 500 hours
Probability of Sufficiency 0.95 0.95 0.85 - 0.975
Number of Vehicles 5 each 5 each 4, 5, 6
Annual Flight Rate 10/year 10/year 5 - 15/year
BOOSTER
30 - 180 days
0.167 - 0.25 hours
38 - 500 hours
0.85 - 0.975
4, 5, 6
5 - 15/year
* Note: Ground Power On Times are ROM estimates. The booster estimate is
higher than that for the orbiter based on additional testing for the higher capability
avionics systems (booster requires remote piloting capability)
i-
m
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Figure 5-26. Booster Ground Power On Time Sensitivity.
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Figure 5-28. Orbiter Flight Power On Sensitivity.
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6.0 LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS
This section documents the database development for.the Life Cycle Cost
Analysis. These data have been developed based upon accomplishing the specific major
activities related to design, development, production, test, verification, safety, reliability,
quality assurance, and management and control for both hardware and software. Life
cycle cost data have been extracted from these efforts and are reported or excerpted here.
When this would result in duplicating a very large multi-page table, an excerpt is
provided here as well as a reference to the full table. These data are also being provided
in electronic spreadsheet form.
The AMLS Life Cycle Cost Analysis Task collected the information developed in
the other Tasks relevant to estimating Life Cycle Costs and prepared that information for
use in cost models. For the AMLS Study, the actual Life Cycle Cost estimates are being
made by Langley Research Center and this report documents the physical and
programmatic characteristics of the AMLS in a consistent form to facilitate cost
estimating and projections of cost variance.
The AMLS program is founded upon developing innovative and effective ways
of assuring realistic life cycle costs for future space transportation systems. These
innovative ways include implementing and merging operations and support, planning and
requirements, and manufacturing producibility into a design that will provide a safe,
reliable and affordable vehicle. To do this, a solid knowledge base is referenced that can
avoid issues which have occurred before and build on their solutions to benefit the
AMLS system. Our experience base permits us to establish several key elements that
will facilitate the Design, Acquisition and Operations Phases:
• Accomplish operation planning and support (logistics) early in the program
definition phase.
• Develop design solutions that minimize adverse operational impacts.
• Involve manufacturing planning early to minimize parts counts and provide
simple designs and processes.
• Allow for adequate development hardware for verification and off-nominal
testing.
• Fund and complete technology developments early.
• Assess software requirements early and def'me a plan for their implementation.
• Provide for performance reserve (design margin) in the system.
• Keep interfaces simple.
• Base system definitions on total life cycle cost.
• Base design requirements on a realistic mission model.
The physical and programmatic information database has been developed with
consideration for this experience.
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The Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Database task for this task assignment of the AMLS
study is different from the initial t,_sk for the Personnel Launch System in that Rockwell is
not estimating the costs directly. The actual cost estimates will be made by the Langley
Research Center using data collected and organized by Rockwell.
The physical and programmatic information used to determine costs covers many
aspects of the AMLS program: Hardware, Software, Facilities, and Supporting Equipment as
well as the staff to operate them safely and effectively over the 30 year operational life of the
program. This information is organized by a 3-Axis Work Breakdown Structure illustrated in
Figure 6-1. The WBS has been adapted from the WBS originally formulated for the earlier
Personnel Launch System (PLS) Study, Reference 6-1.
The hardware development and production costs for the AMLS will be estimated
using the GE PRICE parametric cost estimating program. Some of the input variables from
this program, such as weight, ate readily determined; others are subjective and/or require
information which is not usually documented at this early phase of program evolution. This
database task has collected both. Most of these data are reproduced in this report as well a_
being supplied in electronic form.
Figure 6-I. 3-Axis Work Breakdown Structure.
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Other portions of the AMLS program willbe estimated with different methods and
models. Tables of the information known to determine these costs are being provided in the
areas of Personnel, Logistics, Facilities, Equipment, and Software. Technology availability
has been assessed and development program plans, schedules, and funding requirement
estimates for the critical technologies have been developed and presented in the AMLS
Technology Development Plan (DRD 8), Reference 6-2. Initial estimates for many of the
AMLS characteristics have been incorporated into electronic tables (spreadsheets).
6.1 FLIGHT VEHICLES
An excerpt of the Booster Work Breakdown Structure and the information collected
is presented in Table 6-1. These estimates cover the subsystem weights, materials,
fabrication and assembly methods, and technology concerns. The same information has also
been collected for the Orbiter.
Subsystem weight is known to be a principal predictor of cost. Weight and weight
growth were estimated and allocated based on our experience with the Shuttle and other
space systems. Experience indicates that there are two potential sources of errors in weight
estimates: (1) a tendency for early studies to underestimate actual final weights, and (2) a
random error or variation about the final weight. To produce these estimates, the percentage
weight growth for Shuttle subsystems was examined for applicability to the AMLS
subsystems. Growth and variation percentages were chosen based on a combination of
Shuttle experience and engineering judgement. These percentage estimates were applied to
allocate the overall dry weight growth margin of about 15 percent projected for the AMLS
based on the Shuttle experience.
Additional information was collected to permit calculation of complexity factors for
use in estimating costs with the G.E. PRICE cost estimating program. Cost estimates
developed with the G.E. PRICE model use weight and manufacturing complexity as major
cost determinants. The G.E. PRICE manufacturing complexity factors also depend upon the
type of material and fabrication accuracy required.
The accuracy required for the weight estimates of the different materials comprising
each subsystem is approximately the same as required for the Shuttle Orbiter. For most
structural elements, a fabrication accuracy of+ 0.03 inches suffices and is relatively easy to
achieve. Where higher accuracy is required, a variety of techniques are available to achieve
the accuracy and/or precision needed in local areas without imposing a higher standard on
the entire component. Other data elements provide estimates of design difficulty and
integration difficulty.
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6.2 PERSONNEL
A major cost in aerospace operations is people. Estimates of the headcounts for
AMI.,S Operations Phase Personnel are presented in Table 6-2. They are grouped into three
major areas: Operations, Logistics, and Sustaining Engineering.
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6.2.10_erations Personnel
All personnel headcount estimates reflect substantial-reductions from current practice
with the Shuttle system and unmanned launch vehicles. These headcount estimates are goals
based on examination of AMLS requirements in view of what has been accomplished with
civil and military aircraft maintenance in environments which are, in many senses, harsher
than spaceflight. These goals are a challenge which places a heavy and potentially cosily
burden on the development process to design and manufacture a vehicle that does not need
extensive turn-around effort and that can be quickly fixed when a failure occours.
The headcounts reflect steady-state operations well after the orbital flight test (OFT)
program is completed. In the preparation for the OFT and initial operating capability flOC),
there will be a buildup in personnel to undertake non-recurring tasks which will last at least
through the year after IOC. The Flight and Ground Operations headcounts should be
expected to peak at about twice the given estimates at 1012. Most of the Logistics and
Sustaining Engineering people will still be part of the manufacturing effort at the time of
IOC and this headcount will be many times the estimate given for the steady state.
Variation estimates for the Operations Phase headcotmts are based on estimates that
most functions could be accomplished by 90 percent of the nominal headcount with no
lengthening of time-lines under normal circumstances. Response time for many otherwise
trivial non-scheduled events would be degraded, but adequate stocks of spare/repair parts
should still permit launch schedule adherence. Accordingly, an approximate 10 percent
reduction was assessed against most of the identified Operations, Logistics and Sustaining
Engineering functions to determine the low estimate for Operations Phase personnel.
Pending further study, the high estimate for the Operations phase personnel is based on the
following reasoning:
The order of magnitude reductions in personnel projected for the AMLS depend
on design and development tasks which are both well understood and technically
challenging. The nation already has experience with the Shuttle where operations
efficiency projections were not even addressed because of severe funding constraints on
the design phase. If corrective actions for any shortfalls in capability (especially in areas
affecting turn-around time) are undertaken during the design phase, the AMLS is
unlikely to come out of development with a lot of operations problems in many areas.
The worst that is likely to happen is that the AMLS will pass through an extended test
phase while a few remaining problems are corrected. Under these assumptions, the
AMLS estimates are subject to a relatively small random uncertainty rather than a gross
miss- or underestimate (uncertainty of scale).
The high end of this statistical uncertainty is about 50 percent. Further
investigation should be able to determine operational areas where the uncertainty is
different, but these judgements cannot be made at this time. Accordingly, the 50 percent
is applied to all areas.
175
TheFlight andGroundOperationspeoplearepostulatedto work at the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) which is considered to be the primary launch site. An extrapolation
from an informal review of Shuttle practice indicates that about one third of the Logistics
personnel will be located at the Launch Site, with a very small portion of the Sustaining
Engineering personnel also being located permanently at the launch site. Many factors
could change this allocation, and a substantial portion of what are now considered to be
remote functions could be performed near the launch site just as well as anywhere else.
Both Flight and Ground Operations headcounts reflect the trend toward relying on
software to perform many of the functions which are now performed by humans for the STS.
For Flight Operations, a small crew is retained to monitor the flight in case there are
unanticipated malfunctions. The health monitoring system and flight software are expected
to respond to all normal activities and most abnormalities. The Fright Operations team also
provides mission design, software maintenance, and training for the transportation function.
Major payloads such as telescopes or communications satellites are postulated to provide
their own flight operations staffing. The AMLS facility is expected to provide payload
operations support only during AMLS flights.
Ground Operations headconnt estimates are based on two factors:
(1) an examination of normal turn-around activities for the Shuttle in light of aircraft
maintenance doctrine and experience with that doctrine.
(2) projections of subsystem reliability and maintainability (MTBF and MTTR)
based on the improvement from current Shuttle experience toward current aircraft
experience. The use of health monitoring sensors and software for performance
trend analysis are projected to eliminate many turn-around tasks now performed
on the Shuttle.
These projections result in a headcount for direct operations of about I00 people per
vehicle, a dramatic chop fi'om current spaceflight practice.
6A2..I,agt  
The estimates for AMLS indicate an order-of-magnitude reduction in the number of
people needed in the logistics functions. Logistics cost estimates were developed using
Rockwelrs CLINE model which in turn is based on Shuttle orbiter experience. The model is
based on both statistical and parametric relationships as wen as calculations of physical
measures. The logistics input variables that determine both the resources required and their
associated costs are summarized in Table 6-3.
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The input values determine the manpower and supplies needed as a function of
launch rate. Manpower requiremex/ts are calculated in terms of man hours and amounts of
supplies (e.g.: fuel). These are convertable to dollar costs using payroll rates and supply unit
costs. For a launch rate of ten per year, 1,333 personnel are shown as being needed for all
AMLS logictics functions nationwide. About one-third are expected to be located at the
launch site.
6.2.3 Sustainin_ En_ineerin_
Extrapolatingfrom aircraftand Shuttlexperience,itshouldbe possibletoperform
theongoingSustainingEngineeringfunctionsfora successfuldevelopmentwitha SE staff
about the same size as the direct operations crew. For the AMLS, this minimum crew is
expected to be about 500 with 100 people each for the five areas of the Booster, Orbiter,
Propulsion Systems, Crew/Cabin/Payload/LSS equipment, and Systems Integration. A very
brief survey of experience with the STS, however, indicates that the Sustaining Engineering
and Logistics functions are approximately equal numerically. Accordingly, the nominal
estimate for Sustaining Engineering is set at 1000 people, approximating the off-site
Logistics personnel. The high estimate is set at 1500 people. The distribution by skill
categories is based on a brief review of personnel staff'mg patterns at Rockwell.
The logistics model has also produced estimates of spares and replacement
requirements. An excerpt of this analysis is presented as Table 6-4.
The spares and replacement estimates are denominated in terms of Line Replaceable
Units CLRUs). At this stage of design evolution, the LRUs are not well defined; in some
cases they may be subsystems or major assemblies, in others, they may be repair kits or
repair parts. The estimated numbers of LRUs required are based on reliability assessment
values which project substantial improvement from current experience in many areas. This
improvement, in addition to good experience with Shuttle orbiter subsystems, results in
many of the Line Repairable Unit (LRU) spares being designated as safety spares, that is
spare units for which the probability of normal wear-out is so low that less than one unit is
projected to be required over the life of the AMLS program.
One area where less optimistic projections are used is Main Engines for the Orbiter; a
total of 79 LRUs are projected based on extensive engine use. For the Booster, which uses
essentially the same engine for a much briefer period during launch, only 4 LRUs are
estimated to be required.
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6.3 FACILITIES
AMLS Facility requirements were examined and the-resultant launch site buildings
are dimensioned in Table 6-5. Details of the manufacturing facilities and the launch pad
were not defined. Manufacturing and long-term storage facilities are assumed to be located
well away from the launch site, but all other operational activities including short-term
storageareassumed tobe locatedatthesinglelaunchsite.
The launch pad is projected to be very simple. The mated AMLS vehicles will be
towed to the pad on a transporter/erector which then erects the system and departs the area.
The vehicles are then fueled with very few other services taking place. A simple launch
tower is projected, primarily for crew access, but no other major structures.
Facilities/buildings projected for the Launch Site, assumed to be Kennedy Space
Center, are:
a) Ground Operations buildings to support AMLS vehicle servicing, vehicle and
payload mating, and storage
b) Fright Operations building to support vehicle flight operations and payload
operations while the payload is in or near the vehicle, as well as crew training,
software maintenance and development, and administration.
c) Payload Containment System building to support checkout of payloads which
have been integrated elsewhere, and storage.
The Payload Containment System building is assumed to be located near the AMLS
vehicle Ground Operations servicing/maintenance/storage buildings. At this time, the co-
location ofthesebuildingsappearstobe a convenience rather than a necessity.
The Flight Operations building is located well away from the Launch Pad, as a
blockhouse is no longer needed. This building is planned to serve both training and
administrative functions as well as flight planning and monitoring.
The functional modules for the buildings are categorized as office, shop/lab, and
hangar modules. The offices must be air-conditioned, the while shop/lab modules must be
capable of being clean-rooms (clean) and therefore air-conditioned. The requirements for
the hangar modules need further assessment. Ctmrent aircraft practice is open hangars; if a
clean operations are needed, this is accomplished with temporary structures and/or tenting.
The AMLS may be able to maintain limitedclean areas with the tunnel designs similar to
those chosen for the Personnel Launch System (PLS). If the entire hangar module must be
clean, provisions for airlocks and clean air-conditioning will substantially impact
construction costs.
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Ground Operations equipment for the AMLS is projected to be similar to
equipment developed for aircraft. 'Electronic test equipment will be selected from that
used to maintain avionics now being developed and modified, to match the changes
needed for the AMLS. Only minor development efforts are projected for this test
equipment. Scaffolding and mechanical equipment will probably require shape
modifications from existing equipment, but only appearance factors will change.
The Shuttle equipment list was reviewed to project AMLS equipment functional
requirements based on five flight vehicles and ten flights per year. The equipment is
described in Table 6-6 by a brief name tag and an estimate of the equipment sets needed at
specific locations. Pending later detailed analysis of the AMI.,S requirements in view of the
planned use of BITE, this list is expected to provide a good basis for projecting AMLS costs
from Shuttle practice. While the equipment descriptions do not provide sufficient detail to
provide an independent cost estimate based on the equipment's physical description, the list
should be valuable in future detailed trade studies to determine the paths to follow in
selecting Ground Support Equipment investments. Based on this Shuttle, it appears that
GSE investments are relatively small in relation to the Ground Crew costs and larger
investments are justified ff they can reduce the crew cost.
6.4 SOFTWARE
Estimates of the size (in lines of code) for some of the AMLS software are given in
Table 6.7. Software for the AMLS represents an area of moderate risk because the physical
systems which the software will control and/or monitor are not well defined. Progress in
software, computers, sensors and control mechar_ms over the next ten to twenty years is
expected to build a sut_cient base that much of the AMLS software will be modified and/or
tailored standard software. It is expected to evolve directly from standard aircraft software and
represent about the same level of effort as adapting existing fright software to a new aircraft.
This contrasts dramatically from the Shuttle experience where two separate developments were
undertaken for the regular and backup flight software and informal Rockwell estimates for the
entire industry and government effort for Shuttle flight software are about $1 billion in "as
spent" dollars.
Software for the Health Monitoring System represents a substantial development cost
risk because the smart sensors designated for this application have not yet been deFmed and most
have not been developed. It is reasonable to project that some of the Health Monitoring System
software for the AMLS will evolve from aircraft development efforts over the next decade.
Health monitoring software for the STS Main Propulsion System is already being pursued, and it
is reasonable to project that the technology will be well understood by the time of the AMLS
Phase CJD effort in the year 2000.
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Table 6-6. Equipment Descriptions.
2.6.8
Z6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.8.8
26.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.8.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.6
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.8.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.8.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
2.6.8
Ground Support Equipment list Usecl
On
Sy_len"STS Model
Processing BRCS PRIMARY ENGINE THROAT PLU(PRGP A70-0798
Processing B RCS VERNIER ENGINE THROAT PLUE PROP A70-0799
Processing B OMS ENGINE THROAT PLUG SET PROP A70-0950
Processing BOMS ENGINE INTERFACE CLOSEOUT PROP A70-0955
Processing BMPS PORTABLE REGULATOR TEST E PROP C70-0743
Processing B PROPELLANT GAUGING TEST SET PROP C70-0753
Processing SRCS PRIMARY AND VERNIER INJ INSIPROP C70-0799
Process'rag BVOLUMETRIC LEAK DETECTOR PROP C70-0888
Processing BMPS COMPONENT FLOW TESTERS (-,PROP C70-0903
Processing BMPS INTERNAL INSPECTION SET PROP C70-0907
Processing BMPS TEST ADAPTER SET PROP C70-0914
Processing 8 PROPULSION SYS VALVE LEAKAGE [PROP C70-1536
Processing BOMS/RCS QD TOOL AND CAP SET PBOP F70-0031
Processing BOMS ENGINE INSTALLATION FIXTURE PROP H70-0515
Processing 8 MPS LRU COMPONENT INSTALLER PROP 1-170-0528
Processing BMPS ENG INSTALLATION INSTALLER PROP I..170.0568
Processing BHANDLING ADAPTERS MPS COMPON PROP H70-0703
Processing B HYSTER LIFT TRUCK (HORIZONTAL IPPROP H'/0-0764
Processing BMPS HEAT SHIELD HANDLING SLING PROP H70-0852
Processing BMPS MOVER (WHILE INSTALLED) SEI' PROP H70-0890
Processing 8 MPS TRANSPORT DOLLIES (HORIZ) PROP H70-0901
Processing BMPS HANDLER SLING PROP 1-170-0902
Processing B MPS ROTATING SLING PROP H70-0903
Processing B MPS LRU INSTALLER / COMPONENT ! PROP 1-170-0905
Processing BMPS INTERFACE SUPPORT PANEL PROP 1470-0911
Processing BMPS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIVE PROP $70-0902
Processin9 BTANKAGE MOISTURE MONITORING UPROP S72-1080
Processing B RCS / OMS THRUSTER WORK FIXTUF PROP XXX-2
Processing BMPS WORK FIXTURES PROP XXX.20
Processing BMPS HANDLER I MOVER PROP XXX-21
Processing B RCS / OMS THRUSTER HANDLING DO PROP XXX-3
Processing BGN2 THRUSTER COVER SET PROP XXX-4
Pfocess_ B MPS DOLLY (VERTICAL OFF VEHICLE PROP XXX-43
..... Number of Units at each Facility ............
LF PB SB MB PCPF PAD
0 4 8 0 0 0
0 4 8 0 0 0
0 6 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 o o 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 4 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 8 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 20 40 0 0 0
o 4 0 0 0 0
0 6 0 0 0 0
0 5 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0
0 6 0 0 0 0
0 3 3 0 0 0
0 5 0 0 0 0
Substantialportionsof the Ground Operationssoftware can be assembled from modules
which have alreadybeen developed for militaryand civilaviation.The degree to which existing
softwaremodules can be incorporatedneeds furtherstudy as the tentativeestimatesdeveloped in
thisstudy provide only rough estimatesof the sizeof the programs, and (ina very few cases)the
time needed to develop them under theassumption thatmost of the code would be new.
Software for flight/mission design and control represents a substantial body of code.
Much of the fundamental design work in this area has been accomplished for the Shuttle
program, and this area continues to evolve. One of the future trade analyses for the AMLS will
address the question of how much of this evolving body of code should be adapted and how
much should be developed new.
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Software for the maintenance test equipment will represent a substantial part of the
investment in test equipment, much of which will be unique to the AMLS. The current
practice of developing software in conjunction with the hardware provides the reasonable
expectation that in the next decade there will be a design base of hardware/software modules
in test equipment that is analogous to the modules ("cards") available for personal computers.
The availability of such a design base would substantially reduce the effort needed to design
specialized test equipment/software.
Flight test software is normally expected to be a major task. For the AMLS,
however, the Health Monitoring System collects the information that would now be collected
only during the flight test phase. Accordingly, no estimates for software are provided
pending determination of a requirement for flight test information that would not otherwise
be collected.
Support Software modifications will be needed, but no major new developments have
been identified. Administrative software should emphasize off-the-shelf software, not only
because the procurement and installation costs are much lower than for unique software, but
also because commercial packages are maintained and updated frequently, and replacement
of outdated packages is facilitated. Weather, range tracking, and safety software will need
to be updated for the AMLS, but major rewrites should not be attributed to the AMLS alone.
6.5 COMPLEXITY INFORMATION
The variables shown in the previous tables are the physical and programmatic
characteristics that drive the GE PRICE cost model. This model is widely used in
government and the aerospace industry. It has the capability to address the subjective
topics of complexity/difficulty and technological challenge quantitatively through expert
opinion assessments of the capability of the design team and difficulty of the challenge.
While some of the input variables for GE PRICE such as weight, are readily determined,
others are subjective and/or require information which is not usually documented at this
early phase of program evolution. Tables 6-8a, b, and c are copies of worksheets used
for collecting this information.
The first of these sheets collects some of the general or readily available information,
and documents estimates of the technology status of the subsystem and/or components. Also
collected here are estimates of the design team's experience/expertise; the expected difficulty
of integrating the subsystem; and any special tooling requirements. The next two worksheets
are designed to provide information that permits an independent quantitative estimate of
complexity to be determined. These Worksheet forms were developed to collect and
document subsystem characteristics which are used to determine the manufacturing
complexity. Two different worksheets are needed as the GE PRICE program considers
subsystems to be composed either of structural/mechanical assemblies or electronic
assemblies. These forms relate characteristics known to designers fairly early in the design
process to the quantified experience base in the PRICE program.
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Table 6-8a. GE PRICE Data CollectionWorksheet-General Information,Technology,
Design, Integration,and Tooling.
WBS NUMBER: WBS NAME:
ASSEMBLY/COMPONENT NAME/DESCRIPTION:
ANALOGOUS SUBSYSTEM:
QUANTITY NEXT HIGHER ASSEMBLY:
STRUCTURAL WEIGHT:
TOTAL WEIGHT:
TYPES:
ELECTRONIC WEIGHT:
ELECTRONIC DENSITY:
TECHNOLOGY:
TECHNOLOGY LEVEL AT PRESENT TIME:
LEVEL1: BASICPRINCIPLESOBSERVEDAND REPORTED
LEVEL2:CONCEPTDESIGNFORMULATED
LEVEL3:CONCEPTUALDESIGNTESTEDANALYTICALLYOR EXPERIMENTALLY
LEVEL5: COMPONENT/BREADBOARDTESTEDIN RELEVANTENVIRONMENT
LEVEL6:PROTOTYPE/ENGINEERINGMODELTESTED INRELEVANTENVIRONMENT
LEVEL7: ENGINEERINGMODELTESTEDIN SPACE
LEVEL8: FULLOPERATIONALCAPABILITY
YEAR OF FIRST PRODUCTION:
DESCRIPTION OF TECHNOLOGY ISSUES:
WHERE/HOW WORKED:
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT NEEDED:
DESIGN, INTEGRATION & TOOLING:
DESIGN DIFFICULTY:
DESIGN EXISTS
MODIFIEDDESIGN
m SIMPLE
ROUTINE(NOMINAL)
DIFFICULT
ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY/ DESIGN SSUE
EXPERIENCEOF DESIGNTEAM:
NORMAL
MIXED NEW/OLD
NEW
INTEGRATIONDIFFICULTY:
NONE
MODERATE
ROUTINE
DIFFICULT
INTEGRATION:
WHAT DOES THE SUBSYSTEM I ASSEMBLY / COMPONENT INTERFACE WITH OR NEED TO BE
INTEGRATED WITH? (INCLUDE SOFTWARE AS A POTENTIAL INTERFACE ITEM):
UNUSUAL TOOLING / TEST EQUIPMENT:
186
o ip
. , ::" 1!
_ ,11 1|| J J,!
!/ "ff • ,!
187
Table6-8c.GE PRICE Data CollectionWorksheet-ElectronicsManufacturingComplexity.
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7.0 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
.°
This section documents the results of the technology assessment task. This task
had the overall objective of identifying and selecting applicable technologies that
enhance AMLS goals to achieve minimum life cycle costs (LCC). Technologies with
minimum development risk for efficient and cost effective AMLS system design,
manufacturing, maintenance and operations are the prime candidates for our selection
process. To facilitate the AMLS technology identification process, more than 200
candidate technology topics that are considered relevant to AMLS were compiled from a
comprehensive list of sources.
Our current database has essentially been built on the prior technology screening
effort performed for the PLS. In addition, the Single Stage to Orbit (SSTO), Assured
Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) and Advanced Launch System (ALS) studies have
generated significant technology data applicable to the AMLS. The NASP program,
currently in Phase 2D, has a comprehensive technology maturation program. Many of
these evolving technologies, such as high temperature, high performance structures,
hydrogen/oxygen RCS and OMS and high power density fuel cells will attain fairly
mature status before the mid 1990's. Valuable generic research data has been found on
aircraft services and maintenance from the Air Force Office for Technology Application
documents and SDIO Technology Applications Information Systems.
On the basis of a comprehensive technology database and the selection criteria for
the AMLS, a list of the applicable technology options/alternatives has been identified for
the major WBS elements. A thorough review has been conducted of the technology
maturation programs being actively pursued by the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP)
program and have selected specific applicable technology items for AMI.,S system design
trades. A simple technique for monitoring and tracking the status of applicable
technologies has been devised to aid in the formulation of the AMI.,S advanced
development schedule requirements and technology plans.
Key technology development requirements in six specific technical areas deemed
critical to the AMLS have been investigated. Assessment revealed that some of these
technologies are unique and unproved and have fairly low technology's readiness levels.
Backup technology alternatives were identified if the development of any of the key
technologies could not meet the AMLS schedule requirements.
For the nine key technologies that have been selected from the six technical areas
for having the highest payback potential uniquely for the AMLS, detailed technology
development plans have been developed. These plans show the time schedules necessary
to bring the respective technology to proper level of maturity to meet the AMLS program
requirements. ROM program funding cost estimates for these nine critical technology
development programs have been made and are presented in this report.
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7. I TECHNOLOGY IDENTIFICATION AND ASSESSMENT
The timely identification and development of key technologies is essential for all
advanced aerospace initiatives. To support of the design and-development of the AMLS,
major advancements in technology of materials, structure sciences and reusable low cost
propulsion systems are requited. Many of these technologies are nominal extensions of
the proven design. They are either available now or will attain acceptable levels of
maturity through the ongoing, related technology development programs. However,
some technologies to satisfy the designed needs of the AMLS are unique and will require
dedicated advanced development efforts.
7.1.1 Technology Selection Approach
The technology readiness levels (TRL), as defined by NASA and shown in
Figure 7-I, are presented as a convenient reference. The numerical scale and its
descriptors provide a well-known and recognized measure of the status of an advanced
development program and the maturity of its technologies. Our approach to the
technology selection process is to monitor and identify applicable evolving technologies
that have a projected NASA technology level of 6 by the year 2000. Technologies with
this level of maturity pose minimum development schedule and cost risk to the AMLS.
The focus is on the enhancing technologies that can effectively reduce AMLS life cycle
Figure 7-1. Technology Readiness Levels And
Program Phases
costs. To accomplish this
objective, the major emphasis
of our effort is placed on the
identification and selection of
technologies thatwilllead
to: 1), significant improvements
in system performance,
reliability, safety life, 2). each
of hardware fabrication,
assembly, inspection, ground
processingand flight
operations,and 3). improved
systemmaintainability,
checkoutand turn-around
capabilities.
7.1.2 AMLS Technology Ootions
vv -
The applicable technology options identified for the major WBS elements are
shown in Table 7-1. Many of the structural material selections for the body group are
similar to the PLS and present no technology issue. The application of high temperature
metal alloy for the booster wing structure has only limited space experience and the
fabrication of titanium aluminide structures is in the early stages of development.
Aluminum-lithium has a significant strength/weight advantage compared to conventional
aluminum alloys. It is an attractive option for the thrust structure and for the lower
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orbiterstructure. Theductility andweldabilityOfthis materialareissuesbeing
investigated.
• .
Smart Structures is a fast evolving technology that holds promise to revolutionize
the next generation of structural design for aerospace vehicles. Advanced optical sensors
ate embedded in the structure for material strain measurement. Active sensing enables
detection of dynamic changes in the properties of the materials at critical airframe
locations. This concept, which is in the early laboratory verification stage, is intended to
improve vehicle life cycle/aging predictions to facilitate logistics support and vehicle
maintenance.
Cryogenic tank insulation is the foremost design issue for the AMLS propellant
tank. The viability of applying the insulation system inside and outside the pressure
vessel has been investigated. The concept of using foam insulation (Rohacell) bonded on
the external surface of the cryogenic tank has been experimentally verified. However,
the reliability of these materials has not been demonstrated.
The use of advanced metal encapsulated multilayer insulation (MLI) as a thermal
protection system on the internal surface of the cryogenic tank is only in the laboratory
development stage. The Mid has shown outstanding thermal performance at cryogenic
temperature. The fabrication of the Mid panels involves complex and costly processes.
In addition, the method to join the individual Mid panel to form an integrated insulation
system is an issue for further development.
The design of the reaction control propulsion system and orbit maneuvering
propulsion system using cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen as propellants is based on fairly
mature technology. Specific options associated with the selection of (1) either a liquid or
a gaseous feed system for the Ground and flight processing systems for the AMLS must
incorporate advanced automation and RCS thrusters, or (2) either a pressure-fed or a
turbopump-fed system for the OMS engine is a design issue that can be resolved in
further tradeoff evaluation. The Integrated Hydrogen/Oxygen Technology (RIOT) study
performed by Rockwell's Space System Division for NASA/Lewis Research Center in
1989 provides a useful technology reference.
Avionics elements defined for the AMLS present no particular technology issues.
The system will require advancements in architecture design and in sophistication of data
processing, health monitoring, failure detection, diagnostics and reconfiguration
management and controls. Advanced concepts of using neural network and fuzzy logic
to provide added intelligence and autonomy for more effective control of the AMLS will
be subjects for further technology assessment studies.
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Table 7-la. Technology Options...
WBS Element
Win_ Grouo - Structure
B_ter -
Orbiter
Options
Aluminum Alloy
Composite - Graphitc/Polyimide
HighTemperaun_ MetalAlloy
Columbium Alloy
Aluminum Alloy
TitaniumAluminide
Titanium
Composite-GraphitePo]yimide
Technology Stares & Issues
Temperature Capability Limited, _ Required.
Highest Temperature Capability.
Well Chara_tea-ized Material.
Early Quality Problems Under Control.
Back-up Option To Assure Multiple Reuse.
Heavy - Limited Space Experience.
Temperature Capability Limited, TPS Required.
Early Development.
Low Ductility & Low Fracture Toughness.
Welding Demonstrated.
SPF/DB Demonstrated.
Heat Resistant to 1000°F.
Difficult to Fabricate.
Wing TIPFIN
l_s_mc._um_
Thrust Structure
Crew Cabin
Access Tunnel
Payload Containment
I_wer Orbiter Structure
Tank
Intertank
Graphite/Polyinfide
TitaniumAluminide
Aluminum Alloy
Aluminum Alloy 2024
Aluminum - Lithium Alloy
Silicon Carbide/Aluminum
Titanium Ahnninide
Aluminum 2219
Aluminum Alloy Honeycomb
Aluminum - Lithium Alloy
Cnt_ite/Polyimide
AI Alloy or AI-Li
GraphiteA_lyimide
Thamoplastics
"l_taniumAluminide
Almninum Alloy
Aluminum-Lithium(Booster)
Gmphit_k (Orbiter)
Structure Integrity Monitor
Trend Data Acquisition
Hi_ Tempa_turc Cspsbi_ty.
Early Development.
Temperature Capability Limitcd_ TPS Required.
Substantial Mfg. Experience - Lowest Cost.
Limited Experience, 10% Higher Strength, Lower
Weight Than AI.
Lower Weight & Higher Costs.
Developmental & Very Expensive.
Substantial Mrs. Expc='icnce - Lowest Cost.
Required.
Limited FabricationExperience.
Alternative Material, Lower Weight, High Cost.
RequiresThickTPS.
Or/PiSmlculnlRepairMethod,Suucum,l
Adhesive Require
Cmtificatim.
Not As Mature As Cn/Pi.
High Fabrications Cost
Limited Experience
Bcing Developed for NASP Non-Integral Tank
Limited Experience
Lower Weight. Being Developed for Ahcraft
Optical SensorsEmbedded in Structure for Strain
Measurement in Development - Rockwell Science
Center.
System Inspection Checkout and Repairability are
PotentialIssues.
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Table 7-lb. Technology Options (Continued).
WBS Element
F_a_cair,.Ia_
Internal
External
Options
MLI
Foam Block
SOH
Foam Block
Lower Surfac_a
Side & Upper Surface
Nose & Leading Edges
Auachment Methods
Iandiat.Cr_
Nose Gear (Braking &
Steering) Main Landing
Gear (Bnking)
Reaction Control
System
Orbit Maneuvering
System
HTP-6 (FRC) T'de
Stratified Density Tile
Carbon/Silionn Carbide, SiC/SiC
Metal T'des
AFRSI Blankets, (Direct Bond)
Other Blankets, T'des Available
As Alternatives
Carlxm/Carbon (ACC)
t'Putcnen)
Carbm_ili(_n Carbide (C/SiC)
Reinfet.u_d Ceramiea
High Temp Metal Alloy ('Fib)
Metallic F_tonen ForLeading
r Edge
, Direct Bond Adhesive(s)
Mechanical Fasteners
Electric
Hydraulic
Cryogenic H2 & 02
Cryogenic 142& 02
Technology Status & Issues
Demonstrated at Low Tank Pressure.
High Thermal Efficiency; Inspection and Repair are
Issues.
Requires Development.
Reusability Not Demonstrated.
Requires Impermeable Membrane - Not Developed.
Block Bonding To Tank Not Inspectable.
Reusability Not Demonstrated
Si/_nificant Development Undertaken.
Hardened for Durability, Permanent Water
Proofing.
Lower Maturity, Costs Similar to FRCI.
Much Lower Maturity.
EarlyDevelopment
E.v_ting Orbiter Blanket Technology.
Upgraded Orbiter Technology
Being Developed for Hermes, Candidate for
Performance
Eabanca_mL
Early Development.
No Technology Issues
Available to -600°F andNeed Certification.
Strain Isolation Pad (SIP) Needed For AI-Li.
DesiRn Challenge.
Enhanced System Reliability
Advanced Development of High Power EMA, EHA,
& Switching
Controls Required.
Hydraulics Involves Complexity & Checkout
Req_ents.
Leaks area Problem
High Perfvmance.
!Technology Fairly Mature.
Liquid vs. Gaseous Feed System Selection Issue.
Liquid Thruster Hm Performance & Weight
Advantage
Pressure vs. Tm4x_pomp Fed System Selection
Issue.
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Table 7-1c. Technology Options (Continued).
WBS Elcmcnt Options Tcc_nology Status &Issucs
Prime Pow_ High Power Density, Not Rechargeable
Acmaton
GN&C
Comm. & Tracking
DataPmcc_sing
HealthMonitocing.&
Diagnosis.
Displays & Controls
Software:
Antennas
Cooling System
Radiator
Primary Batteries
(Lithium Thionychloride)
SecondaryBatter/cs (Ag-Zn)
HeatTra_fcrLoop
_nmJfl..l_l_df_m
142/O2 APU
Fuel con (Modified Orbiter)
High Power Density Fucl Cclls
Low Voimgc 28 Vdc
High Voltage 130 V DC
270 V DC
AC
Eleccomechenical (EMA)
Eiecuehydrmmic (H/A)
iAutonomous with Pilot Backup
Head-up Display (HUD)
Hi_ Order Iamguages
ADA/ExpertSystems
Neu_ Network
'FuzzyLogic
Fanbedded
l_ployablc
Passive (Avionics)
Active
Cryogenic Heat Sink
!Mature Technology. High Weight, Limited Cycle
Life.
lMaturity 2-3, Complex, Low Reliability
System Complexity. High Energy Capability.
Technolol_ Maturity at Level 3.
High Weight, mature (TL 8)
Low Weight, Being Developed for SSF.
Low Weight, Being Developed for NASP.
Not Being Considered.
System Simplicity & Reliability.
Low Power (20 liP) Actuator Qualified.
High Power Actuator and Switching Control
_uipm_t
Require Advanced Development
Architectural & Design Issues.
No Technology Issues.
Pm_lkl Proceuing,VLSI Techniques.
No Technology Issues.
Early Develolxnent - RockwellScience Center.
Body Mounted tT.reon)
Deployable (T.nma)
ApplicatiosssBeingInvestigated.
EM Transpmen_ Qucstioaablc.
Deployable is Backup Design, mechanical
Complegity.
Cryogenic Heat Sink
1 Fluid Loop _O)
2 Fluid Loops (Y'rcoo & H_O)
Galley (Hygiene)
May Be Marginal, Heat Sink Capacity Limited,
Ready Technology
Integrated with Enviroamental Control System.
MPS Residuals Available, Being Developed for
NASP.
Liquid Loop Mature Technology.
Mote Complex, Highly Efficient (Heat Pipe, 2-
Phase _nnal Tnmsix_ Loop).
Advanced Solid(HighConductance)Radiator in
Devclopm_t
Being Developed for NASP.
No TechnologyIssues.
More Complex Servicingand Checkout
Requirements.
ImprovedWasteManagement SystemRequired.
Development and Verification for Zax>-G Required.
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Table 7-1 d. Technology Options (Concluded).
WBS Element Oplio_ Technology Status & Issues
Propulsion System
RecoverySystems
_su_ua
Ground Processing
Mission (Flight)
Processing
Solid Rockets
Hybrid Propulsion
Parachutes (Water Landing)
Abort Parameter Se_ors and
Autonomous Con_ls
Automated Checkout Systems
Auto _d Processing Expert
Systems
Auto Logistics Planning Expert
Improved Weather Protection
On Ground
Gas Leak Detecaon System
Automat""'_lMission Control
Systems
Auto Launch Control Expert
Systems
Advanoed Lightning Protection
On Ground and In Flight
No Technology Issues.
Hybrid Development, I.D2 Common with Fuel Cell.
Passive Aero-Stabillty of Capsule Verified.
Smart Sensors and Intelligent Adaptive Expert
Control
System Development and Demonstration required.
At or Very Near the State-Of-The-Art.
Architectural and Design Issues, But Not
Technology
DevelopmentIssues.
Ultra Accurate Multiple Gas Sensors in
Dev©lop_Dt
At or Very Near The SOA. Architectural and
Design Issues,
But Not Teclmology Development Issues.
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An advancedheatexchangerthatpermitstheuseofcryogenichydrogenasthe
heattransferfluidisbeingdevelol_dfortheNationalAero-SpacePlaneforthe
environmentalthermalcontrolsubsystem.The prototypehm'dwarehasbeen testedand
verifiedand showed exceptionallyhighperformanceinheattransfereffectiveness.Itisa
candidatetechnologyforAMLS considerationiftheon-boardcryogenichydrogencan be
used as the heatsinkfluid.
Ground and flight processing systems for the AMLS must incorporate advanced
automation and control techniques to facilitate checkout, launch preparation and turn-
around operations. Advanced sensor technologies such as ultrasonic flow meters, flyable
high frequency signal processors and multispectral, high resolution imaging leak
detection systems, are being investigated by NASA, DOD and private industries.
Operational prototype hardware for some of the systems is projected by 1995 and the
flight qualified system by 1997.
To supplement the information presented in Table 7-1, a more detailed
compilation of the TPS materials/structure technology options has been made. It has
been used for trade studies leading to the Task 3 reference system. The data showing the
TPS options, the maximum operating temperatures of these materials, the technology
status information and potential development issues, are summarized and presented in
Table 7-2.
The prime TPS material options for the vehicle nose and leading edge structure
elements includes carbon-carbon, carbon/silicon carbide (C/SiC), and silicon
carbide/silicon carbide (SiC/SiC). Sic/SiC has the highest allowable temperature of
3200 deg F. However, the material might require a coating, i.e., reaction cured glass
(RCG), that works in the intermediate temperature (1600-2000 deg F) regime to prevent
potential atmospheric oxidation degradation effects. It is noteworthy that carbon/silicon
carbide has been selected as the TPS material and is being developed for the European
Hermes program.
For the AMLS vehicle lower surfaces, the various material options arc listed in
five categories based on their physical characteristics and specific structure makeup.
Recent development programs conducted by Thermal Sciences Division, Thermal
Protection Materials Branch (TPMB) of NASA Ames Research Center have
demonstrated that Alumina Enhanced Thermal Barrier (AETB) tiles can be made to
withstand surface temperatures of 3000 deg F. In addition, further progress is being
achieved in making tiles with Hafnium and Zirconium fibers that may work at
temperatures approaching 4000 deg F.
For the lower heat load surfaces, it may be desirable to use the lightweight
flexible insulation such as the Tailorable Advanced Blanket Insulation (TABI) which
exhibit good surface insulation thermal properties at temperature near 2600 deg F. It was
also reported by TPMB at NASA/ARC that the carbon reinforced silicon carbide ceramic
matrix composite insulation (Top-Hat) was successfully tested in the 20 MW Arc-Jet
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Facility where the surface temperature reaching 3900 deg F is obtained. Top-Hat TPS
consists of a high temperature C/SIC cover mechanically attached to a hollowed out
AETB tile packed with a lightweight alumina filler material:-
To improve the repairability and minimize maintenance costs of the ceramic TPS
panels, a unique mechanical attachment design has been proposed for the AMLS. It is
envisioned that successful development of this technology would dramatically simplify
the TPS panel installation and replacement process and greatly reduce the life cycle costs
of vehicle maintenance and turnaround.
7.1.3 NASP Technol0gy
The NASP program is currently in Phase 2D detailed design definition stage. A
comprehensive technology maturation program with substantial funding is being
energetically pursued to address several critical technology problems. A selected list of
technologies that have potential influence on the AMLS design is shown in Table 7-3.
The advanced development efforts on the Orbital and Ascent Maneuvering
System (OAMS), RCS thruster and stoichiometric gas generator are closely related to the
issues of the AMLS, because both vehicles use similar propellants and have identical
functional performance requirements for the on-orbit propulsion system.
In the high temperature, high performance material area, the NASP technology
maturation program focuses on the characterization and development of the fabrication
processes for alpha and beta titanium metal composites, advanced beryllium and
refractory composites. Significant developmental data have been generated. The
certification of these sophisticated materials relies on further major developments.
Both integral and non-integral tankage concepts have been investigated by the
NASP program. Although the main NASP propellant tank is used for slush hydrogen
storage, the design and material selection issues and thermal protection system
technology requirements are similar to those for AMLS propellant tankage. Many of the
technology development findings from the NASP program will be available in the early
1990's providing valuable inputs for the AMLS technology assessments. According to
the current technology maturation plan, availability dates of some of these technologies
are also shown in these tables.
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Table 7-2. TPS Materials/Struct_e. Technol0 _y 0Dfions.
TI_ Op_ons
Nose & I_.e_lintEdfes
o Cerbon_-
OxidationCoating
InsulatedMetallicAttachments
High-Temp Insulation Blankets
o C_bon/Silicon Carbide(C/SiC)
o Silicon Carbide/Silicon Carbide
(SiC/SiC)
o Ablator
Avcoat
Side & Unner Sm'facm
o Blanke_ Insulation
AFRSI
TABI
FRSI
o Bonded _c T'des
L1900
o Metallic
Titanium Multiwall
I_e_a_Smfa_
o Bonded Ceramic T'dcs
2700
3000
3200
5500
1500
1800
700
1200
12(30
L12200
FRCI
HTP
AETB
TUFI
o Blanket Insulation
AFRSI
TABI
CFBI
2500
250O
250O
2500
2300
1500
1800
1800
Reinfor_.,d Ceramic Panels
W/Fiberons or Layered Insulation
(Mechanical Attachments)
C/SiC
SiC/SiC
Top Hat (NASA Am_)
ACC Multipost
Carlxm-Carbon Shell
Metallic
TI Multiw_
Supmdloy Honeycomb with
HI.us Insulation
Ablat_
Avcoat
300O
3200
27O0
300O
2700
1200
1700
5500
Technology Status & Issues
Shuttle Concept
Improved Propezti_ Permit Weight
Reduction
Advan_d Cad_-Cad_ (ACC)
2 3000°F In Development
Being Developed for Hermes
Coating May Be Required for
Intermediate Temps (1600 - 2000 F)
NotReusable
Being Developed for Shuttle
Being Developed for Shuttle
Available Technology
Shuttle TechnolofD,
Low Su'_g_ Reptaced by Blanke_
Thin Skim - Damage Pm_e
Thicker Skin Paneis Have Withstood Impact Test/n A
Shuttle TPS Concept
More Durable Surfaces and Coating
Being Developed
Lighter & Stronger
Waterproofing Permanent Only Below
1100F
Lower Cost, High Impact Resistance, Repairable
AFRSI-Exitlmg Technology
Higher Temp Capability in
Development
More Durable-Proposed fez SSTO
Composim Blankct-I..ighm Weight
Tmeaded A_achmeu_ inGal_-_p
FdlersN_xled
Coating May Be Needed for 1600-
2000F
Hard Shell Pinned to Bonded "I'de
Multiple Standoff Posts
NASP Concept-Buried Metallic
Attachments
Thin Skins-Demase Proee
Not Reusable
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Table 7-3a. NASP Technology. ,
Technology
Rockets
'Tm'bo-
Machinery
(MainEngine
Pumps, Boost
Pemps, U_/
Status
Igsues MajorMilestone
Decisions
OAMS Module
Perfcx'manoe
Thr_t-to-Weight
Life & Integration
RCS Thruster
Perform aoce,
Response &
Thrust-to-Weight
,OAMS/RCS Jet
Interaction Effects
StoichlometricGas
Generator(27
(Stoich GG)
Performance
X-30 Design Definition
Phaae3 Long Lead
o OAMS Module
Performance
Thru=t-to-Weight
Life & Integration
OAMS 10 Cell Module
Not-F_re Tests - Nov 92
Pump-Fed Module
Hot-Fire Tests - Oct 93
'o RCS l_ruster
Hot-FireTests
o Jet Interaction
Tests in Hytest
fM=8) Facillty
o Stoich. GG
Hot-Fire Tests
o Phase 2C/2D
X-30 Conceptual/
Preti_i.aryDesign
o Initiate Flight
Component
Fabrication &
Development Tests
'BearingLife o Small/Large
Bearing Rig Tests
Ze_o*NPSH H_ o Design Fab& Test
Boost Pump WoAhonte Ho
Performance Boost Pump
, LII Utility Pump o Design Fab & Test
Performance
LO Utility Pump o Design Fab & Test
Performance Workhone Pump
Main Engine H_ Pump o Design Fab & Test
Performance Workhone H,_ Pump
(I) _SED - Full Scale Engineering Development
(2) Development Program Completion Date; Data Available Earlier
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Budget
(ROM)
$3OM
$1M
$5M
Incl.
Hyt_t
Facility
$1M
$15M
$20M
$4M
$15M
$20M
$20M
!$20M
Avai_labifity Date(1 y
Residual Uncertainties
Oct 92/FSED(I )
Aug 92/FSED(I)
Feb 93/Jet Interaction Effects At
High mach No. Model
Ju192/FSED(I)
Feb 93/Phase 3 Final Design
Feb93/FSED (1)
Dec92
Mar 93/FSED(I)
Oct93/FSED(l)
iOct 93/FSED(1)
JIm94/FSED (I)
Table 7-3b. NASP Technology.
Technology
AlphaTMC
Adv
BaTlliam
Adv Heat
F.xchangal
Noll-
htejmd
Tankage-
GR/EP
htcsr_
Tankage
Structural
_Attachments
Hot
Structm_
Status
Issues
Fiber/Matrix Inter-
Action, Temperature
Limitations, Coating
Compatibility,
ProjectedProperee*
Creep, Th_o-
Mechanics] Fstigue
Temperature
Limitations, Coafin8
Dunbility, Projects
Tolm'm)cc
Tanpcrature
Limitations, Ctyogeaio
Toughness,Projected
propeaim
Manifold Plumbing,
Fabrication Tech-
nology, Durability
(Life), Damage Repair,
Hydrogen Coohmt
Max Temperature
Limit
Volumetric Require-
ment & Insulation
From Hot Wall
Thermal Gradients,
Permeability, Fuel
Liner
MaterialSelection,
Density, Durability,
Major Milestone
Decisions
o Effort to Be
Evaluated
Near-Term (Aero-
Shell Test Articles
Built From This
Material)
o Effort to Be
Evaluated
Near-Term
o Effort to Be
Evaluated
Near-Term
o Generic Options 3&7
Aeroject Platelet
o MI_ Tafi:B
o Boeing Verification
Cross Section Built
and Tested
o Recently
Budget
(ROM)
$20-25M
$35-40M
Availability Datc(1)/
Residual Uncertainties
Alpha Available Now
Adv Alpha 1991
Alpha 2 1992
Pre-1992
Commercial-Grade 1990
Adv Alloys 1991
Recognized As
Required Effort
Ring-Frame Manufw.mring o Task B - NASP
Attachment Technology, Low
Weigbt Design
(1) FSED - Full Scale Engineering Develolnnent
(2) Development Program Completioa Date; Data Available Earlier
1991
$1-3M
See Tech
Mat Plan
Budget
Design Sensitive - May Need
Re-evaluation
1990
' $2-5M Critical Issue
1990
2O0
TECHNOLOOY
IDENTIFICATION &
ASSESSMENT
MILS
KEY 11ECHNOI.OOY
NEEDS
ADVANCED
DEVELOPMENT
ADVANCIEO
DEVELOPMENT
REQUIRED
PROVEN TECHNOLOGY J
IMILAR TO EXISTING
HARDWARE
IL_ PHASE II & C4)
LOW-RISK ¢oml_cT I
AIIOVI[ NASA EFFOf_T I
11ECHNOLOGY
LEVEL | lily INDUSTRY
Ist4ASEII PROJECTS
I I ."' _ '_c'_ I '".
J L°°* I ' ' ' ".
,I i _o_msK I I J I "
! I I _LOWNA_ I I I _o,c_ I t
I _t.., I I I t_ I
',, 1 ._u_. I I ' ' ,I
'"'"..., _ "_ j ..... ,'"
I i AO TECHNOLOGY PLAN
TIUtCK HIOH-gl_ ITEMS
COIIlnNUE MONfTOmNG fltLAIED ,tD _
ASMIT NAIA IN AO TEGHNOLOOYPt,AMI4O
mlECT MLATI[D INDUSTRY _ TOWARD
H[OHJeAYIIACK MIA_
Figure 7-2. Technology Development Plan Logic.
7.2 TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT PLAN
To identify candidate technologies that are critical to the AMLS design and to
select the key technologies that require dedicated AMLS development effort, a set of
criteria were defined and a simple logic process was followed as illustrated in Figure 7-2.
The AMLS key technology needs identified through the technology screening and
assessment process can be divided into two categories:
1. the mature technologies that require no advanced development; this usually
includes existing hardware that is proven and qualified
2. the enhancing technologies that require further advanced development to
insure that unique AMLS mission system/operations requirements and LCC
objectives can be achieved
Using the development risk and NASA technology readiness level (TRL) as the
criteria, the second category of technologies can be further classified into two groups:
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D the evolving technologies which will attain a minimum level of TRL 5 by
the start of the AMLSphase B program. These are considered to be low
risk
2. the technologies that will be below TRL 5 at Phase B are considered to be
high risk
The high risk technologies will require focused program attention to accelerate
their development. Plans to upgrade their technology readiness can be implemented in
the form of special NASA advanced development projects such as Phase B and C/D
contracts and/or special industry research programs.
7.2.1 Technoloev Develonment Reouirements
--v
From the list of technology options presented in Section 7.1, a set of technologies
was identified that reflects the key technology development needs for the AMLS. The 19
specific technologies selected, shown in Table 7-4, fall primarily into six categories:
Materials-- Candidate material that promise significant improvements in thermal
properties, weight, producibility and production costs
Structures - Advances in structure fabrication and manufacturing processes, i.e.
welding and forming techniques for large aluminum-lithium primary structures;
smart structures that permit incorporation of embedded sensors for detection of
dynamic changes in the properties of the material at critical locations of the
airframe, providing intelligence for vehicle structure life cycle/aging prediction,
maintenance and logistics support
Thermal Protection Systems Innovative designs that allow the installation of TPS
tiles by simple mechanical attachments, improving vehicle TPS repairability and
maintenance costs
Reusable Cryogenic Tank Installation -- Major improvements in surface temperature
capability, durability, and repairability
Main Pronulsion System -- SSME derivative engines that have improved life, weight
and margin of performance; engines that are producible at lower costs using
advanced fabrication techniques and materials
-- Technology advancements in electromeehanical maintainability;
advanced sensors and health monitoring systems that improve that vehicle control
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,Tab!e 7-4. Key Technology Development Rec utrements Identified.
Technology Items
Aluminum-Lithium
Graphite-Polyimidc
Graphite-Peck
Titanium Aluminidc
SiC/AI Metal Matrix Composites
C/SiC Ceramic Composite
* Reusable Soft
AI-Li Welding
AI-Li Forming
* Smart Structmcs & Sensors
Thermal Protection Svgtem
* Mcchanically ARachcd TPS Panels
Reusable Cryogenic Tank Insulation
* Encap6ulatod Mid ('NASP)
Main Prooulsion Syl_tem
Low Cost SSME Derivative Engines
Elcc0romechanical or
Elccu'ohydrostatic Actuators
O_t,s, SSTO)
* Health Monitoring System
fl_t,S)
H2/O2 Cryogenic RCS/OMS
(NASP, SSTO)
High Power Dcusity Fuel Cell
0qASP, SSTO)
* Solid State Composite Radiator
* Reusable Main Propulsion Engines
Projected TRL
At Year 2000
8
8
6
6
6
6
6
g
6
6**
6
6
6**
6
Backup Technology
Alternatives
2219 Aluminum
Gr/BMI Or Aluminum
Or/B/VII or Or/Epoxy
Titanium 1100
Titanium
ACC
Foam Maintenance
2219 Aluminum
Aluminum Alloys
Incrcescd Iuspcction
Bonded FRCI Tiles
External Iusulatioo
Rohacell
SOA Engines
'Smart' Hydraulics
SOA Available
Technology
Increased Inspection
Hypcrgolic, Storable
RCS/OMS
Shuttle Fuel Cell
Shuttle Single Phase
Flow-Through Radiator
Improved SSME
Derivative Engine
Impacts
Weight
Weight
Weight, Cost
Weight
Weight
Cost. Durability
Cost, Operations
Reusability
Weight
Weight
Operations,
Logistic.rdMaia ten ante
Durability, Operations
Repairability, LCC
Weight,
Durability,
Maintenance,
Cost` Service Life
Maintenance, LCC
Operations Cost,
Reliability,
Maintenance, LCC
Operations
Maintenance
LCC
Weight` Performance,
Operatious,
Contamination
Weight, Performance
Weight, Complczity,
Reliability, Operations
Weight/Performance
Service Life, LCC
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the complex fluid loop of a conventional heat rejection system thus providing greater
systems operational reliability. - •
The technology readiness level (TRL) attainable for each of the key technologies
by the year 2000 has been estimated based on our conservative assessment of the current
ongoing technology effort and the projections of future planned research programs.
Backup technology alternatives and potential impacts were identified, ff the
development of some of the key technologies cannot meet the AMLS objectives and
schedule requirements.
7.2.2 Advanced Develooment Plans
The AMLS program, according to the current master schedule, will possibly be
preceded by several major related national space programs, such as NLS, NASP, PLS,
and SSTO. Technology development programs for these important initiatives as well as
for commercial and military aircraft will undoubtedly yield significant advancements in
materials, structure fabrication, advanced avionics, and vehicle management systems.
Major improvements in cryogenic H2/O2 on-orbit propulsion system can be achieved
resulting in significantly reduced system mass, longer service life and greater operational
flexibility.
Many oftheseevolvingtechnologieslistedbelow arecriticaltotheAMLS and
willbe closelymonitoredinsupportofthenextphaseofAMLS designanalysesand
trade studies:
Low cost reusable SSME derivative engine
Advanced Avionics
Cryogenic H2/O2 RCS/OMS
Electromechanical/Electrohydrostatic actuator (EMA/EHA)
High power density fuel cells
Intelligent, autonomous vehicle management system (VMS)
Besides these items, nine specific technologies driven primarily by the unique
AMLS program schedules and system level design requirements have been identified and
are recommended for advanced development. Technology development plans for these
nine technologies have been generated and presented in Tables %5 through 7-13.
These plans show the schedules necessary to bring the respective technology to
proper level of maturity to meet the AMLS program requirements. Technology issues to
be addressed in the development process are identified. ROM cost estimates for the
development program and funding profiles for these nine technologies are also presented.
Three types of funding are identified: Industry IR&D, Advanced Development Projects,
and Technology Contracts. The funding types represent progression from initial concept
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development and testing through verification of readiness to apply the concept to the
AMLS. In this sense, readiness means the ability to manufacture cost-effectively.
Brief descriptions of the nine technology development plans are presented below:
Reusable Spray On Foam Insulation (SOFI) Reusable SOFI is a major insulation
material baselined for the AMLS booster cryogenic tank design. Successful development
and validation of this technology are critical for the AMLS. The technology
development program, as shown in Table 7-5, will require approximately four and a half
years.
Table 7-5. Reusable SOFI.
POAM _N DI_¢_
LT-_:_-:.
• THIEflMAL lEVY
• IdOIS11UIRE PEIMJEAltON
• INs/qECTION
• REUSE/THF.RMAL CYCUNG
• IIIEPJWqABIUTY
(_ Te_M_logy flmdtn_e Lmml N
cY
Existing non-
fluorocarbon foam
materials will be
evaluated for strength,
adherence and durability.
Surface coatings will be
evaluated, including
integral, reinforced and
bonded skins, and
suitable concepts will be
selected for
development. Prototype
foam systems will be
tested under severe
environmental
conditions to assure
maturity of the selected
approach.
Smart Structures Smart structure technology relies on the development of highly
accurate micro-sensors that can be produced in quantity at extremely low costs.
Advanced sensors that are in early concept validation stages, include fiber optic,
electromagnetic/dielectric, and acoustic sensors. These tiny sensing devices, either
materially imbedded or bonded to structures at critical locations as point or array sensors,
can monitor the changes of the structure strain field and dynamic vibration spectra that
can be interpreted by inversion to identify shifts in structure integrity and strength.
High speed, high capacity data processing computing hardware and software must
be developed. Networking techniques, such as frequency, wavelength or time division
multiplexing and matrix addressing, which enable simultaneous operation of many
sensors with a minimum of opto-electric and microprocessor hardware and structural
invasiveness are essential part of the technology development.
The technology plan Table 7-6, shows that this important technology can be
brought to a NASA technology level 6 of maturity by the year 2000 by implementing an
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Table7-6. Smart Structures.
i
___ I)EAtGN EVALUATION • eSLEC510N
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opticsensorisalsoincluded.
energetic research
program supported by
the government, the
aerospace industry, and
academic research
communities.
A sketch
showing a typical fiber
opticsensor embedded
at critical locations in a
structure and associated
electronic signal
processing equipment is
presented in Figure 7-3.
A brief description of
the principle of
operation of the fiber
Mechanically Attached TPS The technique of using mechanical means to install
the TPS on the su'ucture instead of the conventional bonding process is still in very early
stages of development. Many complex technology issues, e.g., gap seal design and
subsurface flow effects have not been addressed.
A significant (8 year) technology program was envisioned as shown in Table 7-7
is needed to vafidate this approach. The technology program will include design of an
integrated TPS panel/fastening system. Materials for the high-temperature fasteners will
be evaluated. Prototype panels will be fabricated and tested under realistic thermal
conditions to verify the concept. Prototype TPS system panels will be built to
incorporate gap seals and flow barriers.
to validate the design.
Environmental testing will be
conductedtoassuresuccessful
service application of the
mechanically attached TPS
concept.
Encapsulated MLI Significant
progress on this unique and
innovative cryogenic tank
insulation system was made during
the early NASP technology
maturation program. Prototype
panels demonstratedoutstanding
thermalperformance
Wind Tunnel and flight tests will be conducted
FIBER OPTIC RF DIFFERENTIAL STRAIN4)EFECT MONITORING
Iil_ m PUT Im'O $ M_ll_
Figure 7-3. Smart Sensors for Life and
Maintenance Monitoring.
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Mechanically Attached TPS.
TIPS ATI"ACI41MIENT
CQNCIEPT V£NBCAI'GH _q_
(_
TIE_4NOLC_y I_SJ-J_S:
• ATTACHMENT I_EIMGN
• Jn'ACHMENT MATERIALS
• _ P SEA L_:igJI MFACI[ PILOW
• OXJ_t'I_OW REI_JTAHCE
• IACT/Em RI[mlIT_NCE
(_) Tecl_nelogy II_a411mmeLev_ N
I ,"1 _1 _1 _1 =el _1 _1 I I ,o,_ _ _
characteristics,
especially at extremely
high (1500 degree F)
temperatures.
Additional development
work, as shown in the
Table 7-8, is required to
validate the MLI concept
for long-term repeated
USe.
New lighter-
weight materialswillbe
Selectedforthe
aluminum tank
application.Concepts
forattachingthe
insulatingpanelsand for
Sealingtheirjointswillbe developed. System components thatincorporatetheSedetails
as well as insulationof major internalframes and stiffnesswillbe developed. The
system willbe verifiedina sub-scalecryogenic tank test.Demonstration testingwill
includethermal cyclingtocryogenic temperaturesand environmental effectsdue to
maximum temperatures,acousticvibrationand structuralflexure.
A schematic showing the MLI installed insidethe cryogenic tank structureis
preSentedinFigure 7-4. The internalstructureof themetal-cover-encapsulatedMLI is
illustratedinthe crosssectionaldiagram.
Heath
Monitorine System To
improve the
effectiveness and safety
of the vehicle flight
control and autonomous
operations, AMLS will
require advancements in
avionics system
architecture design and
in sophistication of data
processing, health
monitoring, failure
detection, diagnostic and
prognostic capability and
reconfiguration
management.
Table 7-8. Encapsulated MLI.
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Figure 7-4. Internal Encapsulated Multi-
Layer Insulation (MLI) Concept.
Recent advancements in
sensor technologies have
signifrcantly enhanced the
capability and effectiveness of
health monitoring system. On the
basis of the status information of
the current ongoing related
technology programs, it is
envisioned that a health monitoring
system program for the AMLS as
shown in Table 7-9 is warranted.
As illustrated in Figure 7-5,
HMS is a versatile concept that can be applied to all phases of the AMLS vehicle life. It
can be used in every aspect of the vehicle fabrication, test, and verification process. It
plays the most significant role in vehicle operations. Safety monitoring will increase
system reliability. Maintenance monitoring will reduce logistics costs.
SolidStateComnositeRadiatorThe use ofhighconductancematerials,e.g.,
graphitefibercomposite,forconstructionfa spaceradiatorisan emergingtechnology.
Iteliminatesthecomplexityofthefluidloopsof theconventionalstate-of-the-art
radiatorsand increasesignificantlythereliabilityofthesystem.A comparisonofthe
systemcharacteristicsofthevarioustypesofradiatorconceptsisshown inFigure7-6.
Early laboratory experiments, conducted by Research Opportunities Inc., for the
U.S Navy, usinghighconductivitycarbonfibersembedded ina compositepanelhave
demonstmmd theviabilityand effectivenessoftheradiatorconcept.Successful
developmentof thistechnologyisdeemed importantfortheAMLS. The proposed
technologydevelopment
program isshown in
Table7-I0.
ProoulsionEnaines The
technologyplans
presentedinTables7-11
through7-13 reflectsthe
threecritical
developmentactivities
relatedspecificallytothe
SSME derivative
engines.These
programs will produce
generic technologies
deemed essential for the
AMLS main propulsion
Table 7-9. Health Monitoring System.
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Figure7-5. HMS Applied in All Phasesof Vehicle
CycleLife.
engine design and development.
The technology issues that will be
addressed specifically in these
plans include:
AMLS - SSME with reduced
weight
SSME derivative for increased
margin
SSME with producibility
improvements
These programs are aimed
at obtaining significant
improvements in SSME reliability and life/performance margins. Substantial reduction
in engine production costs is also being sought through the use of advanced materials and
simplification of fabrication techniques and testing processes.
The National Launch System (NLS) program, managed jointly by NASA and
U.S. Air Force, will have a major main propulsion engine technology development
effort. It has been indicated that a national consortium of rocket propulsion companies
will be assembled to perform this research and development project. Major technical
emphasis of the project, known as the Space Transportation Main Engine (STME)
program, is being placed on the development of an advanced high thrust, low chamber
pressure, low cost engine that has inherent design characteristics of high reliability and
safety. All these performance features are consistent with the AMLS main engine design
requirements. Our technology assessments show that reusability appears to be a
requirement
especially important
for the AMLS
engine.
Nevertheless,
generic technologies
derived from the
STME program can
serve as a basis upon
which a cost
effective reusable
AMLS main engine
technology
development
program can be
further evolved.
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Table 7-10. Solid State Composite Radiator.
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Table 7-12. SSME Derivative for Increased Margin.
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